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I. INTRODUCTION
The fifty years since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights have seen a revolution in the promulgation and universalization
of human and labor rights. Human rights conventions have proliferated in the
areas of civil and political rights, social and economic rights, and the rights of
women, children, minorities, and refugees. Many of these conventions have
been ratified by a majority of the nations of the world. International
monitoring of human and labor rights compliance is conducted by
international institutions such as the U.N. Human Rights Commission and the
International Labour Organization (ILO), by regional entities such as the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, by non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International, and by national governments. Since the end of the Cold War,
significant steps toward international judicial enforcement have been made
through the development of regional courts such as the European and Inter-
American Courts of Human Rights, through the creation of the International
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR),
and through the 1998 agreement to establish a Permanent International
Criminal Court. Peacekeeping efforts such as that of the United Nations in
East Timor and the military intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty
Norm Internalization and Economic Sanctions
Organization (NATO) in Kosovo also have been motivated substantially by
human rights concerns. The ICTY's indictment last year of Slobodan
Milosevic, a sitting head of state, was a striking pronouncement of the extent
to which international human rights enforcement mechanisms have developed.
Despite significant progress in the identification, definition, and
promulgation of human and labor rights norms, however, international
mechanisms for their enforcement remain underdeveloped. International
monitoring bodies lack enforcement authority and rely substantially on the
"mobilization of shame" to encourage governments to comply with
international norms. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) remains limited
in its effectiveness, and the restricted jurisdiction of the Rwanda and
Yugoslavia war crimes tribunals, and the United States' refusal to join the
International Criminal Court, indicate that effective international judicial
enforcement for even the most fundamental human rights violations such as
genocide, torture, and crimes against humanity may be years away. There is,
to date, no international institution capable of holding individuals such as the
late Pol Pot, General Pinochet, and "Baby Doc" Duvalier accountable for even
the most basic human rights violations. Nor do any international enforcement
mechanisms exist to reach nations and private corporations that utilize forced
labor, murder labor organizers, or engage in other fundamental violations of
international labor rights.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World
Trade Organization (WTO) have consolidated an international free trade
regime, but multilateral efforts to use international trade to encourage
compliance with labor and human rights norms have been consistently
rejected by developing countries, which criticize such efforts as protectionist
and imperialist. Regional trade regimes such as the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union (EU) have proven more
receptive to incorporating labor and environmental concerns into their trading
systems. With the notable exception of the EU, however, enforcement
mechanisms in regional trade regimes also remain weak.
In light of the limited possibilities for multilateral enforcement of
international norms, domestic law mechanisms for this purpose have become
increasingly important. The past several decades have seen significant
progress in the internalization of fundamental human rights into the domestic
law and practices of states.' The 1999 arrest of Pinochet in the United
Kingdom on a Spanish extradition request may be the most striking recent
example, but it is by no means the only case in which domestic legal
structures have been mobilized to redress fundamental rights violations
committed in foreign jurisdictions.2 In the United States, victims of human
1. See generally ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC COURTS
(Benedetto Conforti & Francesco Francioni eds., 1997) (discussing the domestic application of
international human rights law in various countries' courts).
2. Recent domestic efforts to hold government officials accountable for international human
rights violations committed abroad include Senegal's prosecution of former President Hissen Habre of
Chad on torture charges, More "Pinochet Style" Prosecutions Urged Rights Watch, AFRICA NEWS
SERVICE, Mar. 6,2000,2000 WL 15974406, Belgium's recent indictment of Congolese foreign minister
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rights atrocities abroad have filed civil suits under the Alien Tort Claims Act
for violations of the law of nations by former government officials and private
corporations. 3 Congress's 1996 repeal of foreign sovereign immunity for
designated state sponsors of terrorism has exposed certain states to civil
liability for, inter alia, core international law violations.4 Sub-national and
private efforts such as consumer boycotts, labeling schemes that enable
consumers to identify products made using socially responsible methods, and
the development of voluntary corporate codes of conduct have sought to
harness consumer market power to encourage compliance by private industry
with human and labor rights. All of these efforts contribute to the
development of a multi-tiered enforcement structure for the global human
rights regime.
"Unilateral" economic sanctions, or sanctions imposed without express
regional or multilateral authorization, 5 have become one common domestic
enforcement mechanism to encourage foreign states to comply with
international norms. Western states traditionally have resorted to restrictions
on foreign assistance and trade benefits to promote a range of social goals,
although the United States has been by far the most active player in this 
area. 6
Unilateral sanctions by the United States have taken a variety of forms, from
general statutes conditioning foreign assistance and trade preferences on
compliance with certain human and labor rights standards, to statutes that
Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndomasi for crimes against humanity and war crimes, Human Rights Watch
Endorses Belgian Warrant Against DRC Minister, AFRICA NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 17,2000,
2000 WL 29192967, and the Netherlands' investigation ofDesi Bouterse, former military dictator of
Suriname, for crimes against humanity, Marlise Simons, Dutch Court Orders an Investigation of '82
Killings in Suriname, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26,2000, § 1, at 12.
3. Sarah Cleveland, Global Labor Rights and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 76 TEX. L. REV.
1533, 1561-66 (1998) (discussing litigation under the ATCA).
4. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 221,
110 Stat. 1214 (1997) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2000)), waived the foreign sovereign
immunity of countries designated as sponsors of terrorism for damage claims based on acts of torture,
extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, and hostage taking. The waiver was limited in 1997 to claims by
U.S. nationals. Pub. L. No. 105-11, 111 Stat. 22 (1997). States currently subject to the waiver are Iran,
Iraq, Libya, Cuba, Sudan, Syria, and North Korea. See generally Joseph W. Glannon & Jeffrey Atik,
Politics and Personal Jurisdiction: Suing State Sponsors of Terrorism Under the 1996 Amendments to
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 87 GEo. L.J. 675 (1999) (discussing the effects of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act waiver on litigation).
5. For the purposes of this Article, the term "unilateral" refers to action by individual states
which is not taken pursuant to the mandate of a regional or international organization. The term does not
preclude the possibility that other states may also act unilaterally to support the same goals, as in the
case of sanctions against Burma, described infra Part I. "Regional" action refers to measures taken by
states pursuant to the authorization of a regional entity such as the Organization of American States
(OAS), the European Union, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), or NATO.
"Multilateral" measures refer to those adopted or authorized by the United Nations, the World Bank, or
other authoritative multilateral bodies.
6. A study of sanctions imposed in the post-World War II era indicated that of 119 cases
studied between World War II and 1990, thirty-nine involved only foreign states, seventeen involved the
United States and other states or international actors, and sixty-three involved sanctions imposed only by
the United States. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 16-27 (2d ed.
1990).
Norm Internalization and Economic Sanctions
target specific countries deemed to be rights abusers. Recent U.S. legislation
such as the Helms-Burton Act regarding Cuba controversially extends U.S.
sanctions to third parties doing business with the target state. States and
municipalities also have adopted selective purchasing laws to promote
fundamental rights, such as the Massachusetts statute targeting Burma.
Unilateral economic sanctions serve a range of purposes, including
punishing a regime for past wrongdoing and improving future compliance.
Governments may use sanctions to publicly distance themselves and their
private enterprises from noncompliant states and to encourage other states to
respect the normative principles of the international community. In the context
of international trade, labor rights sanctions may also constitute valid
retaliation for unfair trade practices. Trade sanctions targeting goods produced
with forced or prison labor, for example, are intended both to punish human
rights violations and to prevent companies from gaining an improper
competitive advantage in international markets through violations of
fundamental rights.7
Economic sanctions are an important weapon in transnational efforts to
promote respect for fundamental rights and can have substantial behavior-
modifying potential. Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott's comprehensive study
of sanctions in the post-World War II era found U.S. sanctions to be effective
in promoting human rights in Brazil between 1977 and 1984,8 in Idi Amin's
Uganda,9 and in Somoza's Nicaragua.10 Sanctions are acknowledged to have
played a role in dismantling the apartheid regime in South Africa.'" In more
recent examples, the U.S. Congress' consideration of economic sanctions
against Burma in 1995 partially prompted that government's release of pro-
democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi from her six-year house arrest.' In
1998, Colombia disbanded its notorious Twentieth Intelligence Brigade in
response to political pressure and aid restrictions from the United States. 13
And the threat of sanctions from Western trading partners may have
7. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, EMPLOYMENT
AND LABOUR STANDARDS: A STUDY OF CORE WORKERS' RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 11-12
(1996) [hereinafter OECD STUDY].
S. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: SUPPLEMENTAL
CASE HISTORIES 463-66 (2d ed. 1990). Applying a fairly stringent interpretation of sanctions'
effectiveness, the authors concluded that unilateral sanctions imposed since World War In had had a
success rate of about thirty-six percenL HUFBAUER ET AL, supra note 6, at 91. In his study of U.S.
sanctions, Barry Carter concludes that sanctions for human rights purposes have a success rate of forty
percent. BARRY E. CARTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: IMPROVING THE HAPHAZARD U.S.
LEGAL REGIME 233 (1988).
9. HUFBAUER ET AL., SUPPLEMENTAL CASE HISTORIES, supra note 8, at 330-33.
10. Id. at 552-56.
11. See generally How SANCTIONS WORK: LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA 264 (Neta C.
Crawford & Audie Klotz eds., 1999) (concluding that economic sanctions undermined the apartheid
regime, while also having some counterproductive effects); HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 6, at 248
(concluding that U.S. sanctions contributed modestly to the 1990 reforms adopted by Prime Minister F.
W. de Klerk).
12. Moving Myanmar, ECONOMIST, July 22, 1995, at 17.
13. Arturo Carrillo-Suarez, Hors de Logique: Contemporary Issues in International
Humanitarian Law as Applied to Internal Armed Conflict, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1, 133 (1999).
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encouraged Chile's right-wing elite to tolerate, however unhappily, the current
criminal proceedings against members of the Pinochet 
regime.
The use of restrictions on economic assistance and trade to promote
international human and labor rights, however, may conflict with other
fundamental values of the global community. Critics of unilateral sanctions
have argued that economic intervention in the affairs of foreign states-and
particularly extraterritorial measures that target third parties-violate public
international law principles of nonintervention and territorial jurisdiction.
Unilateral trade restrictions may also conflict with GATT trade liberalization
principles, a view that finds support in recent WTO rulings. Selective
unilateral action-particularly by the United States-also has been criticized
as hypocritical conduct that undermines, rather than promotes, efforts to
develop the international human rights regime. Finally, critics who focus
narrowly on the ability of sanctions to alter a foreign state's behavior
condemn sanctions as ineffective measures which merely entrench foreign
leaders and cripple U.S. industry in the global marketplace.
Economic sanctions, however, play a broader role in the development of
the international system than merely seeking to alter a specific state's
behavior. In his writings on transnational legal process, Harold Koh has
argued that norm internalization-the process by which nations incorporate
international law concepts into their domestic practice-is a critical element in
determining why nations obey international law. According to Koh, this
process occurs through repeated interactions between states and a variety of
domestic and transnational actors, which produce interpretations of applicable
global norms and ultimately the internalization of those norms into states'
domestic values and processes.15 Rather than focusing narrowly on punitive
interactions between states, Koh sees "repeated participation in transnational
legal process" as the key factor in the move "from one-time grudging
compliance" with international norms "to habitual internalized 
obedience."' 6
Repeated interactions between states and a wide range of transnational actors
accordingly become the process by which norms created by international
society are clarified and become enmeshed into domestic society.
17 "To the
extent that those norms are successfully internalized, they become future
determinants of why nations obey."
18
This Article argues that economic sanctions have an importance beyond
their classical role in seeking to punish and alter a foreign state's behavior-
that of assisting in the international definition, promulgation, recognition, and
domestic internalization of human rights norms. If, as Professors Myres
14. Tina Rosenberg, The Precarious Nature of Latin Democracies, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 27,
2000, § 4, at 16.
15. Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599,
2646 (1997).
16. Id. at 2655.
17. Id. at 2651.
18. Id.
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McDougal and W. Michael Reisman contend, the creation and existence of an
international norm can be discerned through the responses of various actors in
the international community to an alleged breach, 19 the imposition of
unilateral sanctions by states contributes to the development and identification
of international rules. Economic sanctions also contribute to the process of
norm definition and internalization on various levels. Santions contribute to
domestic internalization by incorporating attention to human rights concerns
into the political processes of the sanctioning state. They also contribute to
transnational internalization by the broader international community by
attracting foreign attention to human rights concerns and generating
multilateral pressure on the target state. Unilateral action thus can contribute
importantly to the definition and incorporation of rights into the international
system. In order to promote norm internalization, however, economic
sanctions must also be consistent with broader principles of the international
community, such as principles of international jurisdiction, nonintervention,
and free trade, and must positively contribute to the development of the global
human rights system, rather than compete with or undermine the development
of this system.
This Article examines the role of U.S. unilateral sanctions in promoting
norm definition and internalization and advancing respect for the international
human rights system. Part II examines the case of Burma to place U.S.
unilateralism in the context of transnational efforts to compel compliance with
fundamental human rights norms. Part m identifies the core human and labor
rights implicated by U.S. sanctions, while Part IV considers the major
statutory and regulatory programs in the United States that link economic
sanctions to human rights. Part V considers the major international law
concerns raised by U.S. unilateralism, Part VI discusses the process of norm
internalization spurred by unilateral sanctions, and Part VII concludes by
examining the contribution of U.S. practice to human rights development. The
Article argues that while some U.S. unilateral measures are problematic and
subject to abuse, those that are consistent with international law and that
promote recognized human rights standards play an important and legitimate
part in transnational legal process and the promulgation and internalization of
fundamental human rights.
II. TRANSNATIONAL COMPLEMENTARITY: THE CASE OF BURMA
Sanctions by the United States are unilateral in the sense that they are
not imposed at the request of a regional or international institution. But the
United States does not act alone in employing aid and trade restrictions to
19. Arthur M. Weisburd, The Effect of Treaties and Other Formal International Acts on the
Customary Law of Human Rights, 25 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 99, 100 (1995-96) ("If violation of a
putative rule is met with coercion from such persons, it is at least possible that the putative rule is in fact
a rule of the system. Conversely, if the system's authorities do not react to violations of a putative rule,
its status as a rule is doubtful.").
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promote international rights. Instead, U.S. sanctions practices form part of a
broad network of decentralized but concerted transnational efforts to define,
transfer, and implement international human and labor rights.20 These efforts
are conducted by a range of transnational actors, including U.N. bodies,
international organizations, regional regimes, national and sub-national
governments, private corporations, unions, religious groups, journalists,
consumer advocates, and NGOs. These transnational actors utilize a range of
instruments, including review in international, regional and domestic courts;
monitoring, site visits and oversight; granting and withholding of diplomatic
relations and membership in regional associations; economic assistance, trade
benefits and sanctions, national and international prizes; corporate codes of
conduct; and consumer boycotts. While apparently ad hoc when viewed in
isolation, these dynamic and complementary activities coalesce into an
evolving web of international efforts to promote universal rights compliance.
This Section examines sanctions against Burma (Myamar) as the most
distinctive contemporary example of this transnational enforcement effort.
Burma became the object of international condemnation in 1988 when
its military government, the State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC),21 violently suppressed pro-democracy efforts and later nullified the
results of the 1990 national election. Over the past decade, the governing
military junta has severely suppressed political protest in the country, placing
pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi under a six-year house arrest and
continuing to restrict her right to travel, detaining or deporting pro-democracy
advocates, closing public universities, and barring Internet access. The
government has made widespread use of forced labor for military porters and
building infrastructure projects, has forcibly relocated thousands of civilians,
and has committed other gross human rights abuses in its violent suppression
of the country's various ethnic groups. Approximately 260,000 Muslim
refugees fled to Bangladesh to escape religious persecution in Burma in 1991-
92, and over 100,000 refugees similarly have fled to Thailand to escape
political oppression and violence against ethnic insurgents. Wages for
ordinary laborers average around fifty cents per day, child labor is rampant,
20. As McDougal and Reisman have observed, international law is created through a
"staggering[ly]" diverse process of communication within the global community:
The peoples of the world communicate to each other expectations about policy, authority,
and control, not merely through state or intergovernmental organs, but through reciprocal
claims and mutual tolerances in all their interactions. The participants in the relevant
processes of communication, . . . include not merely the officials of states and
intergovernmental organizations but also the representatives of political parties, pressure
groups, private associations, and the individual human being qua individual with all his
or her identifications.
Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, The Prescribing Function: How International Law Is
Made, 6 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 249 (1980), reprinted in MYRES S. McDOUGAL & W. MICHAEL
REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIvE: THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE WORLD
COMMUNITY 84 (1981).
21. The military government recently changed its name from SLORC to the State Peace and
Development Council (SPDC).
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and the government has made no effort to stem the sale of women into the
Thai sex trades. Thus, in addition to deposing a democratically elected
government, the state has violated fundamental norms regarding torture,
summary execution, arbitrary detention, religious discrimination, and forced
and child labor. Burma, nevertheless, is party to a number of major human
rights instruments, including the Genocide Convention, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention
on the Rights of the Child, and the ILO's Forced Labour Convention and
Convention on the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organize.22
Prior to 1988, Burma had pursued a thirty-year long policy of economic
isolation, and few Western states at that time had substantial economic
interests in the country. The country is extremely rich in natural resources,
particularly gems, teak wood, and oil. Burma also has an active illegal drug
trade and is reportedly the world's second largest producer of opium and
heroin, after Afghanistan.23 The events of 1988 to 1990, and the government's
continuing participation in widespread human rights abuses, however, have
focused a range of international, regional, state, municipal, and non-
governmental efforts on condemning the actions of the Burmese military
regime. The United States has been a leader in this area, and unilateral
measures adopted by the United States have helped marshal the transnational
response. Sanctions and other measures by the United States have played an
important role in focusing international attention on human rights violations in
Burma and in garnering support for a wide range of transnational measures
condemning these actions.
A. The U.S. Response
Following the SLORC's violent actions against pro-democracy groups
in 1988, the United States suspended anti-narcotics assistance to Burma and
minimized high level diplomatic contacts with the government. The United
States also imposed a de facto embargo on arms sales and attempted to
discourage other states from selling weapons to Burma.24 In 1989, the United
States suspended twelve million dollars in aid25 and encouraged other
countries (especially Japan, Burma's largest donor) to suspend aid as well. 26
In addition, the United States indefinitely suspended Burma's preferred
trading status in 1989 due to the country's labor rights violations.2 7 In 1990,
the United States adopted legislation requiring the President to "impose such
22. For a discussion of these Conventions, see infra, Section III.A.
23. Growing Threat from Burma, INT'L HERALD-TRIB., Mar. 17,2000, at 6.
24. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1990, at 262 (1989) [hereinafter HRW WORLD
REPORT 1990]; see also 22 C.F.R. § 126.1(a) (2000) (prohibiting arms sales to Bumia).
25. Steven Erlanger, Burma Becomes a Test Case in Human Rights Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
15, 1989, § 4, at 5.
26. HRW WORLD REPORT 1990, supra note 24, at 262.
27. Proclamation No. 6245, 3 C.F.R. 7, 7-9 (1992), reprinted in 105 Stat. 2484, 2484-86
(1991); Proclamation No. 5955, 3 C.F.R. 29, 29-31 (1990), reprinted in 103 Stat. 3010, 3011-13 (1989).
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economic sanctions upon Burma as the President determines to be
appropriate" if Burma's rulers failed to transfer the government to civilian
authority and to take other democratizing measures. 28 The Act also requested
the President to "confer with other industrialized democracies in order to
reach cooperative agreements to impose sanctions against Burma."
29 The
United States declined to appoint a new ambassador to Burma in 1990 and
since then has limited diplomatic relations with the country to a charge
d'affaires.3° Pursuant to the sanctions legislation, the United States decided in
1991 not to renew a lapsed bilateral textile agreement with Burma. 31 In 1993,
the United States reduced a $40 million grant to $18 million,32 and the United
States prohibited use of its $7 million contribution to the U.N. Development
Program (UNDP) for projects that would benefit the SLORC. 33 In 1995,
however, the Clinton administration renewed anti-narcotics assistance to
Burma and agreed to provide in-country training for SLORC anti-narcotics
agencies-contradicting earlier statements that U.S. assistance would not
increase until greater improvements in human rights conditions were 
made.34
Throughout the early and mid-1990s, the United States worked to
encourage international opposition to the Burmese regime. The United States
actively supported a U.N. Human Rights Commission resolution regarding
human rights conditions in Burma, endorsed ongoing U.N. diplomatic
efforts, and pressed for appointment of a U.N. special envoy 
to Burma.3 6
Efforts to encourage individual states to adopt restrictions on foreign
assistance and arms sales and to limit diplomatic relations and Burma's
participation in ASEAN, however, were hindered in part by Western industrial
states' low levels of trade and assistance to the country, by the willingness of
certain Asian nations to trade with Burma, and by U.S. reluctance to confront
China on the issue. In 1996, increased repression of democracy leaders and
pending sanctions legislation in Congress spurred a mission of U.S. envoys to
Asian states, producing an agreement by Japan to coordinate future policy
towards Burma with the United States.
37
28. Customs and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-382, § 138, 104 Stat. 629,653 (1990).
29. Id. § 138(a)(2).
30. HRW WORLD REPORT 1990, supra note 24, at 263.
31. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1992, at 351 (1991).
32. Steven A. Holmes, U.S. is Criticized on Burmese Policy, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1993, at
All.
33. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1994, at 148 (1993); see also 22 U.S.C. §
2227(a) (1994) (barring the use of U.S. aid to international organizations for programs in Burma).
34. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1996, 134 (1995) [hereinafter HRW WORLD
REPORT 1996].
35. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1993, at 155-56 (1992) [hereinafter HRW
WORLD REPORT 1993].
36. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1995, 135 (1994) [hereinafter HRW WORLD
REPORT 1995].
37. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1997, 143 (1996) [hereinafter HRW WORLD
REPORT 1997].
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In 1996, Congress imposed a variety of mandatory sanctions against
Burma for human rights violations, including prohibiting foreign aid other
than humanitarian and anti-drug trafficking aid, denying U.S. entry visas to
Burmese officials and directing U.S. representatives to oppose financial
assistance to Burma in international financial institutions such as the World
Bank.38 The Act further authorized the President to bar new investment in
Burma by U.S. nationals if the President found that Burma had acted against
Aung San Suu Kyi, or had committed "large-scale repression" or violence
against the democratic opposition. The President could terminate the sanctions
upon finding that "Burma has made measurable and substantial progress in
improving human rights practices and implementing democratic
government ' 39 and could waive the Act's provisions upon a finding that
sanctions "would be contrary to the national security interests of the United
States.,40 The Act finally required the President to develop "a comprehensive
multilateral strategy" to improve human rights practices in Burma, and to
report to Congress twice a year on Burma's progress toward democracy and
human rights.
The visa restrictions went into effect immediately,42 and in 1997
President Clinton exercised his authority under the Burma statute to prohibit
new U.S. investment in Burma by U.S. nationals. 43 Clinton noted that the
United States would be carefully watching the conclusions of the U.N. Special
Rapporteur and the U.N. Secretary General regarding Burma, and called on
the regime "to cooperate fully with those two important U.N. initiatives."
44
Although in early 1998 the U.S. gave $3 million toward a U.N. crop
substitution program in the Shan State, the U.S. later decertified Burma from
anti-narcotics assistance.45 In 1998, at the direction of Congress, the U.S.
Department of Labor issued a lengthy report on forced labor practices in
Burma.46 President Clinton has continued the sanctions against Burma to the
present date.47
38. 1997 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570, 110 Stat.
3009-166 (1996). The statute is referred to in the text as the Federal Burma Statute.
39. Id. § 570(a).
40. Id. § 570(e).
41. Id. § 570(c) and (d).
42. Proclamation No. 6925, 3 C.F.R. 74 (1997) (suspending visas).
43. Exec. Order No. 13,047, 3 C.F.R. 202 (1998), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000); see
also Steven Erlanger, Clinton Approves New US. Sanctions Against Burmese, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22,
1997, at Al.
44. Letter from President Clinton to Congress Transmitting Exec. Order No. 13,047, at
http://infoserve2.ita.doe.gov/apweb.nsf (May 20, 1997) (on file with The Yale Journal of International
Law).
45. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1999, at 169 (1998), available at
http:llwww.hrw.orglhnv/vorldreport (last visited Mar. 7, 2000) [hereinafter HRW WORLD REPORT
1999].
46. U.S. Dep't. of Labor, Bureau of Int'l Labor Affairs, Report on Labor Practices in Burma,
at http:lvwwv.dol.gov/dol/ilib/publiclmedialreportlofrburmalmain.htm (Sept. 1998) (on file with The
Yale Journal of International Law).
47. Notice of the President, 65 Fed. Reg. 32,005 (May 18, 2000); Notice of the President, 64
Fed. Reg. 27,443 (May 18, 1999); Notice of the President, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,661 (May 18, 1998).
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Burma has also been the country most targeted by U.S. state and local
government procurement laws. In 1996, prior to the adoption of the Federal
Burma Statute, Massachusetts adopted a law prohibiting state and local
governments from entering into procurement contracts or otherwise doing
business with Burma.48 Similar selective purchasing laws against Burma have
been adopted by more than two dozen states and localities, including
Vermont, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and New York City.49 Most reflect a
desire, as set forth in the measure adopted by the City of Berkeley, California,
"to promote universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,
[and to] recognize the responsibility of local communities to take positive
steps to support the rule of law and to help end injustices and egregious
violations of human rights wherever they may occur." 50 The measures have
had an effect on corporate practices: Motorola closed its office in Burma
partially due to a San Francisco ordinance,51 and Apple Computer withdrew
its Burma operations in response to the Massachusetts statute.
52
B. International Responses
Encouraged in part by U.S. measures, the international community has
responded to Burma's human rights abuses with widespread denunciations.
Both the U.N. General Assembly and the Human Rights Commission
repeatedly have adopted annual resolutions condemning Burma's human
rights practices.5 3 The Human Rights Commission appointed a special
48. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, § 22 H(a), J(a) (West 2000) ("A state agency, a state
authority, the house of representatives or the state senate may not procure goods or services from...
any persons currently doing business with Burma (Myanmar)."). The law is referred to in the text as the
Massachusetts Burma Statute. It has since been invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court. See the
discussion infra note 363 and accompanying text.
49. The Organization for International Investment, a business group which lobbies against
trade sanctions, maintains a website cataloguing current local selective purchasing measures.
ORGANIZATION FOR INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, STATE AND MUNICIPAL SANCTIONS REPORT, at
http://wvwv.ofii.orgissues/sanction.asp (visited Oct. 2, 2000) [hereinafter OFII Report] (on file with The
Yale Journal of International Law).
50. The City of Berkeley, California, was the first municipality to enact a Burma selective
purchasing law. The Berkeley Resolution bars contracts for services or commodities with companies
doing business with Burma "until the City Council determines that the people of Burma have become
self-governing." Berkeley, Cal. Resolution No. 57,881-N.S., IflB and IVB (Feb. 28, 1995), cited in
David Schmahmann & James Finch, The Unconstitutionality of State and Local Enactments in the
United States Restricting Business Ties with Burma, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175, 180 n.13 (1997).
51. Leslie Goldberg, Motorola Gets Out of Burma, Into City: Firm's Closing of Office Likely
To Net It $40 million S.F. Radio Contract," S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 6, 1996, at Al.
52. Frank Phillips, Apple Cites Mass. Law in Burma Decision, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 4, 1996,
at B6 (indicating that Apple was discontinuing computer sales to Burma in response to the
Massachusetts law).
53. E.g., Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, G.A. Res. 53/162, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess.,
85 mtg., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/162 (1998); see also Situation of Human Rights in
Myanmar, Commission on Human Rights Res. 1999/17, U.N. ESCOR, 52d mtg., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/RES/1999/17 (1999), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda (last visited Nov. 27,2000).
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rapporteur to Burma in 199254 and has extended the rapporteur's mandate
through 2000.55 In 1992, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) awarded Aung San Suu Kyi the Simon
Bolivar Prize for contributing to "freedom, independence and dignity of
peoples and to the strengthening of a new international, economic, social, and
cultural order."56 The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees has been
involved in monitoring refugee conditions on both the Thai and Bangladesh
borders, and in 1998, the International Red Cross closed its office in Burma
due to lack of access to Burma's prisons.
The ILO repeatedly has expressed concern regarding labor abuses in
Burma and in 1997 appointed a commission of inquiry to investigate Burma's
forced labor practices, an extraordinary step that the ILO previously had taken
against only nine countries.57 The Commission's 1998 report found pervasive
use of forced labor in Burma, often accompanied by beatings, torture, rape,
and murder and particularly targeting ethnic minorities.58 The ILO report
requested that the Burmese government adopt certain reforms if it wished to
remain an ILO member in good standing, and when Burma failed to comply,
the ILO effectively expelled the country from the organization, prohibiting
any further participation in ILO activities and barring ILO technical
assistance.59 The ILO has indicated that the ban will continue until Burma
ceases using forced labor and implements the ILO recommendations.
In 1998, the World Bank suspended international assistance to Burma
following the crackdown on democracy. That policy remained in place
through 1999, when the U.N. and the World Bank pursued discussions with
Burma regarding the possible incremental restoration of aid to the country in
exchange for improved human rights conditions and democratization.
60
54. Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Commission on Human Rights Res. 1992/58,
48th Sess., 52d mtg., Supp. No. 2, at 136, U.N. Doc. E/1992/22, ch. II, § A (1992).
55. Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Commission on Human Rights Res. 1999/17,
supra note 53, § 8(a). In recent years, the government of Myanmar has persistently refused to permit the
Special Rapporteur to visit the country.
56. See International Simon Bolivar Prize-Winners, at http://www.unesco.org/culture/
simon-bolivar/htmlengwinners.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2000) (on file with The Yale Journal
International Law).
57. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1998, at 161 (1997), available at http:Ilwww.
hnv.orglhrw/worldreport [hereinafter HRW WORLD REPORT 1998].
58. Forced Labour in Myanmar (Burma), Report of the Commission of Inquiry Appointed
under Article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization to Examine the
Observance by Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), at http://www.ilo.org/
public/englishlstandards/relm/gbdocsgb273/myanmar.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2000) (on file with
The Yale Journal of International Law).
59. Resolution on the Widespread Use of Forced Labour in Myanmar, International Labour
Organization, 87th Sess., at http:lwwv.ilo.orglpublic/englishlstandardslrelm/ilcilc87/Com-myan.htm
(June 1999). In November 2000, the ILO Governing Body reaffirmed the resolution and called upon
ILO members to ensure that their relations with the Burmese government "do not perpetuate or extend
the system of forced or compulsory labour in that country." Press Release, International Labour
Organization, ILO Governing Body Opens the Way for Unprecedented Action Against Forced Labour in
Myanmar, at http:l/vwwv.ilo.orglpubliclenglishbureauinf/pr/2000/44.htm (Nov. 17, 2000) (on file with
The Yale Journal of International Law).
60. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2000, 172 (1999), available at http://www.hrw.
org [hereinafter HRW World Report 2000].
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Transnational NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch have conducted extensive monitoring and reporting on the human
rights situation in Burma. The International Commission of Jurists in Geneva
also has documented numerous human rights violations in the country,
including the arbitrary arrest of opponents of the military regime, torture of
detainees, media restrictions, forcible relocations and the use of forced labor.
In a gesture that brought perhaps the most substantial international attention to
the Burma crisis, in 1991, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Aung San
Suu Kyi.
C. Regional Responses
On the regional level, the European Union has taken extensive
diplomatic and economic action against Burma. Since the early 1990s, the
European Union has maintained an arms embargo and has suspended military
cooperation and bilateral aid other than strictly humanitarian aid to Burma.
In 1991, the European Parliament awarded Aung San Suu Kyi the Sakharov
Prize for freedom of thought. A Danish effort to impose Europe-wide
economic sanctions against Burma was opposed by Britain, France, and
Germany.62 Nevertheless, Europe joined the United States in opposing
Burma's membership in Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),I
and in late 1996, the EU started declining entry visas for senior members of
the Burmese government, their families, and members of the Burmese security
forces and suspended high-level government visits to Burma.64 Following
Burma's refusal to allow an EU investigation into its forced labor practices
and in response to a complaint by European trade unions, in December 1996
the European Commission for the first time exercised the human rights clause
of the European Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program to
terminate Burma's GSP trade benefits on industrial exports to the EU. The
Commission attributed the decision to Burma's forced labor practices and
indicated that the restriction would remain in place until the use of forced
labor was abolished. In March 1997, the European Union suspended GSP
benefits for Burmese agricultural products, 65 and in 1998, it extended its visa
ban to include transit visas and visas for members of the Burmese tourism
administration. In 2000, the EU further strengthened its sanctions policies by
banning exports of technology that might be used for internal repression or
61. EU/Burma-Myanmar Relations-An Overview, at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/
externalrelations/myanmar/intro/index.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2000) [hereinafter EU/Burma
Relations] (on file with The Yale Journal of International Law).
62. HRW WORLD REPORT 1997, supra note 37, at 143. In October 1999, the EU voted to
cancel aid for another six months; see also HRW WORLD REPORT 2000, supra note 60, at 173.
63. HRW WORLD REPORT 1996, supra note 34, at 134.
64. EU/Burma Relations, supra note 61.
65. HRW WORLD REPORT 1998, supra note 57, at 161.
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terrorism and freezing European funds held by persons subject to the visa
ban.
66
International condemnation is not universal, and Asian nations have
been significantly less critical of Burmese policies. In the early 1990s,
members of ASEAN (then including Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei,
Indonesia, and the Philippines) rejected a U.S. proposal to impose multilateral
economic sanctions on Burma, arguing that, in light of the country's prior
decades of self-imposed isolation, further isolation would be
counterproductive. Malaysia did, however, block Burma from attending the
671992 ASEAN conference, citing Burma's human rights record. In 1997,
ASEAN admitted Burma as its member in a move that was sharply criticized
by the United States and Europe. Western criticism and sanctions, however,
"seemed only to harden ASEAN resolve to accept Burma as a full member
and defy what was projected as an example of western imperialism." 68 But
ASEAN is not impervious to human rights concerns. Among ASEAN
members, Thailand and the Philippines have been the most willing to criticize
Burma's human rights practices.
Burma's membership in ASEAN has created tensions in EU-ASEAN
relations. In 1997, the EU Council President announced that the EU would bar
Burma from participating in the EC-ASEAN cooperation agreement. 69 The
EU excluded Burma from the 1998 Asia-Europe meeting (ASEM) in London,
and only agreed to participate in 1999 discussions with ASEAN after Burma's
participation was limited to silent observer status.
D. Individual State Responses
Individual states also have imposed diplomatic, foreign assistance, and
trade sanctions on Burma. Canada has prohibited military and non-
humanitarian exports to Burma and has maintained limited diplomatic
relations with the country since 1988.70 In 1997, Canada withdrew General
Preferential Tariff benefits from Burma and required all Canadian firms
trading in Burma to obtain export permits. The government further urged
Canadians to discontinue investing in Burma.7'
Australia suspended military relations with Burma in 1991 for a three
year period, and presently has suspended all foreign aid to the country.
Australia also has attempted to use diplomatic contacts to promote political
reform. In 1999, Australia's Human Rights Commissioner met with Burmese
66. EU/Burma Relations, supra note 61.
67. HRW WORLD REPORT 1993, supra note 35, at 156.
68. HR.V WORLD REPORT 1998, supra note 57, at 162.
69. Id.
70. HRW WORLD REPORT 2000, supra note 60, at 173. Contra id. (acknowledging that
Canada has recently expressed "willingness to engage the SPDC on the prospect of cooperation in
narcotics suppression").
71. HRW WORLD REPORT 1998, supra note 57, at 162.
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government officials to try to encourage the regime to establish an
independent human rights office.
72
In 1995, the British Parliament under John Major considered and
rejected imposing trade sanctions on Burma. In 1997, however, the British
Labour government, which had campaigned on a pro-human rights platform,
announced that it would actively discourage U.K. companies from investing in
Burma, and would continue to suspend all government-sponsored trade tours
to the country.73 In 1998, the United Kingdom announced a policy to "actively
discourage" tourism in Burma, the first time the U.K. has adopted such a
policy toward any country.74 West Germany suspended $10 million in aid in
1989,75 and Denmark called for European economic sanctions against Burma
in the mid-1990s.
76
Japan has pursued a mixed policy of sanctions and engagement. Within
six months of the violence of Burma's 1988 "democracy summer," Japan
recognized SLORC as the legitimate government of Burma and continued gas,
hydro, and power projects that had been commenced before the democratic
uprising.77 In October 1989, Japan and Burma entered a $15 million loan
agreement for natural gas development, 78 and Japan provided limited foreign
assistance and debt relief to Burma during the 1990s. Japan also, however,
responded to the crackdown by suspending $300 million in aid,79 and has
continued to keep most Official Development Assistance suspended. In 1998,
Japan terminated all high level meetings with Burmese officials pending a
1999 meeting to discuss improving human rights and democracy.80 Japan
supported Burma's entry into ASEAN in 1997, while warning that the move
should not provide "cover for oppression." 81 The Japanese government has
supported U.N. Human Rights Commission resolutions regarding Burma
without formally voting for them. Tokyo resumed a $19.5 million business
project to enlarge the Yangon airport in 1998, which it justified as
"humanitarian aid." The decision was urged by Japanese business but strongly
protested by the United States. While calling for improvements in the
country's human rights practices, in March 1998, Japan gave Burma $16
million in debt relief and pledged $800,000 for drug crop substitution
programs, without requiring effective mechanisms to monitor the funding's
72. HRW WORLD REPORT 2000, supra note 60, at 172.
73 HRW WORLD REPORT 1998, supra note 57, at 162.
74. HRW WORLD REPORT 1999, supra note 45, at 162.
75. HRW WORLD REPORT 1997, supra note 37, at 142.
76 Id. at 143.
77. EARTHRIGHTS INT'L & S.E. ASIAN INFO. NETWORK, TOTAL DENIAL: A REPORT ON THE
YADANA PROJECT IN BURMA, app. A at 71 (1996), at wwv.earthrights.org/our publication/
TotalDenial/home.html (on file with The Yale Journal of International Law).
78. Id. at 72.
79. Erlanger, supra note 25, at 5.
80. HRW WORLD REPORT 2000, supra note 60, at 72.
81. HRW WORLD REPORT 1998, supra note 57, at 162.
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use. 82 In 1999, Japan informed the Burmese government that no further
substantial aid would be awarded "without substantial political and human
rights reforms. 8 3
Burma's persecution of its minority Muslim population alienated much
of the Muslim world. Bangladesh terminated relations with Burma following
the expulsion of the Muslim Rohingya refugees in the early 1990s, and
Indonesia and Malaysia further reduced their limited support for the Burmese
government. In 1995, the government of India awarded Aung San Suu Kyi, in
absentia, the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding. That
year, India, however, also resumed trade with Burma for the first time since
the 1962 military takeover, in response to Burma's increased trade with
China.
84
Thailand supported ASEAN's policy of constructive engagement with
Burma in the early 1990s and pursued a variety of economic deals with the
country.85 However, Burma's relations with Thailand, which hosts
approximately 100,000 refugees on the Thai-Burmese border, have become
strained as the number of refugees has increased, and both the Burmese
government and rebel forces have conducted bombing campaigns and attacks
along the Thai border. Thailand terminated timber and mineral contracts in
Burma in the early 1990s and closed all border crossings in 1995.86 Thailand
pursued the lucrative Yadana natural gas pipeline agreement with Burma
throughout the 1990s, but in a major blow to the Burmese government,
Thailand recently announced that it would not purchase the Yadana gas.
Both China and Singapore have energetically pursued trade and
investment with the Burmese military regime. Singapore sirned $465 million
in trade and tourism agreements with Burma in 1993.7 The Singapore
government shipped a prefabricated small arms and ammunition factory to
Burma in February 1998,s8 and Singapore's Tiger Beer took over Heineken's
Burmese operations when the Dutch company withdrew. Western China uses
Burma's capital as a deep water port, and so China has warmly embraced the
Burmese government. China, both licitly and illicitly, is Burma's most
important trading partner, foreign investor, and arms supplier. In the early
1990s, China awarded Burma millions in soft loans for roads, airports, and
other infrastructure development. 89 In 1994, China sold over $400 million in
armaments to Burma,90 and trade between the two countries was estimated in
the billions.91 Chinese trade and investment in Burma has continued to grow
throughout the 1990s. Indeed, China's energetic pursuit of trade and
82. HRW WORLD REPORT 1999, supra note 45, at 170.
83. HRW WORLD REPORT 2000, supra note 60, at 172.
S4. HRW WORLD REPORT 1996, supra note 34, at 133.
85. HRW WORLD REPORT 1995, supra note 36, at 135.
86. HRW WORLD REPORT 1996, supra note 34, at 134.
87. HRW WORLD REPORT 1995, supra note 36, at 135.
88. HRW WORLD REPORT 1999, supra note 45, at 169.
89. HRW WORLD REPORT 1995, supra note 36, at 135.
90. HRW WORLD REPORT 1996, supra note 34, at 133.
91. HRW WORLD REPORT 1995, supra note 36, at 135.
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investment in Burma may be the single most significant impediment to the
success of the transnational sanctions efforts.
E. Local Non-governmental Responses
Finally, private corporate, NGO, and consumer efforts have contributed
significantly to the international condemnation of Burma. In addition to the
work of international NGOs discussed above, domestic nonprofits have
emerged in a number of countries to promote public awareness and
condemnation of Burma's human rights crisis.92 Shareholder pressure on the
University of Washington, for example, led the University to support
stockholder resolutions demanding withdrawal from Burma by companies in
which the University held stock.93 Local consumer pressure has spurred U.S.
retailers such as Macy's, Eddie Bauer, Liz Claiborne, Motorola, Apple
Computer, and Levi Strauss to cease doing business in Burma9
4 and to stop
purchasing Burmese-made goods through their other Asian suppliers.
Beverage companies Heineken,95 Carlsberg, and Pepsi have also pulled out of
joint ventures with the Burmese government in response to public pressure.
On the other hand, many Asian companies pursue business as usual in
Burma. Singaporean, Japanese, and Chinese companies are the most
substantial investors in Burma, and Japanese companies such as Nissan and
Mitsubishi Motor Companies, Ni9ppon Steel, and Sumitomo have aggressively
pursued the Burmese market. The oil industry uniformly has been
impervious to international calls for divestment. Premier Oil of the United
Kingdom, Nippon Oil of Japan, Unocal and Texaco of the United States, Total
of France, and the Petroleum Authority of Thailand all pursued investments in
energy exploration and development in Burma during the 1990s, totaling
many billions of dollars. These investments, unlike the sale of retail
commodities, do little to benefit the local populace and provide critical foreign
currency to the Burmese government. Sanctions by the United States carefully
preserved the existing U.S. oil investments in Burma, although the oil industry
has not been immune to public pressure. Amoco Oil Company withdrew from
Burma in 1994,97 and American consumer and labor advocates have brought
two lawsuits against Unocal in U.S. federal court to challenge its complicity in
the use of forced labor in constructing the Yadana pipeline. 98
92. Some of these NGOs are the Karen Human Rights Project, the Committee for the
Publicity of the People's Struggle in Monland, The Burma Relief Center (Japan), and the Free Burma
Project.
93. Causes: Bailing Out of Burma, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1995, § 6, at 18.
94. Macy's No Longer Shops in Myanmar, ECONOMIST, April 22, 1995, at 35.
95. Ted Bardacke, Western Companies Encounter Protesters on the Road to Burma, FIN.
TIMES, July 12, 1996, at 3.
96. Burma: Japan Sees Rich Pickings in Burma, Bus. VIETNAM, Aug. 1, 1996, at 1996 WL
11680262.
97. HRW WORLD REPORT 1995, supra note 36, at 135.
98. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d. 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (denying liability by
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F. Impact of Sanctions
The Burmese government has taken a number of modest but significant
steps in response to international pressure. The government released Aung
San Suu Kyi from her six-year house arrest the day the U.S. Congress began
debating sanctions, 99 though her ability to travel and meet with members of
the opposition remains severely curtailed. Burma acceded to the Convention
to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in 1991 and to the
1949 Geneva Conventions in 1992. In 1997, it ratified the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, a move which has given child advocacy personnel within
the country increased leverage in local interactions with Burmese officials.
The use of forced labor declined in central Burma in the late 1990s, as the
Burmese government replaced manual labor with heavy machinery. After
years of seeking access to Burma's prisons, in 1999, the International
Committee of the Red Cross finally was granted inspection permission and re-
opened its office in the capital of Yangon. 100 And in the summer of 2000, the
government took steps toward opening the country's universities, which had
been closed since 1996.
The response to the human rights crisis in Burma illustrates the
complementary, transnational nature of these apparently isolated efforts. U.S.
unilateral measures and diplomatic efforts to garner international support have
played a catalytic role in broadening and deepening the global response.
Condemnation by U.N. bodies, monitoring, reporting, and widely-publicized
awards by international organizations and NGOs, withholding of diplomatic
relations, denials of loans and foreign assistance, visa blacklists, domestic
litigation, corporate withdrawals and consumer boycotts all have coalesced to
bring substantial international attention, pressure, and condemnation to bear
on the Burmese regime. The various mechanisms serve a number of functions,
including denying the military government access to foreign goods and credit
and denying them membership in the international community through travel
restrictions and boycotts. All of these actions form part of a collective effort
on the part of the international community to refine existing human rights
norms and to promote improved human rights conditions and democratic
governance in Burma.
Burma is not strictly an example of transnational judicial process, in
which international norms are enforced through domestic litigation,1° ' but of a
fluid system of transnational accountability, in which norms that have been
defined through international and regional instruments and the customary
behavior of states are further clarified, elaborated, and internalized through the
defendant for participation in Burmese government's use of forced labor).
99. Moving Myanmar, supra note 12 ("[O]utside pressure was also crucial in securing Miss
[sic] Suu Kyi's release, which came on the day that America's Congress started considering a bill that
would impose swinging trade sanctions on Myanmar.").
100. HRW WORLD REPORT 2000, supra note 60, at 170.
101. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REv. 181, 183 (1996)
(discussing the process by which norms articulated in international fora are transferred and enforced
through domestic courts).
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communications and the practices of international, regional, national, and
subnational systems, which loosely cooperate through individual action to
promote transnational compliance with fundamental rights norms. In the
Burmese example, norms that are articulated and defined through customary
international law and widely-ratified international treaties are asserted through
repeated interactions between the Burmese government and international,
regional, national, sub-national, corporate and nonprofit efforts. Thus, the
various responses to the Burmese crisis have helped define and clarify
international norms prohibiting forced labor and promoting democracy and
free speech. Indeed, Burma has figured prominently in the development of an
evolving international norm against the overthrow of democratic
governments. The effort has further promoted domestic norm internalization
in the states and institutions that have acted in response to the situation in
Burma, by incorporating into their systems an awareness of international
human rights standards and Burma's noncompliance with those standards. The
effort also has produced incremental transnational norm internalization by
encouraging Burma to accept international treaty obligations and modestly
alter its human rights conduct, and by heightening international awareness and
placing pressure on other states and actors to participate in the norm
internalization dialogue. The Burmese example thus demonstrates that
unilateral measures can form important building blocks in the development of
a transnational enforcement process.
III. DEFINING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
Before discussing further the role of economic measures in promoting
the human rights system, it is important to identify the core principles of that
system. The international human rights regime is enunciated through a loose
network of general treaties promulgated by the United Nations; rights-specific
regimes which are promoted by intergovernmental entities and international
organizations such as the International Labour Organization; regional regimes
of conventions and oversight; and universal customary prohibitions that have
evolved through treaties, the practices of states, and the efforts of
nongovernmental and private actors. The resulting global system of rules is
comprised of essentially two tiers of human rights: jus cogens norms, such as
the prohibitions against torture and slavery, that preempt other obligations as a
matter of customary international law; and treaty rights and customary
obligations erga omnes, such as freedom of association and the prohibition
against discrimination, to which states have nearly universally acceded.
Together, these customary international law norms and treaty rights coalesce
to form the global human rights regime. Violations of these principles are
violations of obligations to all other states and offenses to the international
system. 102
102. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4,32-34 (Feb. 5).
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A. The Treaty Regime
The U.N. Charter, through Articles 55 and 56, establishes international
human rights as matters of international concern and pledges member states to
promote human rights. 0 3 The ICJ has recognized that the Charter obligates its
members "to observe and respect ... human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all," and that denial of fundamental human rights is a flagrant violation of
the purposes and principles of the Charter.1°4 The Charter itself leaves the
content of human rights undefined, however, and the cornerstone document of
the U.N. human rights regime is generally considered to be the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,105 which pledges U.N. members to "promot[e]
... universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms," 0 6 and recognizes a broad range of civil, political, and economic
rights. The Declaration is non-binding but is supported by two foundational
conventions, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) °7 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR), t °8 which essentially codify the Declaration into binding
treaty law. A number of additional instruments promulgated to address
specific categories of rights have been widely ratified. These include the 1949
Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols,10 9 the Genocide
103. Article 55 of the Charter provides as follows:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations
shall promote:
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and
social progress and development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and
international cultural and educational cooperation; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
U.N. CHARTER art. 55. Under Article 56, "[a]ll Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate
action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55."
Id. art. 56.
104. Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971
I.C.J. 16, 57 (June 21) (holding that South Africa's imposition of legally-mandated apartheid in
Namibia, an international territory, violated its obligations under the Charter); see also Stephen M.
Schwebel, The Treatment of Hunian Rights and of Aliens in the International Court of Justice, in FIFTY
YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JusTIcE 327, 336 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice
eds., 1996) (arguing that the court's holding is not limited to international territories and "'what is a
flagrant violation"' of the Charter for Namibia 'is also such a violation when committed ... in any
sovereign Member State"').
105. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(AIII), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1,
at 71, U.N. Doc. AJ810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
106. Id.,pmbl.
107. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
108. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
109. E.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
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Convention, 110 the Torture Convention,' the Convention to Eliminate All
Forms of Racial Discrimination,11 2 the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 13 and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child." 4 Regional agreements that substantially incorporate the
principles of the Universal Declaration include the European Convention on
Human Rights, ls the American Convention on Human Rights,
116 the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,1
17 and the African
Charter on Human and People's Rights.'
18
Certain labor rights also have attained broad recognition as fundamental
human rights. The U.N. Charter commits states to improved living standards,
full employment, and freedom from discrimination based on race, gender,
language or religion. 119 The International Labour Organization, which is the
international body primarily responsible for defining and implementing
international labor norms,120 identifies eight of its conventions as setting forth
"fundamental human rights" which must be respected by all nations under all
circumstances. 121 These include conventions protecting the following:
a) freedom of association and the right to organize and bargain 
collectively,
22
110. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
111. Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987) [hereinafter Torture
Convention].
112. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar.
7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter Racial Discrimination
Convention].
113. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18,
1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW].
114. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force
Sept. 2, 1990).
115. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention].
116. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into
force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American Convention]. The twenty-five parties to the convention are:
Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
117. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, OAS Res. XXX, International
Conference of American States, 9th Conf., OAS Doc. OEAISer. LIV/I. 4 Rev. XX (1948), reprinted in
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, HANDBOOK OF EXISTING RULES PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23 doc.21 rev.5, at 15 (1978).
118. African Charter on Human and People's Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217
(entered into force Oct. 21, 1986).
119. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
120. ILO standards are developed and implemented on a tripartite basis, through cooperation
among representatives of governments, labor, and employer organizations. The ILO has promulgated
over 180 labor conventions.
121. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, FUNDAMENTAL ILO CONVENTIONS, at http:l
www.ilo.org/public/englishl/standards/norm/whatarelfundam/index.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2000)
[hereinafter FUNDAMENTAL ILO CONVENTIONS] (on file with The Yale Journal of International Law).
122. Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize
(No. 87), July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 16 (entered into force July 4, 1950); Convention Concerning the
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b) the prohibition against slavery and forced labor,'2
c) equal pay and the prohibition against discrimination in employment,124 and
d) the prohibition against child labor.12
With the notable exception of the United States, which has ratified only
Convention No. 105 regarding the abolition of forced labor and the Worst
Forms of Child Labour Convention, 126 the core conventions are nearly
universally embraced. The Child Labour Convention has proven controversial,
but all of the other instruments have been formally ratified by at least 100
nations.127 Moreover, in 1998, the ILO made significant progress toward the
universalization of these norms by adopting its Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work.128 Article 2 of this ILO Declaration binds all
ILO members to the core labor principles, regardless of whether the member
has ratified the relevant conventions. 129 Thus, commitment to core ILO
principles is now a condition of ILO membership.
The OECD similarly has identified the rights to freedom of association
and to bargain collectively, and the prohibitions against employment
Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively (No. 98), July 1,
1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257 (entered into force July 18, 1951).
123. ILO Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour (No. 105), June 25, 1957,
320 U.N.T.S. 291 [hereinafter 1957 Forced Labour Convention]; ILO Convention Concerning Forced or
Compulsory Labour (No. 29), June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55 [hereinafter 1930 Forced Labour
Convention]. The prohibition against forced labor is closely related to the prohibition against slavery
and likely has attained the status of customary international law. For more information, see the
discussion in Cleveland, supra note 3, at 1569-73.
124. Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation (No.
111), June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force June 15, 1960); Convention Concerning Equal
Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value (No. 100), June 29, 1951, 165
U.N.T.S. 303 (entered into force May 23, 1953).
125. Convention Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment (No. 138), June 26,
1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 297 (entered into force July 19, 1976).
126. 1957 Forced Labour Convention, supra note 123, entered into force in the United States in
1992. The United States is also party to the 1926 Slavery Convention and the 1957 Supplementary
Slavery Convention. Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183,
2191, 60 L.N.T.S. 253, 263 [hereinafter 1926 Slavery Convention]; Supplementary Convention on the
Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956,
266 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 1957 Supplementary Slavery Convention].
127. Specifically, the ILO reports the following total ratifications for these Conventions:
Convention No. 29:155 ratifications
Convention No. 87: 132 ratifications
Convention No. 98:147 ratifications
Convention No. 100: 149 ratifications
Convention No. 105: 150 ratifications
Convention No. I 11: 145 ratifications
Convention No. 138: 103 ratifications
Convention No. 182:49 Ratifications
FUNDAMENTAL ILO CONVENTIONS, supra note 121.
128. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, art. 2 (June 18, 1998), 37
I.L.M. 1233 (1998), available at http://vww.ilo.org/publie/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc86/com-dtxt.
htm [hereinafter ILO Declaration]. The Declaration immediately received approval from all but about
tventy-five of the ILO's approximately 175 members, with the rest abstaining.
129. Id. The ILO Declaration notes that in joining the ILO, all members endorsed the principles
set out in the ILO Constitution and undertook to promote the overall objectives of the Organization.
Accordingly, the Declaration states that "all Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in
question, have an obligation arising from the very fact of membership in the Organization, to respect, to
promote, and to realize.., the fundamental rights which are the subject of those Conventions." Id. at 2.
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discrimination and forced and exploitative child labor, as core labor
standards. 130 The basic labor rights have been incorporated into foundational
international human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration,
13 1
ICCPR, 32 ICESCR,133 CEDAW, 134 and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child. 135 All of these instruments have received near-universal acceptance.
The above international treaty obligations cover a wide range of human
rights protections and create binding obligations between party states. A state,
by acceding to these conventions, becomes obligated to every other state to
uphold the promises of the treaty and "submit[s] its performance to scrutiny
and to appropriate, peaceful reaction by other parties. ,,136
B. Customary International Law Norms: Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes
In addition to the rights detailed in the formal instruments of the human
rights regime, certain rights are generally considered to be universally
accepted and binding on all sovereign states as either jus cogens or erga
omnes principles of customary international law. Jus cogens norms constitute
a small subset of the recognized international human rights, and number
among the most fundamental duties of states. Human rights provisions that
have achieved the universal status of jus cogens are peremptory norms that
cannot be superceded. States may not persistently object to avoid obligations
under such norms, and they prevail over all competing principles of treaty and
customary international law.
137
On the other hand, certain human rights obligations that have achieved
the status of customary international law, but may not yet constitute
peremptory norms, nevertheless enjoy status as obligations erga omnes, or
130. OECD STUDY, supra note 7, at 26. The OECD describes these standards as expressing
"well-established elements of international jurisprudence concerning human rights." Id. at 27. The 1995
World Summit for Development in Copenhagen also affirmed member states' commitment to promoting
these core worker rights. Report of the World Summit for Social Development, U.N. Doe.
AIConf.166/9, at 12 (1996).
131. Universal Declaration, supra note 105, art. 4 (prohibition against slavery and servitude);
art. 20 (freedom of association); art. 23(2) & (4) (rights to equal pay and to form and join trade unions).
132. ICCPR, supra note 107, art. 8 (prohibition against slavery, servitude and forced labor); art.
22 (freedom of association and to form and join trade unions); art. 26 (non-discrimination).
133. ICESCR, supra note 108, art. 7(a)(1) (equal pay); art. 8 (freedom of association, right to
form and join trade unions and to strike).
134. CEDAW, supra note 113, art. 11 (prohibition against gender discrimination in
employment).
135. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 114, at art. 19 (obligating states to
protect children from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent
treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse).
136. Louis Henkin, Introduction to THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 1, 15 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
137. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 344, art. 53
(defining jus cogens norms as principles "accepted and recognized by the international community of
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character"); see also id., art. 64, at 347
(stating that newly emergingjus cogens norms supercede existing treaties).
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obligations owed by and to all. These obligations, as the ICJ has explained,
constitute "obligations of a State toward the international community as a
whole" and include the "basic rights of the human person." 138  The
International Law Institute recognizes that the international obligation to
respect human rights is an obligation erga omnes, binding on all states. 139
Unlike other obligations under customary international law, such human rights
obligations are considered owed to all members of the international
community. All bound parties have a general interest in ensuring their
observance and may take action to secure their enforcement. 140 In short,
obligations erga omnes share withjus cogens norms their universal character.
Erga omnes norms are not, however, peremptory norms which prevail over all
other rules of customary international law.
Identifying the international human rights principles that constitute jus
cogens norms or obligations erga omnes is difficult and controversial.
Nevertheless, a consensus has coalesced around certain core human rights
principles. The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States141 considers jus cogens rights-which also are set forth in
numerous human rights instruments-to include the following:
(a) genocide;
142
138. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4, 32 (Feb. 5); see
also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia
and Herzegovina v. Yugo. (Serbia and Montenegro)), 1993 I.C.J. 86 (Further Requests for the Indication
of Provisional Measures of Sept. 13) (opinion of Judge Elihu Lauterpacht) ("The duty to 'prevent'
genocide is a duty that rests upon all parties and is a duty owed by each party to every other."); Advisory
Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21).
139. The Protection of Human Rights and the Principle of Non-Intervention in Internal Affairs
of States, 63 INSTITtrT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ANNUAIRE 338 (1989); see also Summary Records of
the 38th Mtg., 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 99, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1976 (1976); OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 1 (9th ed., 1992) [hereinafter OPPENHEIM].
140. OPPENHEIM, supra note 139, § 150. Judicial enforcement, however, may not be available.
South WVest Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr., Liber. v. S. Afr.) (Second Phase), 1996 I.C.J. 4, 47 (July 18)
(holding that an actio popularis, or action on behalf of the general community, "is not known to
international law as it stands at present").
141. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
142. Genocide is defined in Article 2 of the Genocide Convention as:
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Genocide Convention, supra note 110, art. 2. Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the
Prevention of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugo. (Serbia and Montenegro)) I.C.J.
Second Request, 1993 I.C.J. 325, 440 (discussing genocide as a peremptory human rights norm); see
also Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
780 (1992), in Letter Dated 9 February 1993 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of
the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess, Ann., at 15, U.N. Doc. S/25274 (1993) (recognizing the
"character" of genocide and other fundamental human rights "as peremptory norms of international
law").
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4 or causing the disappearance of individuals;
1 45
(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;
146
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention;
147
(f) systematic racial discrimination; 148 and
143. Various forms of coerced labor are barred under international law. ICCPR, supra note
107, art. 8. "Slavery," in its strict sense, is defined as "the status or condition of a person over whom any
or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised." 1926 Slavery Convention, supra
note 126, art. 1(1). Servitude or "slave-like" practices include debt bondage, serfdom, compulsory
marital arrangements, and the sale of children into labor. 1957 Supplementary Slavery Convention,
supra note 126, art. 1. Forced labor requires involuntariness and is defined as "all work or service which
is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not
offered himself voluntarily." 1930 Forced Labour Convention, supra note 123. For further discussion,
see Cleveland, supra note 3, at 1569-73.
144. Deliberate state-sponsored killing violates international law unless it is imposed as
punishment pursuant to a lawful judicial conviction or under other authority of international law. Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991 § 3(a), Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(1994)); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 141, § 702, cmt. f.
145. Disappearance involves state-sponsored abduction of an individual, combined with "the
persistent refusal of [state] authorities.., to acknowledge that they hold such persons in their custody."
U.N. Res. on Disappeared Persons, G.A. Res. 33/173, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 45, at 158, U.N. Doc.
A/33/45 (1978). Disappearance frequently involves other violations of fundamental rights, such as
summary execution and torture. G.A. Res. 47/133, U.N. GAOR, art. 1(2), U.N. Doc. A/Res/471133
(1992); see also Velisquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Ser. 4, 155-58 (1988), reprinted in 9
HUM. RTs. L.J. 212, 238-39 (1988).
146. Torture has been defined as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or confession, punishing him for an act
he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating
him or a third person or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such
pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent of acquiescence
of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain
or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
Torture Convention, supra note 111, art. I. Cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment includes acts that
inflict mental or physical suffering, anguish, humiliation, fear and debasement, but which lack the intent
requirement of torture. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 167 (1978); Xuncax v.
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 189 (D. Mass. 1995). Professor Lillich has questioned whether the
prohibition against cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment has achieved the status of a customary
international law orjus cogens norm. Richard B. Lillich, Remarks, 1985 AM. SOC'Y. INT'L L. PROC., 84,
84-86, reprinted in RICHARD B. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY,
AND PRACTICE 156 (2d ed. 1991).
147. International instruments generally recognize that detention is arbitrary if conducted
without a warrant, probable cause, articulable suspicion, notice of charges, or tria. ICCPR, supra note
107, art. 9; European Convention, supra note 115, art. 5. The Restatement provides that detention may
also be arbitrary if "it is incompatible with the principles of justice or with the dignity of the human
person." RESTATEMENT, supra note 141, § 702 cmt. h (quoting Statement of U.S. Delegation, 13 GAOR,
U.N. Doc. A/C.3ISR.863, at 137 (1958)).
148. Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971
I.C.J. 16,57 (June 21) (holding that South Africa's imposition of legally-mandated apartheid in Namibia
violated fundamental human rights under the U.N. Charter). The Racial Discrimination Convention
defines racial discrimination as
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent or
national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.
Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 112, art. I. Racial discrimination violates customary law
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(g) a consistent pattern or gross violations of internationally recognized humanrights.' 49
The Restatement provides that "[t]he rules of this section are peremptory
norms (jus cogens),... and an international agreement that would violate
them would be void." 150 The international law prohibition against slavery
reasonably may be read to include the prohibition against forced and bonded
labor, including exploitative child labor, and other slave-like practices.
151
Crimes against humanity and war crimes, as first defined in the Nuremberg
Charter and the Geneva Conventions, 152 and as elaborated more recently for
the International War Crimes Tribunals and in the Statute of the Permanent
International Criminal Court,153 may also be included among the jus cogens
norms of customary international law. 1
54
The Restatement list does not purport to be exhaustive, 155 and some
commentators have identified a more restrictive list.156 In 1994, the U.N.
when practiced systematically as a matter of state policy, as under apartheid in the former South Africa.
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, Nov. 30, 1973,
1015 U.N.T.S. 243. For further discussion of the modem international law status of the prohibition
against apartheid, see Ronald C. Slye, Apartheid as a Crime Against Humanity: A Submission to the
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 267 (1999) (arguing that the
practice of apartheid constitutes a crime against humanity).
149. According to the Restatement, a consistent pattern of any of the following human rights
abuses would constitute a violation of customary international law:
systematic harassment, invasions of the privacy of the home, arbitrary arrest and
detention (even if not prolonged); denial of fair trial in criminal cases; grossly
disproportionate punishment; denial of freedom to leave a country; denial of the right to
return to one's country; mass uprooting of a country's population; denial of freedom of
conscience and religion; denial of personality before the law; denial of basic privacy such
as the right to marry and raise a family; and invidious racial or religious discrimination.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 141, § 702, cmt. m.
150. Id. § 702, cmt. n.
151. Id.
152. E.g., Geneva Convention, supra note 109. For a discussion of the customary international
law status of the Geneva Conventions, see Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 35, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in
32 I.L.M. 1163, 1170 (1993), approved by S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (1993), reprinted in 32
I.L.M. 1203, 1204 (1993).
153. Crimes against humanity include widespread and systematic attacks knowingly directed
against any civilian population. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N.
Doc. AICONF.183/9 (1998), available at http:llwww.un.orgllav/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. As originally set forth at Nuremberg, crimes against humanity included
"murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts . . .or persecutions on
political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal .... Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 82
U.N.T.S. 279. The Rome Statute adds to this definition acts of torture; severe deprivation of physical
liberty; rape; sexual slavery; enforced prostitution; forced pregnancy; forced sterilization or other forms
of sexual violence; persecution based on national, ethnic, cultural or gender grounds; disappearance; and
apartheid. Rome Statute, supra, art. 7; see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 242, 243 (2d Cir. 1995)
(recognizing rape, forced impregnation, and forced prostitution as war crimes under customary
international law).
154. Cf. OPPENHEIM, supra note 139, § 2 (identifying jus cogens norms as including the
prohibitions against the use of force, the slave trade, piracy, and genocide, and the observance of human
rights, state equality, and self-determination).
155. The Restatement suggests that the right to property and the prohibitions against systematic
religious discrimination and gender discrimination may be included as violations of customary
international law. While not yet jus cogens, the Restatement recognizes these as potentially emergent
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Human Rights Committee, 157 the authoritative body with responsibility for
oversight of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
elaborated on the Restatement list by identifying certain provisions of the
ICCPR as reflecting customary international, if notjus cogens, norms. These
included the prohibitions against slavery; torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment; arbitrary deprivation of life; arbitrary arrest and
detention; denial of freedom of thought, conscience and religion; and
prohibitions against a presumption of guilt in criminal proceedings; against
execution of children or pregnant women; and against advocacy of national,
racial or religious hatred. They also included the right to many; the right of
minorities to their own culture, religion, and language; and the right to a fair
trial. 158 The breadth of the list proved controversial, with the United States in
particular criticizing the Committee's "cavalier" pronouncement of customary
international law. 15 The Committee, however, is not alone in its recognition
of expansive customary rights. In a 1994 Declaration addressing the
customary international law status of the norms set forth in the Universal
Declaration, the International Law Association Committee also ratified the
Restatement's catalogue of customary international human rights, and
suggested a number of possible additions.
160
examples of obligations erga omnes. RESTATEMENT, supra note 141, § 702, cmts. a, j, k, I.
156. Cf OPPENHEIM, supra note 139, § 2 (identifying jus cogens norms as including the
prohibitions against the use of force, the slave trade, piracy, and genocide, and the observance of human
rights, state equality, and self-determination).
157. General Comment 24(52) of 2 November 1994 on Issues Relating to Reservations Made
upon or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to Declarations
Under Article 41 of the Covenant, U.N. Human Rights Comm., 52d Sess., 8, U.N. Doe.
CCPRIC/21IRev.l/Add.6 (1994), reprinted in 15 HUM. RTS. L.J. 464, 465 (1994) [hereinafter General
Comment 24]. The Committee is an authoritative body of experts from eighteen countries established to
monitor compliance with the ICCPR.
158. The Committee also noted that reservations to the protection of the right of peoples to
determine their own political status and to pursue their economic, social, and cultural development
would violate the object and purpose of the treaty, as would a reservation to the prohibition against
discrimination in the protection of rights, and the obligation to give domestic effect to the rights
protected, and the obligation to provide domestic remedies. Id. 9, 11.
159. Richard B. Lillich, The Growing Importance of Customary International Human Rights
Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1. 21 n.101 (1995/1996) (quoting Observations on General Comment
24, Accompanying Letter from the Hon. Conrad K. Harper, Legal Advisor, Department of State, to the
Hon. Francisco Jose Aguilar-Urbina, Chairman, Human Rights Committee (Mar. 28, 1995)):
It cannot be established on the basis of practice or other authority ... that the mere
expression (albeit deplorable) of national, racial or religious hatred (unaccompanied by
any overt action or preparation) is prohibited by customary international law ....
Similarly, while many are opposed to the death penalty in general and the juvenile death
penalty in particular, the practice of States demonstrates that there is currently no blanket
prohibition in customary international law. Such a cavalier approach to international law
[poses] serious concerns about the methodology of the Committee as well as its authority.
160. Comm. on the Enforcement of Human Rights Law, Int'l L. Ass'n., Final Report on the
Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law, in INT'L L.
ASS'N, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-SIXTH CONFERENCE 525, 544-49 (1994), reprinted in RICHARD B. LILLICH
& HURST HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 166
(3d ed. 1995). The Committee questioned whether the prohibition against arbitrary detention must be
limited to "prolonged" arbitrary detention. The Committee also suggested adding: the right to equal
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It is difficult, if not impossible, to define precisely and comprehensively
the rights that constitute core provisions of the global human rights regime.
This is particularly true given the disagreement over priorities among Western
industrial nations, which generally emphasize civil and political rights, and
developing countries, which often place greater emphasis on economic
development. Religious differences may also explain variations in countries'
interpretations of fundamental human rights. Given these rifts, defining the
precise content of core human rights norms poses a continuing challenge to
the human rights system and difficulties unquestionably remain in applying
these norms to specific contexts. Nevertheless, international instruments and
state practice reveal a core of civil, political, and economic rights that enjoy
near-universal recognition. The principles identified in the Restatement,
together with war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the prohibition against
forced labor, are broadly recognized as rights that no state officially claims the
right to violate, and may be considered among the corejus cogens principles
of the human rights system. Other emerging norms that are approaching, but
may not have fully achieved, the status of customary obligations erga omnes
may include freedom of religion, the prohibitions against gender
discrimination and discrimination in fundamental human rights, the
prohibition against the execution of juveniles (from which the United States is
a notable dissenter), the right to a fair trial, the right to property, the right to
freedom of association, the prohibition against employment discrimination,
and a prohibition against the overthrow of democracy. These emerging norms
are binding on the vast majority of states, as a result of their accession to
foundational international and regional conventions and their membership in
the 1LO. For the remainder of this Article, references to core or fundamental
human rights should be understood as referring to these provisions.
C. U.S. Participation
Because this Article focuses on unilateral U.S. enforcement of human
and labor standards, it is appropriate to address briefly the United States'
ambivalent relationship to the controlling instruments. The United States'
participation in the international system is relevant to an examination of norm
internalization since, as discussed in Part V, international law authorizes the
United States to enforce against other states only those norms that either both
treatment and non-discrimination with respect to guaranteed human rights, the right to a fair trial, the
prohibition against forcible return of refugees (nonrefoulement), the right to a nationality, the right to
freedom of marriage, the right to property (excluding international norms regarding state expropriation
of property, which the committee recognized remained "controversial"), the right to free choice of
employment, the right to form and join trade unions, the right to a free primary education, subject to a
state's available resources, and the prohibition against sex discrimination in employment as customary
international law norms.
The Committee concluded that the degree of de facto and de jure suppression of religious
freedom in various countries made "problematic" the recognition of the freedom of thought, conscience,
and religion asjus cogens norms. The Committee also found it difficult to conclude that the protection
of freedom of opinion and expression had become customary international law, and noted that "many
states have not accepted" the Declaration's promise of the right to democracy.
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the United States and the violating state have ratified or those that are binding
on all states as a matter of customary international law.
The United States played a primary role in the creation of the modem
human rights system and was one of the leading forces behind the drafting of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR in
the immediate post-war period.161 The United States aggressively pursued the
development of the Nuremberg Charter, the United Nations Charter and
system, and the Charter of the Organization of American States. 162 Despite its
enthusiasm for drafting human rights provisions for others, however, the
United States has been notoriously reluctant to ratify human rights
conventions. The United States refused to ratify the Genocide Convention for
four decades, and only recently ratified the ICCPR, the Convention to
Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the Torture Convention.
163
When the United States finally did ratify these instruments, it entered
substantial reservations, declarations, and understandings to qualify U.S.
obligations under the conventions, and declined to fully implement them into
domestic law. 164 By far the most important of these qualifications was the
Senate's declaration that the instruments are not self-executing-i.e., that
absent further legislation, they are not directly enforceable in U.S. courts.
165
United States courts also have declared human rights conventions to be non-
self-executing, thus further reducing the possibility that the United States may
be held internally accountable for human rights violations.166 The United
States presently numbers among only a handful of countries in the world that
have not ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, and though a member of the Organization of American States (OAS)
and party to the American Declaration, the United States has not ratified the
161. See generally NATALIE HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE SENATE:
A HISTORY OF OPPOSITION (1990) (discussing the U.S. role in drafting the foundational international
human rights instruments).
162. Louis Henkin, Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy, in THE AGE OF RIGHTS 65
(1990).
163. The United States ratified the Genocide Convention in 1988, the ICCPR and the Racial
Discrimination Convention in 1992, and the Torture Convention in 1994.
164. See generally Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification ofHuman Rights Conventions: The Ghost of
Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995) (discussing U.S. reluctance to ratify human rights
treaties). The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, for example, creates domestic civil remedies only
for acts of torture committed by foreign officials, and limits the definition of torture to acts committed
against individuals "in the offender's custody or physical control." Torture Victim Protection Act of
1991 § 2(a) & 3(b)(1), Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994)). The
statute also defines mental suffering more specifically than the convention. Id. § 3(b)(2). The Genocide
Convention Implementation Act provides that the Act shall not "be construed as creating any substantive
or procedural right enforceable by law by any party in any proceeding." 18 U.S.C. § 1092 (1994).
165. But see David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-
Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L. L. 129, 165-69 (1999) (arguing
that the non-self-executing declaration to the ICCPR may have been intended to avoid establishing a
private right of action under the treaty without otherwise barring judicial enforcement).
166. See generally Carlos Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 695 (1995) (discussing the non-self-execution doctrine).
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American Convention on Human Rights.167 The United States' recent
rejection of both the Land Mines Convention and the Permanent Criminal
Court stand as further examples of U.S. hostility toward embracing
international human rights obligations.
The United States' ratification record of ILO Conventions is equally
checkered. The United States is a signatory to only eleven ILO conventions
that are currently in force, many of which address seamen's rights, and only
two of which involve core ILO protections. Historically a reluctant participant
in the ILO, the United States withdrew from ILO membership between 1975
and 1980, due to the organization's perceived leftist sympathies.168 Although
the U.S. Senate remains hostile to ratifying new labor conventions, the United
States' relationship with the ILO has warmed under the Clinton
administration. President Clinton publicly urged the ILO to adopt the
Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, and the United States was
one of the first states to ratify the new Convention. 169 Moreover, the core
labor rights now are binding on the United States, as a result of its ratification
of the ICCPR and its membership in the ILO. In sum, although substantial
room for improvement remains, the United States has taken significant strides
in the past decade toward embracing fundamental international obligations.
IV. UNILATERAL U.S. SANCTIONS PRACTICE
Foreign trade and economic assistance have long been viewed as an arm
of U.S. foreign policy, and the United States has imposed economic sanctions
for many years to promote a range of foreign policy objectives, including
combating nuclear proliferation, drug and weapons trafficking and terrorism;
promoting democracy and human rights; destabilizing hostile regimes; and
punishing territorial aggression. For over a century, U.S. laws have authorized
the imposition of trade sanctions for human or labor rights violations abroad.
In 1890, Congress prohibited the importation of goods made with convict
labor, 17 and since 1930, U.S. tariff laws have prohibited the importation of
goods made with convict, forced, or indentured labor. 171 This trend has
increased substantially in the post-World War II era. The following Section
addresses the major economic mechanisms through which the United States
promotes human rights compliance. These mechanisms promote both
domestic and transnational norm internalization by conditioning a range of
foreign development and security assistance, international and domestic
investment support, import and export privileges, and government
167. American Convention, supra note 116.
16S. JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS:
CASES, MATERIALS, AND TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF
TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 995 (3d ed. 1995).
169. Elizabeth Olson, U.N. Agency Adopts Treaty on Child Labor, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1999,
at A15; Jane Perlez, Clinton Presses for Treaty to Ban the Worst Child Labor Practices, N.Y. TIMES,
June 17, 1999, at A13.
170. 26 Stat. 624 (1890).
171. TariffAct of 1930, ch. 497,46 Stat. 689 (1930) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1307
(2000)).
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procurement fights on the compliance of foreign states with internationally
recognized human fights norms.
A. Federal Statutes Imposing Sanctions for Human Rights Violations
In the period of intense scrutiny of U.S. foreign policy and executive
practices that followed the Vietnam War and Watergate, the U.S. Congress
adopted a series of statutes that formally incorporated the promotion of
international human fights into U.S. foreign policy. 172 Accordingly, Section
502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which was adopted in December
1974, provides as follows:
The United States shall, in accordance with its international obligations as set forth in the
Charter of the United Nations and in keeping with the constitutional heritage and
traditions of the United States, promote and encourage increased respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms throughout the world without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion. Accordingly, a principle goal of the foreign policy of the United
States shall be to promote the increased observance of internationally recognized human
rights by all countries.
173
A number of the present statutes implementing this policy (which are further
discussed in the chart attached as Appendix A), authorize the withholding of
development and security assistance and trade benefits from countries that
engage in a "consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights" 174 or that are not "taking steps to afford [their
workers] internationally recognized worker rights.' 75 Other laws direct the
172. This legislative effort was driven largely by Representative Donald Fraser, Chairman of
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements.
Stephen B. Cohen, Conditioning US. Security Assistance on Human Rights Practices, 76 AM. J. INT'L
L. 246, 250-53 (1982). In 1973, Fraser held a series of hearings on U.S. foreign policy and human rights,
resulting in the production of a lengthy report that criticized U.S. engagement with governments that
committed fundamental human rights violations against their citizens and the disregard for human rights
compliance in U.S. foreign policy. International Protection of Human Rights, The Work of International
Organizations and the Role of U.S. Foreign Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International
Organizations and Movements of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1974). For
the report ensuing from the hearings, see Cohen, supra.
173. Foreign Assistance Act § 502(b), 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(1) (1994).
174. Foreign Assistance Act § 116, 22 U.S.C. § 2151n (1994) (development assistance);
Foreign Assistance Act § 502(b), 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(1) (1994) (security assistance); 22 U.S.C. §
2420(a) (1994) (police training); 22 U.S.C. § 2347 (1994) (military education and training assistance);
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-133 (1996) (prohibiting U.S. assistance to foreign security force
units "if the Secretary of State has credible evidence to believe such unit has committed gross violations
of human rights") [hereinafter Leahy Amendment]; Amendment No. 3406, S94621 (July 30, 1998)
(applying Leahy Amendment to Department of Defense expenditures).
175. Generalized System of Preferences, 19 U.S.C. § 2462(c)(7) (2000); Caribbean Basin
Economic Recovery Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(8) (1994) (conditioning tariff preferences on "whether or
not such country has taken or is taking steps to afford workers in that country . . . internationally
recognized worker rights"); Andean Trade Preference Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3205 (1994) (applying
GSP labor provisions to Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru); Trade and Development Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-200 (2000), § 104 (a)(1)(F), 114 Stat. 251 (conditioning import benefits for Sub-
Saharan Africa on compliance with internationally-recognized human and worker rights). The Caribbean
Basin Initiative also was amended in 2000 to include consideration of the GSP labor provisions. 19
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United States to oppose loans by international financial institutions (IFIs) to
violating states, 171 withhold domestic investment assistance, 177 or target
specific countries by restricting aid or trade.
1. Statutory Definitions
The rights targeted by U.S. measures vary from statute to statute, but
roughly correspond to the core internationally recognized human rights. Thus,
Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act,17 s one of the foundational
measures barring development assistance to noncompliant foreign
governments, defines internationally recognized human rights to include:
torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention
without charges, causing disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine
detention of those persons, or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the
security ofperson .... 179
U.S.C. § 2703(b)(5)(B)(iii) (2000); see also Trade Act of 1974 § 301(b), 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d) (1994)
(authorizing the President to impose trade sanctions for "unreasonable" trade practices, including
violation of the GSP worker rights). The labor rights amendment of Section 301 spurred much academic
discussion of trade-labor linkage, but the provision has never been applied to promote worker rights.
E.g., AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM
(Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990); Ian Charles Ballon, The Implications of Making the
Denial of Internationally Recognized Worker Rights Actionable Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974,28 VA. J. INT'L L. 73 (1987).
176. The International Financial Institutions Act of 1977, 22 U.S.C. § 262d(a) (1994), directs
the United States to use its "voice and vote" in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other
international financial institutions to "advance the cause of human rights." The Act requires the United
States to direct loans and other assistance away from countries whose governments engage in "a pattern
of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." 22 U.S.C. § 262d(a)(1). It covers U.S.
participation in the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, the International Development Association, the International Finance Corporation, the
Inter-American Development Bank, the African Development Fund, the Asian Development Bank, the
African Development Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction. See also Foreign
Appropriations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 22 U.S.C. § 262p-4p
(1994) (requiring U.S. delegates to IFIs to use their "voice and vote" to press borrowing countries to
guarantee internationally recognized worker rights as set forth in the GSP and relevant ILO
conventions).
177. Since 1985, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), which provides U.S.
government-secured financing, insurance, and other guarantees to U.S. investment projects in
developing countries, has authorized denial of such protection for projects in countries that are not
"taking steps to ...extend internationally recognized worker rights." Overseas Private Investment
Corporation Amendments Act of 1985, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2191a(a)(1) (1994) & 2199(i) (1982 & Supp. In
1985). The statute also requires OPIC to consider a country's "observance and respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms" and the impact of the intended project on those rights. The Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) requires U.S. representatives to the agency to encourage labor
rights protections as a condition for obtaining international investment insurance. 22 U.S.C. §§
290(k)(1-1 1) (1994).
178. 22 U.S.C. § 2151n (1994).
179. 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(a) (1999). Accord International Financial Institutions Act, 22 U.S.C. §
262d(a)(1) (1994) (adopting the Section 116 definition of internationally recognized human rights but
not expressly including the disappearance of persons); see also 22 U.S.C. § 2370(f (Supp. rI 1985)
(providing that assistance to communist countries should consider whether the country was "giving
evidence of fostering the establishment of a genuinely democratic system, with respect for
internationally recognized human rights").
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The Act has been amended to prohibit assistance to governments that fail "to
protect children from exploitation, abuse or forced conscription into military
or paramilitary services," 180 and that have engaged in, or failed to combat,
"severe violations of religious freedom." 181 The Section 116 list does not
expressly include such broadly recognized jus cogens norms as genocide or
crimes against humanity but also does not purport to be exclusive.
The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 182 which provides import
tariff preferences to developing countries, defines "internationally recognized
labor rights" as including freedom of association; the right to organize and
bargain collectively; the prohibition against forced labor, child labor under a
certain age, and the worst forms of child labor; and minimum acceptable
employment conditions with respect to wages, hours of work, and
occupational safety and health. 183 Although this list tracks most of the core
ILO protections, it diverges from the ILO standards in several respects. The
U.S. list fails to include expressly discrimination in employment, which the
ILO recognizes as a core labor protection.184 On the other hand, the U.S. list
includes "minimum acceptable employment conditions," a principle that is not
included among the ILO's core labor rights, that does not enjoy international
consensus, and that the United States has not ratified. Some laws address
specific norms such as coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization,
185
democracy, 186 religious freedom, 187 and forced, indentured or prison labor,
180. 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(b)(2) (1990).
181. 22U.S.C. § 2151n(c) (1998).
182. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(c)(7) (2000). Labor rights provisions were added in 1984 as an
amendment to the 1974 Trade Act. The House Report on the amendment noted that conditioning trade
relations on compliance with these basic worker rights should not significantly alter U.S. policy, since it
was long-established U.S. policy to promote political and human rights. Generalized System of
Preferences Renewal Act of 1984, H.R. REP. No. 98-1090, at 12 (1984) [hereinafter GSP House
Report].
183. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2467(4), (6) (2000).
184. The legislative history of the worker rights amendment indicates that Congress intended
these standards to be flexible and to take into account the level of development in a particular country in
determining whether the country was "taking steps" to afford worker rights. Thus, the House Report to
the 1984 statute notes that "[i]t is not the expectation of the Committee that developing countries come
up to the prevailing labor standards of the U.S. and other highly-industrialized countries. It is recognized
that acceptable minimum standards may vary from country to country." GSP House Report, supra note
182, at 12.
185. Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Act, Pub. L. No. 99-88, 99 Stat. 293 (1985)
(Kemp-Kasten Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act) (withholding U.S. foreign aid from
organizations engaging in such practices).
186. E.g., Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996) (promoting democratization in Cuba) (This act is referred to in the text as
the Helms-Burton Act); Customs and Trade Act of 1990 § 138, Pub. L. No. 101-382, 104 Stat. 653
(1990) (promoting democratization in Burma); 1997 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act § 570,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-166 (1996) (same).
187. International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. § 6441(b)(1) (2000) (authorizing
imposition of a range of sanctions on states violating religious freedom). Examples of religious
intolerance around the world, as set forth by then-Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human
Rights and Labor, John Shattuck, include religious suppression in the Sudan, Chinese repression of
Tibetan Buddhists, Iranian discrimination against Baht'i and evangelical Christians, Burma's oppression
of the Rohingya Muslim minority, and other examples from Russia and Westem Europe. T. Lynch,
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including child labor. 8 8 Other statutes define the human rights contemplated
with less specificity, or not at all. The statute of the Export-Import Bank,
which provides credit assistance to import-export transactions, for example,
provides that the Bank may deny applications where the President determines
that the denial "would clearly and importantly advance U.S. policy" in
promoting "human rights (including child labor)."18 9 The granting of "most
favored nation" (MEN) status to communist countries is conditioned on the
state's recognition of the freedom to emigrate, though the law has been
applied to consider overall protection for fundamental human rights. 19
Finally, various national security statutes, such as the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)"9' and the Export Administration Act of 1979
(EAA),192 give the President broad powers to impose trade restrictions for
foreign policy reasons, which may, at the President's discretion, include
human rights concerns.
Legislative Focus: The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF, 6 LEG.
WATCH 2, at http://vvw.wcl.american.edu/pubhunmright/brieffv6i2/Ifhtm (last visited Oct. 31, 2000)
(on file with The Yale Journal of International Law); see also Foreign Operations, Export Financing,
and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-118, § 577, 111 Stat. 2386, 2433-34
(1997) (prohibiting foreign assistance to Russia if the country is found to discriminate against religious
minorities).
188. U.S. TariffAct § 307, 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (1997) (prohibiting entry into the United States of
goods produced wholly or in part by such means); Treasury and Government Appropriations Act for
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-61, 111 Stat. 1272 (1997), enacting H.R. 2378 as cited in 143 Cong. Rec. DI103
(Oct. 20, 1997); see also Exec. Order 13,126, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,383 (1999) (prohibiting federal agencies
from purchasing any products made with such labor from countries that are not members of NAFTA or
parties to the WTO agreement on government procurement).
189. 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(1)(B) (2000).
190. Jackson-Vanik Amendment of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1994).
191. International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), Pub. L. No. 95-223, tit. II, 91
Stat. 1626, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (2000). If the President determines that "any unusual and
extraordinary threat [exists] ... to the [U.S.] national security, foreign policy, or economy," the
President may declare a national emergency under the National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412,
90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (1994)). The IEEPA authorizes the President
to impose broad economic sanctions, including restricting currency and freezing foreign assets.
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, §§ 1701, 1702(a); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan,
453 U.S. 654 (1981) (upholding broad executive authority under IEEPA). On IEEPA sanctions
generally, see Lee R. Marks & John C. Grabow, The President's Foreign Economic Powers After
Dames & Moore v. Regan: Legislation by Acquiescence, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 68 (1982). IEEPA was
intended to be more restrictive than its predecessor statute, the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), 50
U.S.C. App. § 5(b) (1994), under which Cold War economic sanctions were imposed against countries
such as Cambodia, Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba. The Cuban and North Korean sanctions remain in
place.
192. The Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-2420 (1988) (authorizing the
President to restrict U.S. exports for reasons of foreign policy, national security, or short supply). The
EAA export system is governed by the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Export
Administration, which imposes licensing requirements on the export of certain commodities and exports
to certain countries. The EAA has lapsed since 1994, and the President currently sustains EAA
restrictions through his authority under IEEPA. Executive Order 12,924 (Aug. 18, 1994); see also
Continuation of Emergency Regarding Export Control Regulations, 65 Fed. Reg. 48,347 (Aug. 3, 2000)
(extending EAA restrictions).
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2. Statutory Design
The U.S. sanctions measures also take a variety of forms. Some statutes,
such as the Federal Burma Statute, mandate the imposition of certain
sanctions on specific countries. Others delegate to the Executive responsibility
to "certify" whether a violation has occurred, with the imposition of sanctions
turning on that executive finding. The specificity of the executive finding that
is required may vary significantly from statute to statute, from a general
finding of a threat to national security under IEEPA, to a specific finding that
action has been taken against the democratic leader under the Federal Burma
Statute. All the statutes authorize the President to waive application of the
sanctions based on a finding that certain circumstances exist, such as
improved human rights conditions, "extraordinary circumstances," or simply a
finding that waiver is in U.S. national security interests.
193
Many of the statutes also impose reporting requirements on the
Executive to keep Congress abreast of human rights developments. Thus,
Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act directs the State Department to
prepare annual reports for Congress regarding the status of internationally
recognized human rights in every U.N. member country.
194 The State
Department reports are required to examine country practices regarding the
human rights set forth in Section 116,195 as well as coercive population
control,'196 child labor,197 refugees, 198 and religious freedom.1
99 The Federal
193. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2432(c)(2) (1994) (allowing executive to grant MEFN status upon a finding
that this will promote the purposes of the act or if the foreign government provides assurance that its
emigration practices will improve); Foreign Assistance Act § 116, 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(a) (2000)
(allowing foreign assistance if the Executive finds that the prohibited assistance "will directly benefit the
needy people in such country"). Similar exceptions are authorized for financing assistance by the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). CARTER, supra note 8, at 54; see also 22 U.S.C. §
262d(f) (the United States may support international financial assistance that will "serve the basic needs
of the citizens of [a violating] country"); 22 U.S.C. §§ 2304(a)(2), (e) (2000) (authorizing waiver of
Section 502B security assistance restrictions based on a finding of "extraordinary circumstances" or of
"a significant improvement in [the country's] human rights record"); International Religious Freedom
Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. § 6407 (2000) (authorizing executive waiver of sanctions if this would further
the purposes of the act or promote U.S. national security interests); Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, §§ 6085(b), (c)(1)(B) (authorizing limited waiver based on finding
that Cuba is democratizing); 1997 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §
570(a) & (e), 110 Stat. 3009-166, 167 (1996) (authorizing waiver based on finding that Burma "has
made measurable and substantial progress in improving human rights practices and implementing
democratic government" or if the sanction is "contrary to the national security interests of the United
States").
194. 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(d) (2000).
195. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(d)(1) (1994).
196. 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(d)(2) (2000).
197. 22 U.S.C. § 215 ln(d)(3) (2000). This provision includes consideration of "whether such
country has adopted policies to protect children from exploitation in the workplace, including a
prohibition of forced and bonded labor and policies regarding acceptable working conditions," and "the
extent to which each country enforces such policies, including the adequacy of the resources and
oversight dedicated to such policies."
198. 22 U.S.C. § 215In(d)(5) (2000).
199. 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(d)(7) (2000); see also 22 U.S.C. § 2304(b) (2000) (requiring the State
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Burma Statute requires periodic reports to Congress on the progress toward
democratization in that country and the development of multilateralresponses, while the International Religious Freedom Act requires separate
200 feedom201iannual reporting by the State Department on religious freedom.
The human rights statutes also have fostered the development of
administrative oversight and reporting mechanisms within responsible U.S.
agencies. During the late 1970s, Congress established the Human Rights
Bureau in the U.S. State Department-an office that has evolved into the
present office of Democracy, Labor, and Human Rights.202 In 1994, Congress
created the position of Senior Advisor for Women's Rights in the State
Department. In 1998, an Office of International Religious Freedom headed by
an Ambassador-at-Large for religious freedom was added.20 3 In response,
labor groups successfully demanded the creation of an equivalent labor rights
position in the State Department and additional funding for international labor
rights oversight.
B. U.S. Practice Under the Human Rights Measures
Given the variety of statutory and regulatory options available under
U.S. law for imposing human and labor rights sanctions, comprehensive data
on U.S. sanctions practice is extremely difficult to compile. Between 1993 and
1996, the United States acted approximately sixty-one times to impose
sanctions for overall foreign policy purposes.204 Twenty-two of these actions
were designed to promote human rights and democratization abroad, and
targeted the countries of Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burma (Myanmar),
Burundi, China, Croatia, Cuba, Gambia, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua,
Nigeria, and Yugoslavia. Six other actions promoted compliance with labor
rights. The human rights sanctions primarily involved restrictions on foreign
assistance, private investment support through OPIC, or the sale of military
goods. Only a relatively small portion imposed restrictions on trade. Many
other earlier measures, however, also remain in effect. The present Section
Department to report on human rights conditions in all countries receiving Section 502B security
assistance, including reporting on the country's population control and religious freedom practices).
200. 1997 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570(d), 110 Stat.
3009,3116 (1996).
201. International Religious Freedom Act of 1998,22 U.S.C. § 6412 (2000).
202. The position of Coordinator of Human Rights was created in 1976 and elevated to
Assistant Secretary of State in 1978. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-105 § 109, 91 Stat. 846 (1977). The Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs was
reorganized and named the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor in 1994, and the Assistant
Secretary in charge of the office was renamed Assistant Secretary for Human Rights, Democracy, and
Labor.
203. International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, § 6411.
204. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS, A CATALOG OF NEW U.S. UNILATERAL
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY PURPOSES 1993-1996 (1997) [hereinafter NAM REPORT].
The affected countries were Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burma (Myanmar), Brazil,
Burundi, Canada, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Gambia, Guatemala, Haiti, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Libya,
Maldives, Mauritania, Mexico, Nicaragua, Nigeria, North Korea, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Rwanda,
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Taiwan, United Arab Emirates, Yugoslavia, and Zaire. Id. at 1. Some of the
recorded actions were votes by the United States in international financial institutions. Id.
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addresses representative actions taken by the United States to promote norm
internalization over the past two decades.
1. Foreign Development and Security Assistance
In the early 1980s, Congress restricted foreign assistance to El Salvador
unless the President found, among other things, that the government was
making a concerted effort to comply with internationally recognized human
rights and was bringing an end to "indiscriminate torture and murder of
Salvadoran civilians" by the armed forces.205 In fiscal years 1986 and 1987,
Congress authorized the President to lift restrictions on foreign police
assistance to Honduras and El Salvador if these governments had "made
significant progress, during the preceding six months, in eliminating any
human rights violations including torture, incommunicado detention,
detention of persons solely for the nonviolent expression of their political
views, or prolonged detention without trial.,
20 6 Congress has authorized
certain types of aid to Argentina in response to its "significant progress in
complying with internationally recognized principles of human rights,
20 7 and
has barred aid in the face of deteriorating human rights conditions to nations
such as Chile, Cambodia, and Uganda. In 1990, Congress required the
President to make detailed findings regarding the human rights situation in
Peru before that country could be eligible for anti-narcotics trafficking
assistance. °8
In 1992, Congress voted to terminate U.S. military aid to Indonesia
following disclosures that U.S.-trained security units had been involved in
human rights atrocities in East Timor.20 9 (Congress renewed the funding in
1995, with the condition that the aid be used only for human-rights related
training.) 210 In 1993, the United States suspended and prohibited development• '"211 - 212
assistance to Guatemala2 l and Yugoslavia, respectively. Congress also
prohibited foreign assistance to Nicaragua until the country made significant
205. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-113, §
728, 95 Stat. 1519, 1556 (1981).
206. 22 U.S.C. § 2420(d) (1994).
207. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, § 725, 95 Stat. 1553.
208. International Narcotics Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-623, 104 Stat. 3350, 3353-
54(1990).
209. 142 CONG. REC. H6142 (daily ed. June 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Reed); see also
David R. Schmahmann et al., Off the Precipice: Massachusetts Expands Its Foreign Policy Expedition
From Burma to Indonesia, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1021, 1030 (1997) (reviewing Congressional
action regarding aid to East Timor from 1992 to 1996).
210. Schmahrnann, supra note 209, at 1030; see also Tim Weiner, U.S. Training ofIndonesia
Troops Goes on Despite Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1998, at A3 (discussing Pentagon efforts to evade
funding restrictions).
211. 29 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doe. 1029 (May 27, 1993), cited in NAM REPORT, supra note
204, at app., 21.
212. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 § 1511, Pub. L. No. 103-160,
107 Stat. 1547, 1839 (1993).
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progress in specified areas, including implementing human rights
recommendations.213
In 1993, Congress restricted military and police assistance to Haiti to
avoid assisting individuals involved in drug trafficking or gross human rights
abuse.214 In 1996, Congress restricted certain foreign assistance until the
Haitian government thoroughly investigated extrajudicial killings. Congress
also attempted to promote democratic rule in Haiti by barring assistance to
any government that acquired power through means other than Haiti's 1995
democratic election.215 In the fall of 2000, the United States announced that it
was withholding foreign election assistance to Haiti following irregularities in
that country's elections.
21 6
Congress has employed U.S. foreign assistance on several occasions to
promote foreign compliance with international obligations. In 1995, Congress
prohibited foreign aid to any country failing to comply with U.N. Security
Council sanctions against Iraq, Serbia, and Montenegro, and authorized the
President to bar imports from noncompliant states.217 Congress employed both
foreign assistance and IFI sanctions in 1996 to promote cooperation with the
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.218
In 1996, Congress limited military assistance to Guatemala and ordered
the President to certify whether the Guatemalan military was cooperating with
efforts to resolve Guatemala's past human rights abuses.219 A 1997 Act
regarding the Democratic Republic of the Congo required President Clinton to
certify that the Congo was "cooperating fully with investigators from the
United Nations in accounting for human rights violations committed in the
[Congo] or adjacent countries" in order to qualify for economic assistance.
220
As noted previously, in 1996, Congress suspended non-humanitarian or
anti-narcotics assistance to Burma and ordered the U.S. to oppose IFI
213. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1994, §
562, Pub. L. No. 103-87, 107 Stat. 931, 968 (1993). The ban was also conditioned on Nicaragua's
resolution of expropriation claims and reform of the military, police, and judicial system.
214. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1994, §
563, Pub. L. No. 103-87, 107 Stat. 968 (1993). The President also prohibited the sale of arms, military
vehicles and petroleum products to Angola or UNITA. Exec. Order No. 12,865, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,005
(1993).
215. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1994, §
564, Pub. L. No. 103-87, 107 Stat. 931 (1993).
216. David Gonzalez, US. to Withhold Money for Haiti's Presidential Election, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 6,2000, at A10.
217. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1995,
Pub. L. No. 103-306, § 538, 108 Stat. 1639 (1994). The act essentially expanded a similar 1991 law that
had prohibited foreign assistance to countries failing to comply with the U.N. sanctions against Iraq. The
new act authorized the President to waive the ban on foreign assistance under certain conditions.
218. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-107, § 582, 110 Stat. 751 (1996). The act ordered the United States to oppose IFI loans
and withhold foreign assistance from countries that knowingly helped indicted individuals evade
prosecution by the tribunals. Potential targets of the act were Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia,
and Zaire. NAM REPORT, supra note 204, at app., 16.
219. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-107, § 578, 110 Stat. 750 (1996).
220. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-118, § 585, 111 Stat. 2386 (1997).
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assistance. In 1997, President Clinton barred new investment in Burma. The
same year, the United States authorized restrictions on foreign assistance and
IFI measures to countries and entities doing business with Cuba.221
In 1998, the State Department acted under the Leahy Amendment222 to
block the sale of U.S. attack helicopters to Turkey until Turkey's human rights
record significantly improved. The Department also refused to authorize
Export-Import Bank loans to finance a sale of armored police vehicles to
Turkey for use in provinces where the State Department had found that state-
sponsored torture was "a longstanding and pervasive practice.
22 3
Disclosures of human rights violations by Colombian army units that
had been armed and trained by the United States provoked Congress to
withhold U.S. aid to the Colombian army between 1994 and 1997 (aid to the
police and other branches of the military continued). In 1996, the Clinton
administration issued guidelines to relevant embassies regarding their
obligations under the Leahy Amendment, and requested a formal written
agreement with the Colombian government that the United States would not
provide anti-drug trafficking assistance if it had "credible evidence" that
Colombian security forces had engaged in human rights violations.224 The
Colombian army refused to cooperate, and U.S. military assistance Colombia
was suspended during 1997 until a new military command consented to a
Memorandum of Understanding with the United States.225 On the other hand,
in 2000, Congress voted a $1.3 billion military and narcotics trafficking
assistance package to Colombia, despite evidence of continued human rights
violations by the Colombian army. President Clinton waived human rights
conditions to make the funding available.226
2. Foreign Investment
In response to China's violent 1989 attack on students in Tiananmen
Square, the United States sought to defer consideration of international loans
for China in IFIs, and suspended arms sales, OPIC investment support, and
221. See discussion of Helms-Burton Act, infra Part V.
222. Leahy Amendment, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-133 (1996).
223. Dana Priest, New Human Rights Law Triggers Policy Debate, WASH. POST, Dec. 31,
1998, at A34. Because Turkey is a NATO ally and a major purchaser of U.S. weapons ($15 billion in the
past two decades), the action provoked substantial opposition from the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and
other U.S. officials, who argued the move would only aggravate Turkey's hostility toward human rights
and endanger U.S. trade and national security interests. The net effect of the action was minimal, since
General Dynamics, the U.S. partner to the transaction, privately financed the sale.
224. Carrillo-Suarez, supra note 13, at 128-34.
225. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Republic of Colombia
and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Transfer, Use, Security, and
Monitoring of Articles, Services, or Related Training that may be Furnished to the Government of the
Republic of Colombia by the Government of the United States of America, Aug. 1, 1997, cited in
Carrillo-Suarez, supra note 13, at 130.
226. Marc Lacey, Clinton Defends the Outlay of$ 1.3 Billion to Colombia, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
24,2000, at A6 (discussing Clinton's waiver of human rights provisions).
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high level diplomatic contacts between the United States and China.217 Most
of these restrictions were lifted in the early 1990s.
As discussed above, in 1996, Congress sought to use U.S. IFI votes to
promote cooperation with international criminal tribunals. In 1997, Congress
directed that the U.S. use its vote in IFIs to oppose loans to countries
practicing female genital mutilation that had not implemented educational
programs to deter the practice.
228
Domestic investment support through OPIC occasionally has been
conditioned on labor rights compliance. In the early 1990s, OPIC suspended
insurance programs in Nicaragua, Paraguay, Romania, Chile, the Central
African Republic, and Ethiopia at least in part as a result of labor rights
practices.229 In August 1994, OPIC discontinued its support for U.S. investors
in Gambia,230 and in 1995, Congress suspended OPIC activities in Burundi in
response to a military coup in that country.231 The same year, OPIC
terminated its support for investors in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United
Arab Emirates due to their failure to take adequate steps to promote
internationally recognized worker rights.232
3. Trade Restrictions
a. National Emergencies-the JEEPA, TWEA and EAA
In response to the 1979 hostage crisis, President Carter invoked IEEPA
to impose sweeping sanctions against Iran. 33 President Reagan employed
IEEPA to impose sanctions on South Africa in 1985,234 and in 1990, the
United States imposed trade and other sanctions on Iraq, motivated in part by
Iraqi human rights violations in the Persian Gulf region.235 The statute has
also been invoked to impose sanctions for human rights purposes on
227. 135 CONG. REc. H3455 (daily ed. June 29, 1989) (statement of Rep. Fascell); Thomas L.
Friedman, U.S. Suspends High-Level Links To China as Crackdown Goes On, N.Y. TIMES, June 21,
1989, at C12. The U.S. sanctions were accompanied by a limited international response. The European
Community condemned the Chinese action, suspended high-level communications and ultimately
adopted sanctions similar to those adopted by the United States. Alan Riding, Europeans Adopt New
Sanctions Against Chinese, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1989, at Al0. Italy suspended grants and loans to
China, and Belgium suspended loans and development assistance. Clyde Halberman, Economic
Penalties Are Placed on China by Italy and Belgium, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1989, at All; see also
MICHAEL P. MALLOY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND U.S. TRADE 196-97 (1990) (reviewing U.S. response
to the Tiananmen massacre).
228. The Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, § 579, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 170
Stat. 3009, 3170 (1990).
229. R. Michael Gadbav & Michael T. Medwig, Multinational Enterprises and International
Labor Standards, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 149 (Lance A.
Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996).
230. OPIC acted under the authority of Section 508 of the Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-87, § 508, 107 Stat. 931
(1993).
231. Id.
232. NAM REPORT, supra note 204, at app., 26.
233. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 3 C.F.R. 457 (1980).
234. Exec. Order No. 12,532, 50 Fed. Reg. 36,861 (1985).
235. Pub. L. 101-513, §§ 586-586J, 104 Stat. 2047 (1990).
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Nicaragua, Libya, Panama, Iraq, Haiti, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia and Eritrea,
Burma and the Angolan rebel forces, UNITA.
236
Export controls imposed under the EAA for foreign policy purposes
generally form part of broader economic sanctions measures imposed by the
President under IEEPA or the TWEA and may be imposed in part for human
rights reasons. Restrictions were imposed on Iran during the Iranian hostage
crisis and on agricultural exports to the Soviet Union following the invasion of
Afghanistan. Following the 1982 suppression of the Polish Solidarity
movement, the United States imposed export restrictions on the sale of U.S.
petroleum equipment to the former Soviet Union2 7 and also barred trade with
Poland.238 For decades, EAA sanctions have essentially prohibited all exports
to North Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba, by requiring licenses for all exports toS• 239
these countries and denying all license applications.
In November 1994, in response to Nigeria's hanging of nine
environmental activists, the United States expanded existing sanctions against
Nigeria to ban exports of military goods.24 In December 1995, the United
States suspended all export licenses for commercial defense products and
services to Nigeria. Export-Import Bank financing is barred for most products
and services to Angola unless the President finds that Angola has held free
and fair elections and taken other steps toward democratization. 24 1 In the
spring of 2000, President Clinton lifted import restrictions on luxury goods
from Iran in an effort to reward Iran for the recent election of a reform
242
government and to encourage future democratization.
Without question the most famous recent unilateral trade measure
imposed on a single nation for human rights violations was the 1986
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act,243 which was adopted over President
Reagan's veto. 244 The Act, which was supported by U.N. calls for sanctions,
236. For executive orders under IEEPA, see notes following 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1994).
237. The sanctions were imposed under the Export Administration Act of 1979 and remained in
place until the late 1980s. For further discussion, see CARTER, supra note 8, at 19-22.
238. See generally H. Moyer & Linda Mabry, Export Controls as Instruments of Foreign
Policy: The History, Legal Issues, and Policy Lessons of Three Recent Cases, 15 LAW & POL. INT'L
Bus. 1 (1983) (examining the U.S. response to the Iranian hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, and martial law in Poland).
239. 15 C.F.R. § 785.1 (1994).
240. 60 Fed. Reg. 66,334 (1995). The sale of defense goods to Nigeria was prohibited in June
1993. 58 Fed. Reg. 40,845 (1993). In April 1994, Nigeria had been rendered ineligible for assistance
from the Export-Import Bank and OPIC due to narcotics trafficking activities.
241. 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(11)(2000).
242. David Stout, U.S. to Drop Longtime Ban on Luxuries fron Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15,
2000, at A8.
243. Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086 (1986) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5017 (West
Supp. 1991)).
244. In 1985, President Reagan imposed limited sanctions on South Africa by executive order
under IEEPA in an effort to avert support for broader sanctions legislation that was pending in Congress.
Exec. Order No. 12,532, 50 Fed. Reg. 36,861 (1985); see also Exec. Order No. 12,535, 50 Fed. Reg.
40,325 (1985) (forbidding imports of South African krugerrands). The more comprehensive sanctions
legislation ultimately was adopted by Congress the following year and went into force over the
President's veto. See MALLOY, supra note 227, at 444-49.
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terminated new investment in South Africa, required U.S. companies in South
Africa employing more than twenty-five South African nationals to comply
with certain labor practices,245 and restricted trade in many goods between the
United States and South Africa. The Act was repealed in 1993, in conjunction
with the transition to majority democratic rule in South Africa.24 6
b. Import Preferences
(i) Most Favored Nation Status
MEFN status was withdrawn from Poland in 1982, following the
suppression of the solidarity labor union movement.247 Romania's MFN status
was jeopardized in the 1980s due to its human rights practices, and Romania
was excluded from the MFN system in 1988 as a result of its unwillingness to
comply with U.S. human rights demands. 248 The end of the Cold War has
resulted in the extension of MEN benefits to most formerly communist
countries to the point that "most favored nation" status was recently
redesignated "normal trade relations" by the Clinton administration.
Nevertheless, the United States continues to withhold normal trade relations
from Afghanistan, Cuba, Laos, North Korea, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro).250
China's MFN status was a source of controversy throughout the 1990s.
Concern over the use of convict labor in China played a prominent role in the
1992 debates regarding China's MFN status. The United States and China
reached an agreement regarding the use of prison labor in 1992,51 and
renewal of China's MFN status was conditioned in part on China's improved
compliance with the agreement.2 Opposition to MEFN benefits for China in
the aftermath of Tiananmen Square led President Clinton to grant only
conditional MFN treatment to China in 1993, tied to China's immediate
253progress on various human rights issues. In May 1994, Clinton barred
245. 22 U.S.C. § 5035 (1986) (repealed 1993); 22 C.F.R. pts. 60-65 & § 7.3(d), 7.5(b)(3), 7.8.
246. South African Democratic Transition Support Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-149, 107 Stat.
1503.
247. Suspension of the Application of Column 1 Rates of Duty of the Tariff Schedules of the
United States to the Products of Poland, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,005 (1982). Poland's MFN status was restored
in 1987. Restoration of the Application of Column I Rates of Duty of the Tariff Schedules of the United
States to the Products of Poland, 52 Fed. Reg. 5425 (1987).
248. Paul Lansing & Eric Rose, The Granting and Suspension of Most-Favored-Nation Status
for Nonmarket Economy States: Policy and Consequences, 25 HARv. INT'L L.J. 329, 329 (1984).
Romania's MFN status was renewed in 1993 and GSP status was granted in 1994. Notice of the
Effective Date of the Trade Agreement Between the United States of America and the Government of
Romania, 58 Fed. Reg. 60,226 (1993); 59 Fed. Reg. 8115 (1994).
249. Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 5003(b)(2), 112 Stat. 685 (1998).
250. Harmonized Tariff Schedule for the United States (2000), Supplement 1, General Note
3(b), at http:lldataweb.usic.gov/SCRIPTS/tariff/001 Ign.pdf (on file with Yale Journal of International
Law).
251. China-United States Memorandum of Understanding on Prohibiting Import and Export
Trade in Prison Labor Products, 31 I.L.M. 1071 (1992).
252. JACKSON, supra note 168, at 1008.
253. Exec. Order 12,850, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,327 (1993); Presidential Determination No. 93-23,
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weapons and munitions imports from China2 54 in response to China's failure
to make adequate progress on five of the seven human rights issues. Business
support for trade relations with China and the need for China's cooperation
with non-nuclear proliferation policies toward North Korea led President
Clinton to renew China's MFN status and de-link trade from human rights in
1994, despite the fact that China had made little progress on the terms from
25the prior year. In exchange for renewed trade relations with China, Clinton
agreed to help develop a voluntary code of conduct establishing labor and
human rights standards for U.S. companies operating abroad.256
Like President Bush before him, Clinton has maintained that
constructive engagement is the most effective way to promote improved
human rights conditions in China while preserving U.S. interests in the
region.257 In the spring of 2000, President Clinton successfully pushed for
Congress to normalize trade relations with China permanently and to
authorize China's entry into the WTO, despite China's renewed belligerence
toward Taiwan and the administration's acknowledgment that China's human
rights situation had deteriorated.258
(ii) Generalized System of Preferences
The GSP system has been the primary trade provision utilized to
promote labor rights. Labor unions and NGOs frequently request review of
GSP status, and U.S. State Department's annual investigation and reporting of
labor rights conditions plays an important role in the review process. Review
petitions citing labor abuses were filed regarding forty countries between 1984
and 1995. While most of the countries were found to satisfy GSP standards, in
the past twelve years, the following countries have been removed or
suspended from GSP treatment as a result of substandard labor practices:
259
58 Fed. Reg. 31,329 (1993). The conditions included the granting of exit visas, compliance with the
U.S.-China agreement on prison labor, progress in complying with the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, release of political prisoners, humane treatment of prisoners, protection for Tibetan religion and
culture, and allowing international radio and television broadcasts into China.
254. Arms Export Control Act, 22 C.F.R. §126.1 (1994); Importation of Arms, Ammunition,
and Implements of War, 27 C.F.R. § 47.52 (1994).
255. JACKSON, supra note 168, at 994-95.
256. This effort has resulted in the creation of the Apparel Industry Partnership, a coalition of
government, labor, human rights, and industry representatives who have drafted a code of conduct for
the apparel industry. U.S. companies doing business in China and elsewhere are not required to
participate in the partnership. See Cleveland, supra note 3, at 1552-53.
257. President in Press Conference on China MFN Status, 1994 WL 209851, at 1 (White
House).
258. Pub. L. No. 106-286, § 101, 114 Stat. 880 (2000); see also Joseph Kahn & Eric Schmitt,
Clinton to Send China Trade Bill to Congress Soon, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2000, at Al. For a discussion
of China's human rights situation, see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 1999 STATE DEPARTMENT COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 1019 (2000) (concluding that "[tihe Gdvernment's poor human
rights record deteriorated markedly throughout the year), available at http:llwww.state.gov/www/
global/humanrights/1999_hrpreport/china.htm.
259. Recent Changes in the GSP Program, at http:lwww.ustr.gov/reportslspeciallchanges.html
(last visited Nov. 2, 2000).
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Romania (removed 1987, restored 1994);260 Nicaragua (removed 1987);261
Paraguay (suspended 1987, restored 1991); 262 Chile (suspended 1987, restored
199 1);263 Burma (suspended 1989);264  the Central African Republic
(suspended 1989, restored 1991);265 Liberia (suspended 1990);266 Yugoslavia
(suspended 199 1);267 Sudan (suspended 1991);26 Syria (suspended 1992);269
Mauritania (suspended 1993);270 the Maldives (suspended 1995);271 Pakistan
(partially suspended 1996)." Pre-1993 sanctions remain in effect against
North Korea for labor rights violations.273 Furthermore, in 1993, the United
States placed El Salvador, Guatemala, Indonesia, Thailand, Malawi, and
Oman on "six-month continuing review status" to determine whether the
countries made "'substantial concrete progress' toward addressing worker
rights. 274 In 1997, the United States commenced a GSP review of labor rights
practices in Belarus and Swaziland.275
As with the imposition of sanctions on countries such as China for
general human rights abuses, the decision whether to impose sanctions for
foreign labor rights violations often poses difficult realpolitik questions for the
U.S. Government. In 1994, for example, Indonesia's entitlement to GSP status
was challenged by various groups, and a GSP Subcommittee review found
substantial violations in every designated area of worker rights.
276
260. Proclamation No. 5617, 3 C.F.R. 26, 26-27 (1988), reprinted in 101 Stat. 2086, 2086-87
(1987); 59 Fed. Reg. 8115 (1994).
261. Proclamation No. 5617, 3 C.F.R. 26, 26-27 (1988), reprinted in 101 Stat. 2086, 2086-88
(1987).
262. Id.; Proclamation No. 6245, 3 C.F.R. 7, 7-9 (1992), reprinted in 105 Stat. 2484, 2484-86
(1991).
263. Proclamation No. 6244, 3 C.F.R. 5, 5-7 (1992), reprinted in 105 Stat. 2482, 2482-83
(1991); Proclamation No. 5758, 3 C.F.R. 187, 187-88 (1988), reprinted in 102 Stat. 4941 (1988).
264. Proclamation No. 5955, 3 C.F.R. 29, 29-31 (1990), reprinted in 103 Stat. 3010, 3011-13
(1989).
265. Proclamation No. 6245, 3 C.F.R. 7, 7-9 (1992), reprinted in 105 Stat. 2484, 2484-86
(1991); Proclamation No. 5955, 3 C.F.R. 29, 29-31 (1990), reprinted in 103 Stat. 3010, 3011-13 (1989).
266. Proclamation No. 6123, 3 C.F.R. 52, 52-56 (1991), reprinted in 104 Stat. 5252, 5253-56
(1990).
267. Proclamation No. 6389, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,467 (1991).
268. Proclamation No. 6282, 56 Fed. Reg. 19,525 (1991).
269. Proclamation No. 6447, 3 C.F.R. 107, 108 (1993), reprinted in 106 Stat. 5320, 5321
(1992).
270. Proclamation No. 6575, 3 C.F.R. 65, 66 (1994), reprinted in 107 Stat. 2675, 2676 (1993).
271. Proclamation No. 6813, 3 C.F.R. 61, 62-63 (1996).
272. Proclamation No. 6942, 3 C.F.R. 94, 95-96 (1997). The suspension withheld GSP
treatment for imports of surgical instruments, leather gloves, sporting goods and carpets from Pakistan.
273. NAM REPORT, supra note 204, at 1.
274. Gadbaw & Medwig, supra note 229, at 148. Guatemala was removed from review in
1997, following Guatemala's adoption of measures to reduce the intimidation of workers and to improve
labor rights compliance. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Announces
Termination of GSP Review of Guatemala and Initiation of Reviews of Belarus and Swaziland, May 2,
1997.
275. Press Release, supra note 272.
276. The GSP Subcommittee found that Indonesia substantially obstructed the rights to
associate and to organize and bargain collectively, for example, by imposing registration requirements
that thwarted the formation of unions, by requiring that all unions belong to a government-controlled
national union structure, though government harassment of organizers, police and military intervention
in strikes, and by erecting substantial legal obstacles to the right to strike. The GSP subcommittee
further received credible reports that Indonesia condoned the use of forced labor by logging companies
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Nevertheless, in light of Indonesia's large size and strategic and economic
importance to the United States, the U.S. ultimately suspended the Indonesian
review for six months while the GSP subcommittee monitored Indonesia's
progress.
277
Indonesia's experience is typical in that although many GSP cases are
submitted and reviewed, relatively few countries are denied GSP benefits on
grounds of worker rights violations. As the above list reflects, most countries
from which preferences are withheld also have poor political relations with
the United States for other reasons. Moreover, the Clinton administration
recently has been less willing to impose GSP sanctions for labor violations,
even as the administration has publicly advocated greater international labor-
trade linkage. Nevertheless, the reviews do encourage labor rights compliance
by GSP recipients, regardless of whether sanctions are ultimately imposed,
and the OECD has concluded that the GSP system plays an important role in
278promoting global worker rights.
(iii) Import Restrictions
During the 1990s, Section 307 of the Tariff Act prohibiting the
importation of goods produced with prison or forced labor was invoked to
exclude certain Mexican products.279 In June 1993, the United States barred
specified leather imports from China following a determination by the U.S.
Customs service that goods produced at the Qinghai Hide and Garment
Factory were produced with convict labor.280 In April 1996, the Customs
Service again acted under Section 307 to bar importation of certain iron pipe
fittings from the Tianjin Malleable Iron Factory in China, based on a
determination that the goods were being produced with prison labor.
281
Following the 1997 amendment to Section 307,282 a petition was filed to ban
on Irian Jaya and that individuals had been sold as domestic or agricultural workers. Child labor
remained a serious problem, regional minimum wages were consistently less than the amount required
to meet basic needs, and enforcement of the minimum wage law was "virtually nonexistent." The
Subcommittee concluded that it was "unable to recommend that Indonesia is taking steps to provide
internationally recognized worker rights" and that Indonesia had made little progress in major areas of
concern. Generalized System of Preferences Subcommittee of the Trade Policy Staff Committee, 1992
GSP Annual Review-Worker Rights Review Summary-Indonesia (Case 007-CP-92, July 1993),
reprinted in JACKSON ETAL., supra note 168, at 999-1006.
277. Id. at 1006.
278. OECD STUDY, supra note 7, at 186.
279. Merchandise Produced by Convict, Forced, or Indentured Labor, 19 C.F.R. § 12.42(h)
(2000).
280. Determination That Merchandise Imported from the People's Republic of China is Being
Produced with Convict, Forced, or Indentured Labor by the Qinghai Hide and Garment Factory, 58 Fed.
Reg. 32,746 (1993).
281. Determination That Merchandise Imported From the People's Republic of China Is Being
Produced Using Convict, Forced, or Indentured Labor by the Tianjin Malleable Iron Factory, 61 Fed.
Reg. 17,956 (1996).
282. Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-61, § 634, 111 Stat. 1272 (1997) (barring use of customs service funds "to allow the
importation into the United States of any good, ware, article, or merchandise minded, produced, or
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importation of rugs from South Asia that are knotted by hand with child
labor.283
c. National and Sub-National Government Procurement
In 1999, President Clinton barred federal agencies from purchasing
products made with child labor.284 In addition to the federal measures, state
and local governments have adopted selective purchasing laws prohibiting
government procurement agreements with specific foreign governments or
with entities doing business in targeted states, including Burma, Nigeria,
China, Cuba, Indonesia, and Switzerland.285 Dade County, Florida, for
example, has barred government contracts with companies doing business
with Cuba since 1992, and expanded the provision to include Helms-Burton
manufactured by forced or indentured child labor, as determined pursuant to section 307 of the Tariff
Act of 1930").
283. International Labor Rights Fund, Labor Rights and Trade, at n.35 (1998), at
www.laborrights.org (last visited Nov. 28, 2000) (on file with The Yale Journal of International Law).
284. Exec. Order 13,126, supra note 188.
285. According to the Organization for International Investment, a business organization which
lobbies against U.S. economic sanctions, states and municipalities recently have imposed selective
purchasing and/or investment sanctions as follows:
California (Holocaust survivor reparations, 1998, 1999);
Alameda County (Burma, 1996), (Nigeria, 1997);
Berkeley (Burma, 1995), (Nigeria, 1997), (China/Tibet, 1997);
Los Angeles (Burma, 1998);
Oakland (Burma, 1996), (Nigeria, 1997);
Palo Alto (Burma, 1997);
San Francisco (Burma, 1995);
Santa Cruz (Burma, 1997);
Santa Monica (Burma, 1995);
West Hollywood (Burma, 1997);
Boulder, Colorado (Burma, 1996);








Tacoma Park, Maryland (Burma, 1996);
Ann Arbor, Michigan (Burma, 1996);
Carrboro, North Carolina (Burma, 1996);
Chapel Hill, North Carolina (Burma, 1997);
New York, New York (Burma, 1997);
North Olmstead, Ohio (sweatshop labor, 1998);
Portland, Oregon (Burma, 1998);
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (N. Ireland, 1989, amended 1991, 1994, 1995);
Vermont (Burma, 1999);
Washington (Holocaust survivor reparations, 1999);
Madison, Wisconsin (Burma, 1996).
Other state and local measures are pending. OFII Report, supra note 49; see also Paul Blustein, Thinking
Globally, Punishing Locally, WASH. POST, May 16, 1997, at G1 (discussing proliferation of state and
local sanctions measures); Robert S. Greenberger, State, Cities Increase Use of Trade Sanctions,
Troubling Business Groups and US. Partners, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1998, at A20 (discussing response
to Massachusetts Burma Statute).
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"traffickers" in 1996. 286 In 1998, North Olmstead, Ohio barred the
government from doing business with countries where "sweatshop" labor is
employed, defined as child labor, forced labor, sub-living wages, and a longer
28than 48-hour work week. 87 Local governments also have imposed sanctions
on specific foreign entities, such as New York's recent sanctions to pressure
Swiss banks to provide restitution for Holocaust accounts.288 The domestic
legality of such measures recently was called into question by the U.S.
Supreme Court.289
In sum, the United States has utilized a wide range of economic
measures to promote human rights compliance in a variety of contexts. The
questions to be explored in the remainder of this Article are to what extent
these actions are consistent with the international law system and promote the
promulgation and internalization of human rights norms.
V. COMPLIANCE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
As noted in the Introduction, unilateral economic sanctions cannot
legitimately promote norm internalization unless they are employed in a
manner consistent with the broader principles of the international system. A
number of criticisms predicated on international law have been directed at
unilateral sanctions generally, and at U.S. sanctions practices in particular.290
The foreign targets of sanctions criticize U.S. economic unilateralism-like
U.S. military unilateralism-as the hegemonic actions of a global
"hyperpower," which violate state sovereignty and the principles of the U.N.
system. The use of trade sanctions or foreign assistance limitations to impose
secondary boycotts has been criticized for violating international law
principles regarding state jurisdiction. Free trade advocates contend that trade
286. Jim Oliphant, U.S. Appeals Court Ruling Heartens Foes of Dade Law Barring Cuba
Trade, FLA. DAILY Bus. REV., July 8, 1999, at A2. It is unclear whether the law has ever been enforced
to impact substantial corporate interests. The county retains authority to waive application of the law on
a case-by-case basis. The county invoked the ordinance to bar the use of county facilities for a Latin
American musical conference because Cuban musicians were scheduled to play, but ultimately relented
after the American Civil Liberties Union threatened suit. The county also waived application of the
policy to AT&T, which conducts business in Cuba through a subsidiary, and allowed AT&T to submit a
bid for the $50 million contract to manage Miami's pay phones. Id.
287. OFII Report, supra note 49.
288. David Johnston, New York Officials to Impose Sanctions on Swiss Banks Sept. 1, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 3, 1998, at A3; John Maggs, Businesses Battle State Sanctions, Corporate Leaders to File
Constitutional Challenge, J. CoM., Aug. 28, 1997, at IA; David Sanger, As U.S. Urges Delicacy on
Swiss Gold, New York City Hints at a Bold Stroke, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1997, at A10; David Sanger,
Swiss Banks Said to Offer Holocaust Payment, N.Y. TIMEs, June 5, 1998, at A9.
289. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
290. For recent critiques of U.S. unilateralism, see, e.g., Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Place and
Role of Unilateralism in Contemporary International Law, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 19 (2000); Peter
Malanczuk, The International Criminal Court and Landmines: What are the Consequences of Leaving
the U.S. Behind, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 77 (2000), at http://www.ejil.orgjoumallVolll/Nol/index.html
(last visited Dec. 2, 2000); Bernhard Jansen, The Limits of Unilateralism from a European Perspective,
11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 309 (2000), at http://www.ejil.org/joumal/Voll l/No2/index.html (last visited Dec. 2,
2000).
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restrictions to promote fundamental rights violate the GATT international
trading system. And human rights advocates maintain that U.S. unilateral
action undermines the development of international standards and a
multilateral human rights enforcement system. All of these critiques
essentially contend that unilateral economic action, at least as conducted by
the United States, frustrates, rather than promotes, the broader international
legal system. This Section addresses each of the above criticisms in turn. It
concludes that while some U.S. unilateral measures may conflict, or fail to
comport, with international rules regarding jurisdiction, free trade, and
international human rights standards, unilateral measures do not per se
undermine the international system, and, when properly tailored to comply
with international rules, may play an important role in its development.
A. The Validity of Nonforcible Unilateral Action Under International Law
The first question raised by unilateral economic sanctions is whether
they violate the sovereignty of the foreign target state-a principle protected
both by customary international law and by the U.N. Charter, which
recognizes the right of states to be free from foreign intervention in matters of
purely domestic concern. 291 U.S. sanctions notoriously have been used to
accomplish changes in foreign states' behavior. Some desired changes have
been as modest as the release of political prisoners, while others as intrusive
as the destabilization or restoration of governments. Sanctions have targeted
cultural practices such as genital mutilation and domestic population
control.292 The U.S. embargo against Cuba has significantly debilitated that
country's economy.
293
States subject to sanctions and developing countries have often
contended that economic interventions such as these constitute unlawful
294intrusions into their sovereign affairs. This charge was also raised in 1989
by then U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, who admonished, as
Western states contemplated sanctions in the aftermath of China's Tiananmen
Square massacre, that U.N. members should avoid interfering in what was
essentially a domestic matter of another member.295 The relationship between
unilateral economic sanctions and state sovereignty raises two questions-
whether such measures may be adopted consistent with the U.N. Charter and
whether they comport with customary international law. Each question is
considered below.
291. Article 2(7) of the Charter provides that "[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state.. ."). U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7.
292. E.g., The Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, § 579, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
170 Stat. 3009, 3170 (1990).
293. HUFBAUER ET AL., SUPPLEMENTAL CASE HISTORIES, supra note 8, at 203.
294. Barbara Crossette, China Tries to Deflect Criticism on Rights, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 6, 2000,
at A10.
295. MALLOY, supra note 227, at 197.
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1. Unilateral Intervention and the U.N. Charter
The U.N. Charter expressly contemplates that multilateral economic
sanctions may be imposed in order to preserve the peace and stability of the
international system. Article 41 authorizes the Security Council to call for
non-military measures, including "complete or partial interruption of
economic relations," to respond to a breach of the peace or act of aggression
under Article 39.296 Multilateral U.N. sanctions, however, have proven of
limited use in the promotion of human rights. In the first thirty years of the
United Nations' existence, Security Council authorization for economic
sanctions was provided only once-in the 1965 call for economic sanctions
against Rhodesia.297 The Security Council imposed a limited arms embargo on
South Africa in 1977,298 though the U.N. efforts to impose broader
multilateral economic sanctions on South Africa were thwarted for nearly a
decade by the vetoes of the United States and other Western nations.
299
The decline of Cold War tensions has allowed the Security Council to
employ economic sanctions more actively in recent years. The international
community has also been increasingly willing to recognize human rights
atrocities as matters which threaten international security and warrant
economic, humanitarian, and even military intervention, in places as varied as
Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, and East Timor. In Somalia, for
example, the United Nations found that the "magnitude of human tragedy"
constituted a threat to international peace and security warranting armed
intervention. 30 The United Nations has also recognized that human rights
conflicts resulting in transnational refugee flows may constitute threats to
international peace and security.3 1 While these are positive developments,
296. U.N. CHARTER art. 46.
297. S.C. Res. 232, U.N. SCOR, 21st Sess., 1340th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/232 (1966);
Seventh Report of the Security Council Committee Established in Pursuance of Resolution 253 (1968)
Concerning the Question of Southern Rhodesia, 30 U.N. SCOR, Spec. Supp. No. 2, Vol. 1, at 100, U.N.
Doc. S/11594/rev. 1 (1975); see also Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Riesman, Rhodesia and the
United Nations: The Lawfulness ofInternational Concern, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1968) (discussing the
propriety of the Security Council's imposition of mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia under Article 39
of the Charter). The sanctions remained in place until 1979, the year before Rhodesia became
independent Zimbabwe.
298. S.C. Res. 418, U.N. SCOR, 32d Year, Res. & Dec., at 5-6, U.N. Doc. S/INF/33 (1977).
299. Jennifer Davis et al., Economic Disengagement and South Africa: The Effectiveness and
Feasibility of Implementing Sanctions and Divestment, 15 L. & POL'Y. INT'L Bus. 529, 559 (1983). In
1985, the Security Council called for the suspension of new investment and export loans, and
prohibitions on the sale of South African krugerrands, nuclear contracts, and the sale of computer
equipment that could be used by the security forces. S.C. Res. 569, U.N. SCOR, 40th Sess., 2602d mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/569 (1985); S.C. Res. 418, U.N. SCOR, 32nd Sess. 2046th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/418 (1977). More comprehensive sanctions had been called for by the General Assembly. See,
e.g., G.A. Res. 35/206, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 48, U.N. Doc. A/Res/35/206 (1980) (calling
upon the Security Council to impose mandatory, comprehensive, and effective sanctions against South
Africa).
300. Robert M. Cassidy, Sovereignty Versus the Chimera of Armed Humanitarian Intervention,
21 FLETCHER FORUM ON WORLD AFF. 47,59 (1997).
301. U.N. Security Council Resolution 688 authorized military assistance to Kurdish refugees
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most Security Council economic interventions in the 1990s have been driven
more by the desire to prevent destabilization of the world order-as in the
case of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the military coup against President
Aristide in Haiti in 1991, and Libya's surrender of individuals suspected in the
Pan Am 103 bombing-than by strictly human rights concerns. China, in
particular, remains hostile to any U.N. action targeting governments for
domestic human rights practices.
While multilateral economic sanctions are expressly provided for by the
Charter, the Charter does not bar unilateral economic measures to promote its
purposes. Unlike the unilateral use of force, which is expressly prohibited by
Article 2(4) of the Charter,302 the Charter does not expressly prohibit
unilateral nonforcible interference such as economic sanctions or the
curtailing of diplomatic relations by U.N. members. Some developing
countries have argued that Articles 2(4) and 2(7) implicitly bar economic and
other nonforcible intervention.30 3 Article 2(4), however, is limited to "the
threat or use of force," and Article 2(7) is limited to action by the United
in northern Iraq as a result of threat of refugee flows to international peace and security. David A.
Martin, Strategies for a Resistant World: Human Rights Initiatives and the Need for Alternatives to
Refugee Interdiction, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 753, 766-68 (1993). The Security Council also found that
refugee flows in Bosnia contributed to the threat to international peace and security. Guenther Auth,
Protecting Minorities: Lessons of International Peacekeeping, 91 AM. SOC. INT'L L. PROC. 429, 438
(1977); Christopher A. Riley, Note, Neither Free Nor Fair: The 1996 Bosnian Elections and the Failure
of the U.N. Election-Monitoring Mission, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 1173, 1202-03 (1997).
302. Article 2(4) forbids the "threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4. The prohibition is subject to the right of self-defense from armed attack under
Article 5 1.
303. In 1984, the U.N. General Assembly pronounced the following under the GATT:
[D]eveloped countries should refrain from threatening or applying trade restrictions,
blockades, embargoes and other economic sanctions, incompatible with the Charter of the
United Nations and in violation of undertakings contracted, multilaterally or bilaterally,
against developing countries as a form of political and economic coercion which affects
their economic, political and social development.
G.A. Res. 39/210, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, 104th plen. mtg., at 160, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/39/210 (1984). Eighteen countries, including the United States, opposed the resolution.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 141, § 905, Reporter's note 6. The Charter of the Organization of American
States also provides that "[n]o State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic
or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advantages
of any kind." CHARTER OFTHE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES art. 19; see also id. art. 18
(prohibiting forcible and nonforcible "interference... against the personality of the State or against its
political, economic, and cultural elements"); Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention, G.A.
Res. 2131 (XX) (1965), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., 1408 plen. mtg., at 9 (1965) (prohibiting, inter alia, the
use of economic, political, or other measures to coerce another state into subordinating the exercise of its
sovereign rights or to otherwise secure advantages from it); G.A. Res. 44/125, U.N. GAOR, 81st mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/125 (1989); G.A. Res. 38/197, U.N. GAOR 2d Comm., 38th Sess., 104th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/Res/38/197 (1983) (noting the use of economic coercion against developing countries).
Although the General Assembly has adopted resolutions condemning the U.S. economic embargo of
Cuba for the past nine years, the resolutions have focused primarily on the United States' use of
extraterritorial measures. E.g., Press Release, GA/9814, Nov. 9,2000 (discussing G.A. Res. No.
A/RES/55/20 (2000)). Richard D. Porotsky, Economic Coercion and the General Assembly: A Post-
Cold War Assessment of the Legality and Utility of the Thirty-Five-Year Old Embargo Against Cuba, 28
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 901, 950 (1995) (concluding that the resolutions have not altered international
positions regarding a legal norm prohibiting economic coercion).
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Nations, not by its member states.304 No international consensus has emerged
to support the contrary position.
Furthermore, one of the most significant developments of the past
several decades has been the broad recognition of human rights as matters of
international concern that warrant bilateral and multilateral intervention by
states. The U.N. Charter itself obligates member states to respect human rights
and fundamental freedoms and "to take joint and separate action in
cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of [these] 
purposes." 305
Thus the Charter creates mutual obligations among states to respect human
rights and anticipates unilateral as well as multilateral action to achieve this
goal.306 In short, nothing in the U.N. Charter bars the use of nonforcible,
economic measures to promote human rights compliance. To the contrary,
economic measures are fully consistent with the Charter's goal of joint and
separate action to achieve its human rights goals, and, when properly
calibrated, such measures complement, rather than contradict, the multilateral
remedies available under that instrument.
2. The Customary International Law of Nonintervention
Customary international law likewise does not bar states from
using economic measures to promote human rights compliance. As discussed
below, although international law traditionally has protected the right of states
to be free from intervention by other states in the conduct of their sovereign
domestic affairs, this principle of nonintervention does not clearly apply to the
use of nonforcible economic measures to promote international human rights.
Even if human rights measures were to violate the nonintervention norm, they
may still constitute an acceptable use of nonforcible countermeasures to
retaliate against violations of international human rights.
304. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7) (barring intervention by the United Nations into the domestic
affairs of states). Article 2(7) of Charter "does not exclude action, short of dictatorial interference,
undertaken with the view to implementing the purposes of the Charter." OPPENHEIM, supra note 139, §
132; see also JEAN-PIERRE COT & ALLAIN PELLET, LA CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES: COMMENTAIRE,
ARTICLE PAR ARTICLE 141-60 (1985); CHARTA DER VEREINTEN NATIONEN 100-14 (Bruno Simma ed.,
1991). Since 1945, Article 2(7) has been construed very narrowly, to the extent that many previously
"internal" concerns of states, and particularly those relating to fundamental human rights, are recognized
as matters of international concern. As early as 1946, the General Assembly intervened under the
Charter, regarding the treatment of Indians in South Africa, Res. 44(1) (1946), cited in OPPENHEIM,
supra note 139, § 433 n.23. For further discussion of economic coercion under the U.N. Charter, see
generally ECONOMIC COERCION AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (Richard Lillich ed.,
1976).
305. U.N. CHARTER art. 56; see also supra note 103 (giving text of Articles 55 and 56).
306. See generally John Dugard, Sanctions Against South Africa: An International Law
Perspective, in SANCTIONS AGAINST APARTHEID 113 (Mark Orkin ed., 1989) (tracing U.N. responses to
apartheid as a threat to international peace and security); McDougal & Reisman, Rhodesia and the
United Nations, supra note 297 (same).
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a. The Nonintervention Norm
Customary international law prohibits "intervention" in the form of
"forcible or dictatorial interference by a state in the affairs of another state,
calculated to impose certain conduct or consequences on that other state.',30 7
As a threshold matter, it is unclear whether economic interference constitutes
a form of "coercion" within the meaning of the nonintervention norm. In
particular, because economic assistance is voluntary and given at the donor
country's discretion, the use of foreign assistance to alter a foreign state's
behavior may not be subject to the nonforcible countermeasures analysis.30 8
Customary international law traditionally has allowed states to use economic
coercion for a wide range of purposes,3° 9 and the relatively frequent use of
economic sanctions by the United States and other developed nations since
World War II makes it difficult to conclude that a customary international
norm exists against the practice.
The compatibility of economic coercion with international law was
confirmed by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, in which Nicaragua challenged
both U.S. military support for the Contras and U.S. economic coercion (in the
form of terminated foreign aid, the reduction of Nicaragua's sugar import
quota, and a trade embargo). The ICJ concluded with respect to the U.S.
economic measures that it was "unable to regard such action on the economic
plane ... as a breach of the customary-law principle of nonintervention." 310
Nothing in customary international law, therefore, appears to bar the use of
economic coercion.
This is particularly true when economic measures are used to promote
human rights norms, which are not strictly matters of domestic sovereignty.
As the ICJ has recognized, an intervention prohibited by the nonintervention
norm must "be one bearing on matters in which each State is permitted, by the
principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely." 31' Human rights are not such
307. OPPENHEIM, supra note 139, § 129.
308. Oppenheim states:
[A] state may, without thereby committing an act of intervention .... sever diplomatic
relations with another state, discontinue exports to it or a programme of aid, or organise a
boycott of its products .... Although such measures may... be intended ... to persuade
the other state to pursue, or discontinue, a particular course of conduct, such pressure
falls short of being dictatorial and does not amount to intervention.
Id.; Lori Fisler Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence over
Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 39-42 (1989); Tom J. Farer, Political and Economic Coercion in
Contemporary International Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 405, 413 (1985) (arguing that economic coercion
constitutes aggression "only when [...] the objective of the coercion is to liquidate an existing state or to
reduce that state to the position of a satellite").
309. According to Vattel:
[E]very nation has a right to choose whether she will or will not trade with another, and
on what conditions she is willing to do it; if one nation has for a time permitted another to
come and trade in the country, she is at liberty, whenever she thinks proper, to prohibit
that commerce-to restrain it-to subject it to certain regulations; and the people who
before carried it on cannot complain of injustice.
VATrEL, THE LAW OFNATIONS, bk. I, ch. VIII, § 94 (Chitty ed., 1866).
310. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 126 (June 27).
311. Id. at 108.
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principles subject to domestic discretion, but are matters of international
concern which justify intervention by the international community.
3 12 As the
Barcelona Traction court wrote, "[i]n view of the importance of the rights
involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their 
protection." 313
Accordingly, international law recognizes a number of exceptions to state
sovereignty to promote compliance with, and enforcement of, human rights.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that, with respect to
"provisions relating to the protection of the human person contained in treaties
of a humanitarian character, 3 14 states may neither terminate their own
obligations nor suspend performance due to a material breach by another
party. In 1994, the U.N. Human Rights Committee confirmed this principle by
ruling that signatories to the ICCPR could not validly enter reservations to
provisions that reflected jus cogens and erga omnes obligations of
international law.315 Core international human rights principles have also been
recognized as exceptions to the U.S. act of state doctrine316 and to head of
state immunity.317 With respect to individual liability, principles of universal
jurisdiction give states authority to punishjus cogens crimes such as genocide,
torture, war crimes, and the slave trade, regardless of whether the state
otherwise would enjoy jurisdiction, as a result of the global community's
universal condemnation of those activities and collective interest in
suppressing them.31 8 This exceptional jurisdiction extends not only to the
312. See, e.g., Darrosch, supra note 308, at 31-34, 45-47 (arguing that economic intervention
in foreign states for human rights purposes does not violate the nonintervention norm).
313. Barcelona Traction, Light And Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4,32 (Feb. 5).
314. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 60, 5, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
346.
315. As the U.N. Human Rights Committee noted:
Although treaties that are mere exchanges of obligations between States allow them to
reserve inter se application of rules of general international law, it is otherwise with
human rights treaties, which are for the benefit of persons within their jurisdiction.
Accordingly, provisions in the Covenant [ICCPR] that represent customary international
law (and a fortiori when they have the character of peremptory norms) may not be the
subject of reservations.
General Comment 24, supra note 157, 8.
316. RESTATEMENT, supra note 141, § 443, cmt. c ("A claim arising out of an alleged violation
of fundamental human rights... [would] probably not be defeated by the act of state doctrine.").
317. In re: Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that acts of
torture, execution, and disappearance are not official acts protected by head of state immunity); see, e.g.,
Genocide Convention, supra note 110, art. 4 (recognizing liability for rulers and public officials);
Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3)
[2000], 1 A.C. 147 (1999) (holding that former head of state lacked immunity after torture and became
subject to universal jurisdiction with ratification of Torture Convention).
318. Cf. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161 (1820) (recognizing piracy "as an
offense against the universal law of society"). See generally In re: Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d
at 1475 (recognizing torture, summary execution, and disappearance as violations of "universal"
obligations); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1016
(1986), vacated on other grounds, 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he 'universality principle' is based
on the assumption that some crimes are so universally condemned that the perpetrators are the enemies
of all people."); Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[F]or purposes of civil
liability, the torturer has become like the pirate and the slave trader before him-hostis humanis generis,
an enemy of all mankind."). The Statute of the International Criminal Court acknowledges that "it is the
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actual perpetrators, but also to their aiders and abetters. 319 In sum, economic
measures themelves do not appear to implicate the nonintervention norm. And
because human rights protections enjoy the status of international, rather than
domestic concerns, at a minimum, economic measures to promote
international human rights do not constitute coercive intervention under
customary international law.
b. Nonforcible Countermeasures
Even if economic sanctions for human rights purposes could constitute a
form of prohibited coercion, the principle of nonforcible countermeasures
would allow use of such sanctions to retaliate for another state's breach of its
international obligations to protect human rights.320 Customary international
law generally provides that a state that has violated an international obligation
to another state or an obligation to all states (erga omnes), is subject to
peaceful retaliatory measures that would otherwise be illegal. The measures
adopted, however, must be necessary to terminate the violation or prevent
future violations and proportional to the violation or injury suffered.32 1
Furthermore, nonforcible countermeasures may be used only after other
attempts at mediation and compromise have failed.322
One question that might be raised regarding the application of
nonforcible countermeasures analysis to human rights treaties is whether
human rights violations involve the requisite breach of a mutual obligation,
since few human rights treaties expressly recognize the right of states to act
against other states to enforce human rights norms. 3 23 Some commentators
duty of every state to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes."
Rome Statute, supra note 153, pmbl., 6; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 141, § 404, cmt. a;
STEVEN RATNER & JASON ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 141 (1997); DIANE F. ORENTLICHER, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute
Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991) (discussing duty of states to
extradite or prosecute violations of universal norms of international law).
319. E.g., Torture Convention, supra note 111, art. 3.
320. For a discussion of state authority to impose lawful countermeasures, see generally
RESTATEMENT, supra note 141, § 905 & cmts. a, C; ECONOMIC COERCION, supra note 308; O.Y.
ELAGAB, THE LEGALITY OF NON-FORCIBLE COUNTER-MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1988);
FARER, supra note 308; David J. Gerber, Beyond Balancing: International Law Restraints on the Reach
of National Laws, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 185 (1984).
321. OPPENHEIM, supra note 139, § 131. Few courts have addressed the necessity and
proportionality requirements of nonforcible retaliation, and most decisions that implicate the
proportionality requirement appear to have found it satisfied. The broad U.S. sanctions against Iran
imposed following the seizure of U.S. consular personnel were upheld by the ICJ as appropriate under
the circumstances. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.CJ.
3, 17 (May 24); see also Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946 Between the United States of
America and France (U.S. v. France), 18 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 417, 443-45 (Dec. 9, 1978) (upholding
U.S. denial of air service rights to France following France's denial of equivalent rights, and observing
that countermeasures should be equivalent in some measure to the breach and should seek "to restore
equality between the Parties and to encourage them to continue negotiations with mutual desire to reach
an acceptable solution").
322. RESTATEMENT, supra note 141, § 905, cmt. c.
323. Notable exceptions include the 1957 Slavery Convention, 266 U.N.T.S. 3,41, art. I, which
broadly obligates states parties "to take all practicable and necessary legislative and other measures to
bring about ... the complete abolition" of forced labor and all other slave-like practices, the 1957
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have read this absence, combined with the reporting and oversight committees
established by various human rights conventions (such as the ICCPR Human
Rights Committee or the ILO complaint procedures), as precluding unilateral
retaliation. 324 The jus cogens and erga omnes status of human rights norms
under the U.N. Charter and customary international law, however, renders
their breach subject to nonforcible countermeasures. Accordingly, the better
view is that the formal treaty procedures-which lack enforcement
mechanisms-were intended to complement the existing decentralized
enforcement mechanisms that are available under customary international law.
States that wish to be a part of the international community accept both the
obligations of that community and the possibility that they will be held
accountable through unilateral or multilateral sanctions for violations of its
norms. Thus, resort to reasonable nonforcible countermeasures is justifiable if
both the sanctioning and target states are party to the international human
rights treaty being violated, or if the target state violates ajus cogens or erga
omnes norm of international law.
In short, the use of unilateral economic sanctions to promote
fundamental human rights is consistent with the obligations imposed by the
U.N. Charter, various human rights instruments, and customary international
law norms regarding nonintervention and nonforcible countermeasures.
Whether human rights sanctions fall beyond the reach of the nonintervention
norm altogether or are justifiable as reasonable nonforcible countermeasures,
they are allowed under international law as an appropriate response to human
rights violations.
B. Secondary Boycotts and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
A second potential customary international law concern is raised by
sanctions measures that target third party entities or states. Under traditional
public international law principles, a state's prescriptive jurisdiction-or
authority to legally regulate conduct-extends to persons and things present in
the territory and to conduct substantially occurring in the territory or having
substantial effects there. A state also may exercise jurisdiction over the actions
and interests of its nationals. 325 "Extraterritorial" sanctions, or secondary
boycotts, have long been criticized as violating these principles, since they
Supplementary Convention, supra note 126, at art. I, and the Apartheid Convention, supra note 148, at
art. IV(a) & (b), which requires states "to adopt any legislative or other measures necessary to suppress
as well as to prevent any encouragement of the crime of apartheid" without jurisdictional limitation. The
Genocide Convention also authorizes actions against other states in the ICJ. Genocide Convention,
supra note 110, art. IX.
324. Weisburd, supra note 19, at 115-16 (1995-96).
325. RESTATEMENT, supra note 141, § 402; OPPENHEIM, supra note 139, §§ 137-39 (discussing
international law bases for state jurisdiction). Exercise of jurisdiction is subject to the goal of avoiding
unreasonableness and conflict with other laws. RESTATEMENT § 403, cmt. g. States also have limited
universal jurisdiction to regulate and punish conduct recognized by the international community as
violating matters of universal concern. Id. § 404.
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purport to exercise authority over foreign states and entities for engaging in
conduct (business with third countries) that has no jurisdictional nexus with
the sanctioning state. Such measures are also criticized as violating principles
of nonforcible retaliation, due to the critical absence of any breach of duty
between the sanctioning and target states.
The United States has specifically condemned secondary boycotts, such
as the Arab League's boycott of Israel, for violating international law, and
U.S. law opposes secondary boycotts. 326 Nevertheless, the United States has
imposed sanctions on persons or property with extraterritorial effects in the
past,327 and present U.S. sanctions laws contain a number of extraterritorial
provisions. The 1996 Helms-Burton Act withholds foreign assistance, not
simply from the target state, but from countries that provide economic
assistance, debt relief, or trade benefits to Cuba, and withholds entry visas and
allows suits for damages against foreign entities doing business with Cuba.
328
Selective purchasing laws such as the Massachusetts Burma Statute deny
government contracts to companies doing business with the target state.329
Both types of laws have been criticized for violating international rules
regarding jurisdiction and nonforcible countermeasures.
330
326. Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(1) (2000) (requiring the President to
prohibit U.S. nationals from supporting boycotts against U.S. allies); see also Action Affecting Export
Privileges, Baxter International Inc., 58 Fed. Reg. 16,813 (1993) (enforcing anti-boycott provisions).
327. Most extraterritorial U.S. laws purport to regulate the foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
companies as "persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction." International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1) (2000); Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §2405(a) (1994);
Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 500.329(d) (2000); Cuban Assets Control Regulations,
31 C.F.R. §§ 515.201, 515.329 (2000). President Carter's IEEPA sanctions against Iran froze all Iranian
assets in the control of persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729
(1979). The notable exception to this practice was the 1982 Soviet pipeline embargo, which was
imposed in response to the Soviets' suppression of the Polish solidarity movement. The regulations,
which were adopted over the objection and ultimate resignation of Secretary of State Alexander Haig,
purported to bar the sale of petroleum goods to the Soviets, including any goods sold by foreign entities
that contained U.S. products or that were produced under licensing arrangements with U.S. companies.
The European Community opposed the controls as violating international law, see, e.g., European
Communities: Comments on the US. Regulations Concerning Trade with the U.S.S.R., reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 891 (1982), and a Dutch court concluded that international law barred application of the controls
to the local subsidiary of a U.S. corporation. Compagnie Europeenne des Petroles S.A./Sensor
Nederland B.V., Rb. Den Haag, Sept. 17, 1982, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 66, 72-73 (1983). For further
discussion of the international law compliance of the Soviet embargo, see Note, Extraterritorial
Application of the Export Administration Act of 1979 under International and American Law, 81 MICH.
L. REV. 1308 (1983).
328. The 1996 Congress passed a number of laws with controversial territorial implications. In
addition to waiving foreign sovereign immunity for state sponsors of terrorism, see supra note 4, the
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA), Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541, imposed
extraterritorial sanctions on domestic and foreign entities investing in Iranian and Libyan petroleum
industries. The Act was adopted to sanction Iran and Libya for their perceived participation in recent
acts of terrorism. As with Helms-Burton, President Clinton tempered foreign opposition to ILSA some
degree by declining to enforce its extraterritorial provisions against any foreign company. L. Dhooge,
Meddling with the Mullahs: An Analysis of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, 27 DENV. J. INT'L
L. & PoL. 1, 55 (1998). In a tentative agreement with the European Union, the United States agreed not
to impose ILSA sanctions on any European company, in exchange for the EU's agreement not to file a
complaint with the WTO. Raf Casert, EU, U.S., Fail to Settle Trade Dispute Over Cuba, Libya, Iran,
Assoc. Press, Oct. 15, 1997, 1997 WL 2555359.
329. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, § 22 H(a), J(a) (West 2000).
330. The measures also have been challenged as invalid under the GATT, a subject that is
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 26: 1
1. Helms-Burton Act
The most controversial recent U.S. human rights statute is the Helms-
Burton Act regarding Cuba.331 Formally designated the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, Helms-Burton was adopted in March 1996
in response to Cuba's attack on two planes operated by the Miami-based
Cuban liberation group Brothers to the Rescue. 32 The Act's stated purposes
are to secure international sanctions against the Castro regime, to promote
democratization in Cuba, and to restore the expropriated property of U.S.
nationals. Although the United States has maintained a near-complete
embargo on U.S. interactions with Cuba since President Kennedy,333 the law
reflected Congress' frustration with both the failure of past sanctions to
destabilize Castro and the international community's unwillingness to
cooperate with the U.S. sanctions program. Accordingly, Helms-Burton
codified existing executive sanctions against Cuba and imposed new sanctions
on third parties doing business with the country.
Title I of the law codifies the existing system of sanctions against
Cuba 334 and obligates the United States to oppose Cuban participation in the
OAS and international financial institutions. It further directs the United
States to oppose IFI assistance to Cuba and requires the U.S. Treasury to
withhold funds from IFIs equaling the amount of any financial assistance
awarded to Cuba over U.S. opposition.335 Title II extensively details the steps
that Cuba must take in order to be considered a democratically elected
government for purposes of terminating the embargo. 336 These include
beyond the scope of this Article.
331. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-114, 110 Stat. 785.
332. President Clinton had promised to veto the statute but, following the attack, he agreed to
sign it, conditioned on the inclusion of the Title III waiver clause. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and
Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 419,419 (1996).
333. President Kennedy's embargo against Cuba, imposed by regulation pursuant to the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 620(a), 75 Stat 424 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §
2370(a)) (now (a)(1)), and the Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1994), barred trade
with Cuba by "persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States," including the foreign subsidiaries
of U.S. corporations. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.101, 515.329 (1963). The
extraterritorial effect of the embargo was largely ameliorated by the issuance of licenses until
Congress's passage of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, which barred the issuance oflicenses to U.S.
foreign subsidiaries and authorized denial of U.S. aid to countries providing assistance to Cuba. Pub. L.
No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2575 (1992) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6001-6010 (1994)).
334. Helms-Burton provides that the sanctions in place as of 1 March 1996 "shall remain in
effect" until the President finds that Cuba has become a "democratically elected government," as
defined in Section 204 of the statute. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, Pub.
L. No. 104-114, § 102(h), 110 Stat. 785 (1996). The codification of existing sanctions is significant,
since it eliminates the Executive's annual review of the Cuban embargo and appears to foreclose
executive modification of the sanctions absent congressional approval.
335. Id. § 105. The President has limited authority to suspend these restrictions to allow food,
medical, and certain military assistance to Cuba upon a finding that a transitional democratic
government is in place. Id. § 204(a).
336. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6065-66 (2000).
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allowing Cuban prisons to be investigated by appropriate international human
rights organizations; 337 conducting elections supervised by international
monitors such as the United Nations and OAS;338 respecting "internationally
recognized human rights and basic freedoms set forth in the Universal
Declaration; 339  restoring Cuban citizenship to returning Cuban-born
expatriates;34° permitting unfettered international human rights monitoring of
the country;341 and making "demonstrable progress" toward returning property
expropriated from U.S. citizens (including naturalized Cubans) or paying "full
compensation in accordance with international law standards and
practices.
342
Helms-Burton contains a number of extraterritorial provisions. Although
the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act authorized denial of U.S. aid to countries
providing foreign assistance or trade benefits to Cuba,343 Helms-Burton
extends the definition of foreign assistance to include debt forgiveness by
third party states.344 Title I, the most controversial part of the Act, creates a
private right of action in U.S. courts for "U.S. nationals" 345 whose property
was expropriated by the Cuban government to sue individuals who "traffic" in
such expropriated property.346 The term "trafficking" is broadly defined to
encompass most forms of doing business with Cuba, including "engag[ing] in
a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated
property. ' 347 In a provision required by President Clinton "in order to afford
the President flexibility to respond to unfolding developments in Cuba,
3 48
Title III authorizes the President to suspend operation of the private right of
action provision for six month periods if the suspension is necessary to
promote U.S. interests and will "expedite a transition to democracy in
Cuba. 3 49 Title IV denies U.S. entry visas to any foreign national who has
either confiscated property, or trafficked in confiscated property in Cuba. The
mandatory restriction s° was implemented by the State Department and has
resulted in the denial of entry visas to foreign nationals.
337. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, Pub. L. No. 104-114, §
205(a)(2), 110 Stat. 785 (1996).
338. Id. § 205(a)(4)(C).
339. Id. § 205(a)(6)(B).
340. Id. § 205(b)(2)(B).
341. Id. § 205(b)(4).
342. Id. § 206(6).
343. Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2575 (1992) (codified at
22 U.S.C. § 6001-6010 (1994)).
344. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-114, § 102(f), 110 Stat. 785 (1996).
345. "U.S. nationals" includes individuals who were Cuban nationals at the time of the 1959
revolution and have subsequently been naturalized in the United States. Id. § 303(a)(4)(C).
346. Id. § 302(a). Litigants may recover damages totaling up to three times the value of the
entire expropriation, regardless of the actual value of the benefit received by the trafficking entity.
347. Id. § 4(13).
348. Committee of Conference, Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of
1996, H.R. REP. 104-468, at 65 (1996) [hereinafter Helms-Burton Conference Report]; see also
Lowenfeld, supra note 332, at 426 (discussing compromise over Title Im suspension provision).
349. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6085(b), (c)(1)(B) (2000).
350. Title IV allows waiver by the Secretary of State only on a case by case basis for medical
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The extraterritorial provisions of Helms-Burton and the related Iran and
Libyan Sanctions Act351 spurred formal protests from the international
community, which condemned the Act as violating both customary
international jurisdictional rules and the GATT. Canada, Mexico and the
European Union adopted "blocking" and "clawback" legislation, barring their
companies from complying with Helms-Burton, prohibiting the enforcement
of judgments entered under the Act, and authorizing companies to countersue
for any damages resulting from the U.S. sanctions measure. 52 The OAS Inter-
American Juridical Committee unanimously condemned Helms-Burton as an
international law violation in a decision which the U.S. member joined.353
Canada and Mexico pursued dispute resolution mechanisms under NAFTA,354
and the European Community formally initiated dispute resolution
proceedings in the WTO.355
In response to the international community's outrage over the Act's
secondary boycott provisions, President Clinton has continuously waived the
Title III private right of action provision, arguing that the purposes of the act
would be better served if the United States built up international support for
356promoting democracy in Cuba. President Clinton also recently promised
EU leaders he would try to persuade Congress to rescind the Title IV visa
restriction. 357 The Europeans ultimately suspended their WTO challenge in
exchange for assurances that the United States would withhold enforcement of
reasons or to allow entry into the country to defend against Title III litigation. Id. § 401(c).
351. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541. See supra
note 328.
352. Act to Protect Trade and Investment from Foreign Norms that Contravene International
Law, Oct. 23, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 133 (Mex.); Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act Incorporating the
Amendments Countering the U.S. Helms-Burton Act, Oct. 9, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 111 (Can.); Council
Regulation 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 Protecting Against the Effects of the Extra-Territorial
Application of Legislation Adopted by a Third Country, and Actions Based Thereon or Resulting
Therefrom, 1996 O.J. (L 309). The EU measure also applied to the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22
U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010 (1994). Council Regulation 2271/96, Protecting Against the Effects of the Extra-
Territorial Application of Legislation Adopted by a Third Country, Annex, 1996, 0.. (L309) 5-6.
353. Opinion of the Inter-American Juridical Committee in Response to Resolution
AG/DOC.3375/96 of the General Assembly of the Organization, entitled: "Freedom of Trade and
Investment in the Hemisphere," OEA/Ser.G, CP/doc.2803/96 (Aug. 23, 1996), 35 I.L.M. 1329, 1334
(1996) ("[T]he exercise of jurisdiction by a State over acts of 'trafficking' by aliens abroad, under
circumstances whereby neither the alien nor the conduct in question has any connection with its territory
and there is no apparent connection between such acts and the protection of its essential sovereign
interests, does not conform with international law."), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/forum/
psector/intlorg/iajce.asp.
354. Harvey Oyer, The Extraterritorial Effects of U.S. Unilateral Trade Sanctions and Their
Impact on U.S. Obligations under NAFTA, 11 FLA. J. INT'L L. 429, 456 (1997).
355. United States-The Cuban Liberty and Democracy Solidarity Act, WTO Doc. WT/DS
38/2 (Oct. 8, 1996).
356. David E. Sanger, Clinton Grants, Then Suspends, Right to Sue Foreigners on Cuba, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 1996, atAl.
357. Stefaan Smis & Kim Van der Borght, The E.U-US. Compromise on the Helms-Burton
and D'Amato Acts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 227, 232 (1999); see also James Bennet, To Clear Air with
Europe, U.S. Waives Some Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1998, at A6 (discussing terms of U.S.-
European agreement).
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the Helms-Burton provisions and avoid extraterritorial sanctions measures in
the future.
358
2. Selective Purchasing Laws
Selective purchasing laws such as the Massachusetts Burma Statute
359
also raise extraterritorial concerns, since they punish companies or
governments for their economic interactions with third party states. The
Massachusetts statute has prompted significant outcry both at home and
abroad. The European Union, Japan, and Thailand condemned the sanctions
as violating WTO rules on governmental procurement, 360 and the European
Community and Japan initiated dispute settlement proceedings in the World
Trade Organization. 361 When discussions with the United States failed to
resolve the Massachusetts issue, Japan and the European Commission
requested the establishment of a WTO dispute panel, and a panel was
established in October 1998 over the objection of the United States.362 The
international controversy over the Massachusetts law dissipated when the
United States Supreme Court invalidated the measure, finding that it
unreasonably conflicted with the Federal Burma Statute.363 That decision did
not bar state and local selective purchasing measures that are not preempted
by federal statute, however, nor does it address the validity of any similar
government procurement rules that might be adopted by the national
358. In a summit meeting between the United States and the EU on May 18, 1998, the parties
agreed that in the future they "will not seek or propose, and will resist, the passage of new economic
sanctions legislation based on foreign policy grounds which is designed to make economic operators of
the other behave in a manner similar to that required of its own economic operators." Smis & Van der
Borght, supra note 357, at 231-32.
359. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, § 22 (West 2000).
360. WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 26, at
1098, art. IV(I) (June 25, 1997) ("A Party shall not apply rules of origin to products or services
imported or supplied for purposes of government procurement covered by this Agreement from other
Parties, which are different from the rules of origin applied in the normal course of trade and at the time
of the transaction in question to imports or supplies of the same product or services from the same
Parties."); see, e.g., Massachusetts Law on Burma Riles EU, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 19, 1997, at A34; A State's
Foreign Policy: The Mass that Roared, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 1997, at 32.
361. United States-Measure Affecting Government Procurement; Request for Consultations
by the European Communities, WTO Doc. WT/DS88/1 (June 26, 1997); United States-Measure
Affecting Government Procurement; Request for Consultations by Japan, WTO Doc. WT/DS95/1 (July
21, 1997); see also EUROPEAN COMM'N, REPORT ON UNITED STATES BARRIERS AND INVESTMENT § 4.6
(1998).
362. Christopher McCrudden, International Economic Law and the Pursuit of Human Rights:
A Frameworkfor Discussion of the Legality of 'Selective Purchasing'Laws under the WTO Government
Procurement Agreement, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 3, 24 (1999).
363. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). The suit was brought by the
National Foreign Trade Council, an association of U.S. companies doing business abroad, with whom
the European Union joined as an amicus. Deidre Shesgreen, Can States Set Trade Policy? LEGAL TIMES,
Aug. 17, 1998, at 4. For further discussion of the possible domestic and international law infirmities of
the Massachusetts statute, see Daniel M. Price & John P. Hannah, The Constitutionality of United States
State and Local Sanctions, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 443 (1998) (arguing that local sanctions measures
unconstitutionally infringe on the national foreign affairs powers); Alejandra Carvajal, State and Local
"Free Burma" Laws: The Case for Sub-National Trade Sanctions, 29 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 257
(1998) (arguing that local measures are constitutionally sound).
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government. The jurisdictional and GATT validity of human rights
restrictions on government procurement thus remains an open question.
3. Prescriptive Jurisdiction
Despite the international outcry, the question of whether Helms-Burton
violates principles of state jurisdiction remains unresolved. Supporters of
Helms-Burton have contended that prescriptive jurisdiction is satisfied due to
the "effects" on the United States of foreign entities' trafficking in U.S.
expropriated property.364 Purchase of previously confiscated properties in
Cuba by foreign investors, so the argument goes, has direct effects in the
United States by clouding title to properties and undermining Cuba's future
ability to make restitution.365 Whether the role of a foreign purchaser in
potentially clouding title forty years after an expropriation would constitute a
sufficiently direct, substantial and foreseeable U.S. "effect" to warrant the
exercise of territorial jurisdiction, however, is dubious. Moreover, the Act is
overbroad to achieve this purpose. "Trafficking" in expropriated property
extends not only to entities that purchase such property, but to those doing
business that in any way uses, or benefits from, the existence of confiscated
property. President Clinton's refusal to enforce the private right of action
provisions of Helms-Burton thus appears to be a valid attempt to bring that
congressional effort in line with international law.
On the other hand, jurisdictional requirements appear to be satisfied in
the selective purchasing context. Selective purchasing laws involve a clear
nexus-in the form of a potential government contract-between the
sanctioning and sanctioned entity. Massachusetts does not reach out to impose
sanctions on countries doing business with Burma that have no territorial
connection with the state, but instead declines to do business with them itself.
Principles of prescriptive jurisdiction accordingly should not bar such
measures, which appear to be consistent with international requirements.
Moreover, from a normative perspective, selective purchasing laws may serve
a valuable purpose. Local measures that affect third parties doing business
with the target state often are adopted because the government has no other
way to voice its economic objection to practices of the target state. Where the
government does no direct business with the country or its companies, as in
the case of Massachusetts and Burma, a ban on doing business with the target
state would be meaningless.
364. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
114, § 301(9), 110 Stat. 785 (1996) ("International law recognizes that a nation has the ability to provide
for rules of law with respect to conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial
effect within its territory.") (emphasis added).
365. Brice M. Clagett, The Controversy Over Title III of the Helms-Burton Act: Who is
Breaking International Law-The United States, or the States that have Made Themselves Co-
Conspirators with Cuba in its Unlawful Confiscations? 30 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 271, 277
(1996-97).
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4. Unlawful Countermeasures
Even if jurisdictional concerns can be satisfied, both Helms-Burton and
selective purchasing laws could be vulnerable to the charge that they violate
principles of nonforcible retaliation due to the critical absence of any breach
of duty between the sanctioning and target states. Under traditional
countermeasures analysis, if Cuba expropriates the property of U.S. nationals,
it has breached an international law duty to the United States for which the
United States is entitled to peacefully retaliate. On the other hand, a French
company that does business with Cuba has not thereby violated any duty to
the United States and cannot be subject to retaliation.
3 66
This charge, of course, is applicable only if economic measures actually
violate the nonintervention norm, a premise which is rejected above.
Moreover, to the extent that these laws target foreign companies rather than
foreign states, the analogy to nonforcible countermeasures (which addresses
conduct between states) may be misplaced. The exercise of authority under
these circumstances is more analogous to an exercise of a state's jurisdiction
to enforce through nonjudicial measures, and international rules regarding
state-to-state behavior may not be implicated. 67
Supporters of Helms-Burton contend that the Act properly retaliates
against third parties because these actors have breached a duty to the United
States by "aiding and abetting" Cuba's unlawful expropriation. Under this
argument, those who do business with the Castro regime are abetting Cuba in
its unlawful confiscations of U.S. property, and thus independently violating
an international law duty to the United States. The argument is tenuous. It is
not clear how presently doing business with Cuba aids or abets a confiscation
that occurred nearly forty years ago. Moreover, while some international law
norms extend liability to aiders and abetters, it is not at all clear that the
prohibition against the uncompensated confiscation of property reaches this
far. As the Inter-American Juridical Committee observed in reviewing the
legality of Helms-Burton, a "claimant State does not have the right to attribute
liability to nationals of third States for the use of expropriated property located
in the territory of the expropriating State where such use conforms to the laws
of this latter State, nor for the use in the territory of third States of intangible
property or products that do not constitute the actual asset expropriated.
3 68
Finally, the right of individuals not to be deprived of property by their own
government without compensation-which Helms-Burton also purports to
enforce-is not a clearly established norm of international law.
The resolution of these questions regarding the validity of extraterritorial
measures is beyond the scope of this Article. However, the Helms-Burton and
the selective purchasing laws raise provocative questions for norm
internalization and unilateral human rights measures. A significant portion of
366. Cf Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 127 (June 27)
(nonforcible countermeasures are not available to third-party state).
367. RESTATEMENT, supra note 141, § 431.
36S. Inter-American Juridical Committee, supra note 353, at 6, 6(d).
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the Helms-Burton controversy may be attributable to the fact that the measure
is viewed as a fruitless effort driven by domestic U.S. political concerns rather
than a desire to promote valid international norms. But what if a secondary
boycott were directed, instead, at a regime akin to Nazi Germany, which the
international community acknowledged to be an egregious human rights
violator? Are there circumstances in which doing business with a gross human
rights violator itself breaches some duty to the international community
sufficient to expose a state or its entities to unilateral economic retaliation
from other states? International law regarding jus cogens norms authorizes
states to prescribe and punish violations wherever they occur, and prohibits
not only the direct commission of these acts, but their aiding and abetting.
369
The sale of weapons to a genocidal state presumably would violate the
international prohibition against genocide, for example, and justify economic
retaliation against the supplying state. The trials of the Nuremberg
industrialists imputed international criminal liability to business entities that
assisted the Nazi regime. If doing business with a gross human rights violator
can be analogized to aiding and abetting, a third party entity may have
sufficiently breached its international duties to justify peaceful retaliation. Of
course, this is the argument urged in support of Helms-Burton. If viable,
however, such a human rights exception for secondary boycotts could only be
invoked in response to violations of international norms which extend
obligations to aiders and abettors. Under this analysis, the use of secondary
boycott measures to target those who directly and substantially aid and abet
gross human rights violations, such as apartheid in South Africa or the
genocide in Rwanda, might be appropriate. The use of such measures for the
purpose of remedying lands expropriated forty years ago from U.S. and
former Cuban nationals, as under Helms-Burton, would present a much more
difficult case.
Helms-Burton ultimately underscores the current difficulties involved in
using unilateral extraterritorial measures to promote human rights values.
Supporters of Helms-Burton assert that the law "furthers both the
development and implementation of international law by reinforcing
otherwise rudimentary enforcement mechanisms . . . [and] represents a
legitimate exercise of U.S. jurisdiction for the benefit of the international rule
of law. 370 The general consensus of the international community, however, is
that Helms-Burton - and particularly the Title III provision for suits against
third parties - in fact abuses and distorts international law norms to serve
peculiarly U.S. interests. As such, the secondary boycott provisions
undermine the moral and normative persuasive power of U.S. unilateral
sanctions measures and divert attention from the human rights message being
promoted to the legitimacy of the selected messenger. Even if secondary
boycotts of this type do not violate the letter of international law, they are
369. See infra Section IV.A.
370. Clagett, supra note 365, at 296.
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sufficiently problematic that they are likely to undermine, rather than promote,
the goal of norm definition and internalization.
C. Compliance with the International Trade System
Measures employing trade restrictions to promote internalization of
human rights norms raise additional questions regarding compliance with the
GATT/WTO system. The desire of Western states to promote fundamental
international rights through trade restrictions have clashed directly with the
values of the free trade system in recent years. Developing countries and free
trade advocates charge that restrictions on trade with foreign states and
government procurement policies eliminate the valid low-wage competitive
advantage of developing states and are merely disguised protectionist
measures that conflict with the anti-discrimination principles of the
GATT/WTO system. The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement,
which obligates participating states to purchase in a manner that does not
discriminate against any other party to the agreement, may also raise obstacles
to selective-purchasing laws such as the Massachusetts Burma Statute.371
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was adopted in
1947 to promote the goal of reducing trade barriers and eliminating disguised
protectionism from the international trading system. Articles I and I1372 of the
GATT accordingly require parties to give equal market access to similar
products from all other GATT members and bar discrimination between a
party's own products and the like products of another member state. Article
XI of the GATT further prohibits non-tariff barriers to trade. GATT dispute
panels and their successors in the WTO recently have applied these principles
to invalidate U.S. import restrictions that were designed to prevent
environmental degradation abroad. For example, the WTO found U.S. import
laws that required foreign tuna to be harvested according to dolphin-safe
methods to violate GATT rules,373 and struck down U.S. requirements that
imported shrimp be harvested through sea-turtle-safe methods. 374 The WTO
has also concluded that EU banana import preferences, which were intended
to promote economic development in former European colonies in the
Caribbean, violated the GATT.375 Decisions such as these have increased
371. WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 360. There are presently
twenty-five parties to the government procurement agreement. For an excellent discussion of the
implications of the procurement agreement for local selective purchasing laws, see McCrudden, supra
note 362.
372. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, A-12, A-
18-19, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 196-200, 204-08.
373. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155, 205
(1993).
374. WTO Appellate Body Report on United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WTO Doc., WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle]. See
generally Patricia Isela Hansen, Transparency, Standards of Review, and the Use of Trade Measures to
Protect the Global Environment, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 1017, 1053-57 (1999) (discussing the Shrimp/Turtle
holding).
375. WTO Appellate Body Report on European Communities-Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WVTO Doc., WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997).
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pressure from advanced industrial nations, and particularly from labor and
environmental groups, to loosen GATT free trade restrictions to accommodate
domestic legislation promoting valid public policy concerns.
376
WTO members, however, persistently have resisted any linkage between
human and labor rights issues and trade relations. At the Uruguay Round of
trade negotiations, the United States and France proposed that consideration
of the relationship between labor standards, social justice, and trade concerns
should be included on the WTO agenda. 377 In 1994 the United States brokered
a tentative agreement to consider labor rights issues in the next WTO
negotiations,378 but these and subsequent efforts to discuss worker rights have
been thwarted by developing countries. Linkage was strenuously opposed at
the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference of the WTO by India and other
developing nations, despite support for the initiative from Canada, the
European Commission, Norway, and the United States.379 Although the recent
WTO talks in Seattle brought unprecedented attention to the relationship
between WTO trade issues and labor, environmental, and other social
concerns, the talks failed to make any progress toward accommodating these
considerations in the free trade principles of the GATT.
The recent rulings of the WTO notwithstanding, however, the GATT
does not impose an absolute free trade regime. Certain types of trade measures
to promote human rights clearly are GATT compliant, such as GSP import
preferences for developing countries 380 and measures barring imports made
with prison labor.381 Restrictions on trade in military technology for human
376. For an excellent analysis of the implications of WTO rulings for trade-labor linkage, see
Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers' Rights, 3 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUS. L. 131 (1999).
377. The U.S. implementing statute for the Uruguay Round called for the establishment of a
working group within the WTO "to examine the relationship of internationally recognized worker rights
... to the articles, objectives, and related instruments of the [GATT and WTO]." OECD STUDY, supra
note 7, at 188 (quoting Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 131, 108 Stat. 4809
(1994)).
378. Michael Bergsman, Kantor Announces U.S. Has Secured GATT Deal to Discuss Labor
Rights, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Apr. 8, 1994, at Sl.
379. WTO: Ministers Agree to Do Nothing on Labour Standards, EUR. REP., Dec. 14, 1996,
LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS file. The Singapore Ministerial Declaration addressed the issue as
follows:
We believe that economic growth and development fostered by increased trade and
further trade liberalization contribute to the promotion of these [ILO] standards. 'We
reject the use of labour standards for protectionist purposes, and agree that the
comparative advantage of countries, particularly low-wage developing countries, must in
no way be put into question. In this regard, we note that the WTO and ILO Secretariats
will continue their existing collaboration.
Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(96)/DEC (Dec. 13, 1996), reprinted in 36
I.L.M. 220,221 (1997).
380. In 1971, GAIT members adopted a ten-year waiver that permitted (but did not require)
GATT countries to give more preferential treatment to less-developed countries. In 1979 the members
adopted a decision on differential and more favorable treatment for developing countries that eliminated
the need for extension of the GSP exception. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 168, at 1132-35.
381. GATT, supra note 372, art. XX(e) (creating a GATT exception for measures relating to
the products of prison labor).
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rights purposes likely may be justified under Article XXI(b)(ii)'s exception
for measures "necessary for the protection of [a member's] essential security
interests." 382 And if "international emergencies" under Article XXI(b)(iii)
were construed to include systematic violations of jus cogens norms,
unilateral trade measures could be imposed in situations such as the Rwandan
genocide under this national security provision.
Article XX of the GATT includes a number of exceptions-notably
those for measures necessary to protect public morals and human life-that
also might be construed to include violations of human rights norms. 383 The
GATT maintains that its provisions should be interpreted to be consistent with
other relevant principles of international law, and this approach would support
interpreting the Article XX provisions to embrace core international human
rights norms. Nevertheless, the WTO has given a sufficiently restrictive
interpretation to Article XX that even if the Article XX exceptions encompass
human rights values, few trade measures would satisfy the Article XX
requirements. GATT dispute panels, for example, have interpreted the
requirement that a measure be "necessary" to promote public morals or human
life as requiring the least trade-restrictive measure reasonably available to
promote the goal.384 Furthermore, the WTO has narrowly read the preamble or
"chapeau" of Article XX as prohibiting many trade measures. In the
Shrimp/Turtle case, for example, the Appellate Body concluded that although
the U.S. measure served a legitimate Article XX purpose, by dictating the
specific turtle-protective methods that foreign states must adopt, by banning
all shrimp imports from uncertified states, by failing to pursue multilateral
measures, and by employing non-transparent evaluation methods, the measure
violated the chapeau.1
85
382. The GATT national security exception was raised by the United States in support of
Helms-Burton before agreement was reached with the European Union. In 1985, President Reagan
prohibited all trade with Nicaragua, justifying the action on grounds of national security under GATT
Article XXI. Exec. Order No. 12,513, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,629 (1985). The United States further maintained
that the GATT was not authorized to review a country's determination of its national security interests. 2
Int'l Trade Rptr. (BNA) 765 (1985). The GATT panel ultimately agreed with the United States that "it
was not authorized to examine the justification for the U.S. invocation of a general exception" to the
GATT, but observed that the U.S. embargo was "counter to the basic aims of the GATT." GATT, GATT
AcTiVnEs 1986, 58-59 (1987). See generally Richard S. Whitt, The Politics of Procedure: An
Examination of the GA 7T Dispute Settlement Panel and the Article X9 Defense in the Context of the
U.S. Embargo of Nicaragua, 19 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 603 (1987) (analyzing the use of GATT
Article XXI in the Nicaragua dispute). In 1975, Sweden also attempted to justify a bar on the import of
shoes to Sweden on national security grounds. Id. at 619.
383. Steve Charnovitz, The Influence of International Labour Standards on the World Trading
Regime: A Historical Overview, 126 INT'L L. REv. 565, 742 (1987); Howse, supra note 376, at 142.
384. See, e.g., GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States-Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/R, at 41, 6.28 (Jan. 29, 1996). (stating that the U.S. effort
to regulate smog-causing contaminants in domestic and imported gasoline was not "necessary" under
GATT Article XX(b) because less trade-restrictive alternative measures were reasonably available and
had not been pursued by the United States); GA 2'Dispute Panel Report on Thailand-Restrictions on
Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 223
(1991) (holding that Thai ban on cigarette imports "could be considered to be 'necessary' in terms of
Article XX(b) only if there were no [less trade-restrictive] alternative" available to achieve Thailand's
goal of protecting human life).
385. Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 374, 146-86.
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The restrictive approach to Article XX in part reflects concerns by WTO
arbitrators that recognizing exceptions to GATT free trade principles will
encourage abuse by states in the form of disguised protectionist measures.
Trade restrictions imposed ostensibly to target coercive population control
policies, for example, could be used to bar all imports from China. The use of
trade laws to promote compliance with fundamental human rights norms,
however, is not per se a protectionist measure that undermines the free trade
system and should not automatically be construed to violate the GATT.
Concerns about disguised protectionism can be addressed through ordinary
GATT procedures and cannot justify a blanket prohibition against human
rights measures. Moreover, states have a legitimate interest-indeed, an
international law duty-to promote fundamental rights. Trade restrictions that
promote fundamental rights recognized by the international community and
target countries that have engaged in systematic abuse advance legitimate,
nonprotectionist policies, and should be recognized as such. Also, certain
rights violations constitute unfair trade practices-as GATT Article XX(e)
regarding prison labor recognizes. An interpretation of trade liberalization that
would allow producers who violate fundamental rights to gain a competitive
advantage in the international market not only would distort the concept of
free trade, but also would improperly exploit it to erode protection for basic
human rights.
The compatibility of government selective purchasing laws with the
GATT Agreement on Government Procurement also is uncertain at this time.
While selective purchasing laws may potentially conflict with the WTO
386
Agreement on Government Procurement, that agreement may be less
restrictive than the general GATT anti-discrimination provisions and is not
clearly subject to the same WTO interpretations.
387
I have argued at length elsewhere that Articles XX and XXI of the
GATT may be reasonably interpreted to accommodate even broad trade
sanctions designed to promote the fundamental, jus cogens values of the
human rights regime.388 For our purposes here, it is sufficient to note that
much about the GATT/WTO approach to these provisions remains unclear.
While the GATT clearly imposes some constraints on a state's ability to
promote human rights through trade restrictions, if the GATT is interpreted in
light of other international law principles, it is possible that core human rights
386. As stated in the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement:
A Party shall not apply rules of origin to products or services imported or supplied for
purposes of government procurement covered by this Agreement from other Parties,
which are different from the rules of origin applied in the normal course of trade and at
the time of the transaction in question to imports or supplies of the same product or
services from the same Parties.
Supra note 360, art. IV.
387. For further discussion, see McCrudden, supra note 362, at 32-46.
388. Sarah H. Cleveland, Human Rights Sanctions and the World Trade Organization, in
HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Francesco Francioni ed., forthcoming
2001).
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measures may be accommodated within the free trade framework. Conversely,
continued adherence to present WTO interpretations of the GATT anti-
discrimination principles, and refusal to accommodate fundamental rights
protections under the GATT's Art. XX and XXI exceptions, would deprive
WTO members of an important means of promoting respect for human rights.
D. Compatibility with the International Human Rights Regime
The final potential tension between unilateral sanctions and the
international system is the claim that unilateral action ignores and abuses
international standards and undermines efforts to promote multilateral
definition and enforcement of human rights. The United States, in particular,
has been criticized for refusing to apply international standards and for
manipulating the rhetoric of human rights to serve its own political
purposes. 389 Specifically, Philip Alston has criticized the United States'"aggressive unilateralism" in the labor rights area for
the use of the rhetoric but not the substance of "international standards;" the application
to other countries of standards that have not been accepted by those countries and are not
generally considered to be a part of customary international law; the invocation of
international instruments that the United States itself has not ratified; and the neglect of
existing and potential international mechanisms for achieving comparable objectives.39°
In the environmental area, the WTO similarly has criticized the United States
for failing to negotiate bilateral and multilateral agreements,39t failing to
pursue cooperative efforts through existing international mechanisms, and
failing to ratify relevant international environmental instruments.392
The criticism of U.S. unilateralism thus is four-fold: U.S. sanctions 1)
enforce against other states rights that are not binding on the United States; 2)
fail to apply international standards regarding human and labor rights; 3)
neglect available multilateral mechanisms; and 4) selectively and
hypocritically enforce human and labor rights. Thus, by playing the global
sheriff according to its own rules, the United States undermines the legitimacy
of multilateral enforcement efforts. The following Section considers each of
these criticisms in turn, and concludes that, historically, many of these
criticisms of U.S. practice have been valid. But unilateralism is not inherently
hegemonic, and unilateral measures which are crafted with proper respect for
international law principles can complement, rather than compete with, the
development of a multilateral system.
389. See supra note 290.
390. Philip Alston, Labor Rights Provisions in U.S. Trade Law: "Aggressive Unilateralism"?,
in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 72 (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F.
Diamond eds., 1996)
391. Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 374, at 65.
392. The United States had made no effort, for example, to raise the issue of sea turtle
protection before the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species Standing Committee
as a subject requiring concerted action. Id. at 70 n.174.
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1. U.S. Adherence to International Instruments
The United States' failure to ratify and execute international human
rights instruments that it purports to enforce has been a major structural
weakness of U.S. unilateral sanctions efforts. U.S. statutes withholding
development and security aid for acts of torture, cruel, inhumane or degrading
treatment, arbitrary detention, disappearance, and other flagrant violations of
life, liberty and the security of the person were enacted approximately fifteen
years before the United States ratified the ICCPR and the Torture and
Genocide Conventions. Federal statutes target the foreign exploitation, forced
labor, and conscription of children, 3 despite the United States' failure to
ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child or the original ILO Child
Labour Convention. The United States for fifteen years has purported to
protect other "internationally recognized worker rights," such as the freedom
to associate, organize, and bargain collectively and the prohibition against
forced labor, despite the fact that the United States has ratified only one of the
ILO conventions defining these rights.
Aggressive unilateralism by a country that refuses to be policed itself
does little to advance the development of the international rights regime.
Fortunately, however, in the last decade, the United States has made some
progress on this front. U.S. ratification of the Genocide and Torture
Conventions, the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, and the ICCPR
formally obligated the United States to respect many of the fundamental
human rights that it purports to enforce abroad.39 4 The ICCPR also includes
respect for the rights to freedom of association, including the right to form
trade unions,395 and the modem prohibition against slavery, servitude, and
forced labor.396 Finally, the 1998 ILO Declaration obligates the United States
to adhere to the remaining core labor rights. The focus of many U.S. statutes
on enforcement of jus cogens norms such as torture also reduces concerns
about formal obligations, since these protections are universally recognized
under international law. A remaining dissonance between U.S. ratifications
and sanctions practice is the GSP enforcement of "internationally recognized"
standards regarding minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational health
and safety. The United States has not ratified the ILO conventions governing
these principles, nor have these principles been recognized as core ILO labor
rights. However, the United States also is unlikely to take measures against a
foreign state solely for failure to comply with this requirement. In sum, the
United States' recent embrace of core human rights conventions has reduced,
393. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2151n (1990); International Financial
Institutions Act of 1977, 22 U.S.C. § 262d(e) (1990).
394. Of course, by declaring the ICCPR to be non-self-executing and by declining to fully
implement the Genocide and Torture Conventions, the United States has failed to fully incorporate the
core international standards into its own domestic law. See discussion infra Part II.
395. ICCPR, supra note 107, art. 22.
396. Id., art. 8.
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though not eliminated, the dissonance between U.S. sanctions and ratification
practice.
2. Statutory Definitions and International Standards
U.S. statutes and practice over the past decade also have conformed
more closely to international standards. U.S. statutory definitions increasingly
have been tied to international definitions of core human rights.
Internationally recognized worker rights, for example, are defined in the GSP
to include three of the four core ILO labor standards and directly incorporate
the ILO definition of the worst forms of child labor.3 97 Other than the
exclusion of discrimination in employment and the inclusion of minimum
conditions, the GSP appears facially consistent with these international
norms.398 The concept of a "consistent pattern of gross violations" of
internationally recognized human rights as set forth in Section 116 of the
Foreign Assistance Act itself is drawn from international practice. The phrase
derives from Resolution 1503 of the United Nations Economic and Social
Council, under which a Human Rights Commission working group examines
communications regarding state practices that "appear to reveal a consistent
pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human rights and
fundamental freedoms," even when committed by states that are not parties to
any applicable international agreement.399 Other U.N. bodies also have
recommended sanctions against states engaging in "consistent patterns of
gross violation," such as apartheid.40 0 The focus of the major U.S. human
rights sanctions statutes on fundamental rights of torture, cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detention, disappearance, and
other fundamental rights also suggests a desire to construe "internationally
recognized human rights" consistent with the universally-recognized norms.
On the other hand, while Section 116 does not purport to be exclusive, the
statute fails to include expressly such fundamental customary international
law norms as genocide, slavery, summary execution, and crimes against
humanity. The statutes do not expressly recognize the universal norm against
systematic racial discrimination, though the 1998 amendments add severe
forms of religious discrimination. 401 Moreover, U.S. laws seeking to target
coercive population control policies and to promote democratization may
advance norms that have not clearly achieved customary international law
status.
The few sanctions provisions that define the international standard being
applied correspond unevenly with international norms. Regulations
397. 19 U.S.C. § 2467(6) (2000).
398. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
399. Procedures for Dealing With Communications Relating to Violations of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, E.S.C. Res. 1503 (XLVIII), 48 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. No. IA, at 8-9, U.N.
Doc. E/4832/Add.1 (1970), cited in RESTATEMENT, supra note 141, § 702, Reporters' n.10.
400. RESTATEMENT, supra note 141, § 703, Reporters' n.10 (noting that the term "gross
violations" of human rights that appears in U.S. statutes derives from international U.N. practice).
401. 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(c) (1998).
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promulgated under Section 307 of the Tariff Act essentially employ verbatim
the definition of forced labor set forth in the ILO Forced Labor Convention
(No. 29).402 The 1999 Executive Order barring purchases of goods made with
exploitative child labor, on the other hand, defines such labor more narrowly
than the ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention.40 3 The sanctions
statutes otherwise do not define the substantive norms at stake.
Despite the statutory discrepancies, consideration of international
standards has been more or less formally incorporated into the U.S. sanctions
review process. The International Religious Freedom Act, for example, seeks
to effectuate the U.S. obligation to promote religious freedom under, inter
alia, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR.
404 The major
statutes conditioning development and security assistance on human rights
compliance now require that country determinations consider both a state's
compliance with human rights monitoring efforts by international
organizations such as the Red Cross, Amnesty International, and the United
Nations, and the relevant findings of such international organizations and
NGOs.40 5 The GSP review process similarly is tied to ILO international
tripartite agreements and procedures. Benefits determinations by the GSP
Subcommittee take into account relevant ILO conventions and the findings of
ILO supervisory bodies in determining labor rights compliance. The GSP
committee maintains regular contact with ILO staff and deliberately seeks
consistency between its evaluations and ILO recommendations. The
402. Compare 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (1994) (defining forced labor as "all work or service which is
extracted from any person under the menace of any penalty for its nonperformance and for which the
worker does not offer himself voluntarily"), with ILO Forced Labor Convention, supra note 123, art.
2(1) (defining "forced or compulsory labor" as "all work or service which is exacted from any person
under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily").
403. Compare Exec. Order 13,126, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,383 (1999), § 6(c) (defining "forced or
indentured child labor" as "all work or service (1) exacted from any person under the age of 18 under
the menace of any penalty for its nonperformance and for which the worker does not offer himself
voluntarily' or (2) performed by any person under the age of 18 pursuant to a contract the enforcement
of which can be accomplished by process or penalties"), with ILO Convention Concerning the Worst
Forms of Child Labour (No. 182), art. 3, at http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/publiclenglishldocslconvdisp.htm
(last visited December 6, 2000) (on file with The Yale Journal of International Law).
404. International Religious Freedom Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6401(a)(2),(3) (1998); Universal
Declaration, supra note 105, art. 18; ICCPR, supra note 107, art. 18(1). Accord International Religious
Freedom Act § 6402(13) (defining "violations of religious freedom" as violations of the rights set forth
in these instruments). The Act further defines "particularly severe violations of religious freedom" as
breaches of such fundamental human rights norms as torture, arbitrary detention, disappearance, and
other flagrant denial of the life, liberty, or security of persons. Id. § 6402(11).
405. See generally International Financial Institutions Act, 22 U.S.C. § 262d(e) (1990)
(requiring consideration of the target country's cooperation with international human rights monitors
such as the Red Cross, Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, and U.N. and
OAS entities); Foreign Assistance Act §115, 22 U.S.C. §215In(c) (1990) (directing executive officials
to consider the extent of a country's cooperation with international human rights investigations by
international organizations such as the Red Cross or the United Nations); Foreign Assistance Act §
502B; 22 U.S.C. § 2304(b) (1990) (requiring the President to consider the relevant findings of
international organizations and NGOs and the foreign state's cooperation with human rights
investigations in determining whether a country is engaging in gross human rights violations).
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Subcommittee frequently recommends that countries seek ILO technical
assistance in achieving needed modifications of labor legislation.40 6
The centralization of U.S. monitoring and reporting efforts in the State
Department plays an important role in ensuring the consistency of U.S.
interpretations with international law. The Department has developed
considerable expertise in monitoring and analyzing international human rights
compliance. The annual Country Reports now expressly interpret international
human and labor rights in light of the applicable international conventions
40 7
and draw on broad input from intergovernmental bodies and NGOs. The
Country Reports are required by law to indicate relevant U.N. Human Rights
Commission actions regarding state practice. 40 8 The Reports also significantly
expand the consideration of human and labor rights norms beyond those
designated by statute. The 1999 Country Report on Burma, for example,
included lengthy consideration of, inter alia: political and extrajudicial killing;
disappearance; torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment
(including rapes by the military and prison conditions); arbitrary arrest,
detention, or exile; denial of fair public trial; arbitrary interference with
privacy, family, home, or correspondence; use of excessive force and
violation of humanitarian law in internal conflicts; freedom of speech and the
press; freedom of assembly and association; freedom of religion; freedom of
movement, foreign travel, emigration and repatriation; political rights and
democracy; governmental attitudes toward international rights monitoring;
discrimination based on race, sex, religion, disability, language, or social
status (including the rights of children and discrimination in employment);
and worker rights, including the status of child labor practices, minimum age
for employment, and trafficking in persons.40 9 State Department monitoring
practices and the Country Reports thus at least appear to narrow the major
dissonances between the rights which the United States purports to enforce by
statute and the core norms of the international human rights system.
3. Cooperation with International Institutions
Like U.S. treaty ratification practices, U.S. cooperation with
international human rights institutions remains sporadic but is improving.
After many years of withdrawal from the ILO, the United States has taken
steps under the Clinton administration to assist in promoting the ILO's core
labor rights agenda, particularly in the area of child labor. The United States
ratified the ICCPR in 1992, in part to ensure that the United States could
406. OECD STUDY, supra note 7, at 185-86.
407. For example, according to the U.S. State Department, the GSP provisions recognize that
"[a]n international consensus exists, based on several key International Labor Organization (ILO)
Conventions, that certain worker rights constitute core labor standards." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRAcTICEs FOR 1997 xxiv (1998), available at http://www.hri.orgdocs/
USSD-Rights/97/Overview97.htm (last visited Nov. 4,2000).
408. 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(d)(4) (1990); 22 U.S.C. § 2304(b) (1990).
409. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 1999 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1999
984-1006 (2000), available at http://vww.state.gov/www/global/humanrights/1999__hrpreport/bunna.
html.
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participate in U.N. Human Rights Committee decision-making processes.
Recent statutes have increasingly emphasized the importance of multilateral
cooperation in the protection and enforcement of human rights. Thus, the
1996 Federal Burma Statute instructs the President to develop "a
comprehensive, multilateral strategy to bring democracy to and improve
human rights practices" in Burma, and directs the President to cooperate with
members of ASEAN and other countries with major trade and investment
interests in Burma to devise such an approach.410 The 1998 International
Religious Freedom Act also encourages the President to enter into agreements
with targeted countries to end religious persecution, or alternatively to impose
411a range of sanctions. In 1998, the Clinton administration adopted new
guidelines regarding the imposition of economic sanctions by the United
States, which assert that sanctions should only be utilized after diplomatic
efforts have failed and that international cooperation should be sought prior to
the introduction of unilateral sanctions. The United States has also
employed unilateral measures to promote foreign compliance with
international institutions, such as U.N. Security Council sanctions against
Iraq, Serbia, and Montenegro,413 and the International Criminal Tribunals for
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.4 14 Much room for progress remains in
this area, but the United States' increased willingness to cooperate with
international institutions in the past ten years is a promising development.
4. Selective Enforcement
Even if U.S. substantive definitions of human and labor rights
substantially comport with international standards, U.S. selectivity in
imposing sanctions undermines international respect for unilateral action.
Federal policies may be challenged for promoting the "human rights dujour"
of the congressional leadership, as in the example of the Helms-Burton Act,
the provisions targeting China's forced population control policies, and the
1998 International Religious Freedom Act, which overnight elevated
410. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570, 110 Stat. 309, 3166 (1996).
411. International Religious Freedom Act § 401(b)(1), 22 U.S.C. § 6442 (1998).
412. Stuart Eizenstat, Undersecretary for Economic, Agricultural and Business Affairs,
Remarks before the North American Committee of the National Policy Association (Jan. 7, 1998),
transcript available at http:liwvw.state.gov/ww/policyremarks/980107._eizenpolicyassoc.htnl; see
also Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 2901, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §
2423(a), 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) (urging that "the President should, through diplomatic means, employ
alternatives to export controls").
413. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 103-306, § 538, 110 Stat. 1608, 1639 (prohibiting foreign assistance to any country failing
to comply with the U.N. sanctions and authorizing the President to bar imports from noncompliant
states). The Act expanded a similar 1991 law that had prohibited foreign assistance to countries failing
to comply with the U.N. sanctions against Iraq. The new Act authorized the President to waive the ban
on foreign assistance under certain conditions.
414. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-107, § 582, 110 Stat. 704, 751.
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defending religious freedom to a primary goal of U.S. foreign policy. U.S.
policies also unevenly penalize foreign states for engaging in similar human
rights practices. Differential application of sanctions measures has led critics
to contend that U.S. sanctions policies, far from being motivated by respect
for international norms, simply reflect the whims and fads of U.S. domestic
politics. 415 U.S. policy is criticized for picking and choosing among human
rights violators, ignoring countries that are strategically and economically
important to the United States, such as China and Indonesia, and targeting
those that are already isolated from the United States for other reasons, such
as Cuba and Iran, or those where the United States has little economically and
strategically at stake, such as Burma and Haiti. Thus, presidential hopeful
Patrick Buchanan recently criticized the "monumental hypocrisy" of Clinton
administration policies, arguing, "[hie blockaded, starved and invaded tiny
Haiti for human rights violations, but he proudly chaperones China into the
WTO. 4 16 As noted in Part H, states that are diplomatically, strategically, and
economically isolated from the United States for other reasons, or that also
violate other international norms, are most likely to be the targets of U.S.
human rights sanctions. For example, President Clinton's 1997 suspension of
investment in Burma specifically noted that Burma, in addition to escalating
human rights abuse, was one of the world's leading illicit drug traffickers.41
Thus, it is no accident that the states designated by the U.S. State Department
as state-sponsors of terrorism-Sudan, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Syria,
and Libya-are also targeted for human rights violations. By contrast, other
states with egregious human rights records, such as Guatemala, Turkey,
Colombia, China, and Indonesia, have not been equally isolated by the United
States.
Together with resort to secondary boycotts, hypocrisy in the imposition
of sanctions has done the most to undermine the normative legitimacy of U.S.
unilateral actions. While differential treatment on occasion may have
legitimate policy justifications, it is rarely justified from an international law
perspective and is devastating to the credibility of unilateral actions. As
explored more fully below, if U.S. unilateral enforcement practices are to
complement the international system, rather than isolate and undermine it,
unilateral measures must be applied in as principled a manner as possible.
a. Selectivity and the Separation of Powers
Part of the motivation for U.S. selective enforcement practices is purely
political: The United States is more willing to target small countries than large
ones and to target its enemies over its friends. These selective enforcement
practices can be explained in part-though not justified-by the structural
415. Alston, supra note 390, at 79 ("It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the United
States is, in reality, imposing its own, conveniently flexible and even elastic, standards upon other
states.").
416. Francis X. Clines, Buchanan, In a Change, Calls for End to Sanctions, N.Y. TIMElS, Dec.
17, 1999, at A26.
417. Letter from President Clinton to Congress, supra note 44.
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division of responsibility over foreign policy within the national government.
Economic sanctions laws suffer from many of the general difficulties in
executive-congressional relations found in other foreign relations areas.
Although Congress and the President share constitutional authority over
foreign relations, the Executive's historic responsibility as the representative
of the United States in the international field, and his or her institutional
advantage in gathering information abroad and in responding quickly to
changed circumstances, combine with congressional indecision, inertia, and
lack of political will to make congressional control of the President in the
foreign affairs area notoriously difficult.41 8 Indeed, the leading U.S. Supreme
Court decision upholding executive discretion over foreign relations, United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
4 19 involved a sanctions statute.
420
Nevertheless, a review of U.S. sanctions practices reveals that Congress, the
Executive, and the courts share responsibility for the apparent selectivity of
U.S. sanctions practices. Some degree of executive discretion in sanctions
measures may be advantageous in many circumstances, by allowing the
President to take greater steps than those necessarily contemplated by
Congress, or allowing the President to modify congressional overreaching that
proves out of step with the international community. Discretion, however, can
also result in abuse. The Reagan administration's policies illustrate the
difficulties posed when the Executive refuses to comply in good faith with
sanctions requirements, thereby undermining the credibility of U.S. sanctions
decisions. Helms-Burton, on the other hand, reflects the hazards incurred by
misguided congressional efforts to dictate executive action, with equally
problematic impact on the legitimacy of U.S. action in the international
community.
(i) Congress
Sanctions statutes can contribute to selective enforcement either by
targeting particular states or human rights violations over others, or by
allowing the Executive to impose sanctions selectively through certification
and waiver provisions. Under the latter circumstance, sanctions statutes may
reflect efforts by Congress to shift the burden and responsibility of decision-
making to the President. This is particularly true under statutes such as the
418. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY 47-67 (1993) (arguing for greater
judicial and congressional involvement in foreign affairs); Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President
(Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255 (1988)
(arguing that executive primacy over foreign relations results from a pattern of executive initiative,
congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance).
419. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
420. The Joint Resolution at issue in Curtiss-Wright criminalized the sale of weapons to
countries engaged in a conflict between Paraguay and Bolivia, conditioned upon a presidential finding
that such a prohibition "may contribute to the reestablishment of peace" in the region. 48 Stat. 811
(1934), quoted in Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 312. The Supreme Court upheld the statute as a
constitutional delegation of power to the President over foreign affairs.
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Federal Burma Statute, where Congress authorizes executive imposition of
additional sanctions if the President finds that human rights conditions have
deteriorated. Congress thus transfers to the President responsibility for
deciding whether sanctions are appropriate, while setting forth certain factors
to be considered in imposing sanctions and in defining the form sanctions
should take. Delegation of enforcement responsibility to the President in this
manner may invite abuse, allowing Congress to adopt political "show
sanctions" while leaving the Executive to take the international heat. On the
other hand, such certification procedures can build legitimate flexibility into
sanctions measures where they are applied even-handedly and according to
principled international standards by the executive branch.
(ii) The Executive
The broad discretion bestowed on the Executive by most sanctions laws
contributes to the politicization of sanctions efforts. Discretion is incorporated
into the statutes through vaguely defined standards, through delegation to the
Executive of responsibility for finding a triggering violation, and through
waiver provisions.
(a) Drafting Ambiguity
Statutory language establishing the standards for imposing sanctions has
been criticized for failing to define clearly the rights to be applied. As noted
above, of the U.S. measures examined, only the child labor provision of the
GSP, the child labor executive order, and Section 307 of the Tariff Act
specifically define the rights at stake.421 Some sanctions statutes, such as
Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act,422 identify the basic rights intended
to be enforced but do not define them. Other statutes simply refer generally to
human rights or national security. Vagueness of this type reduces the guidance
provided to the President, undermines the ability of Congress to analyze the
validity of an executive decision, and eliminates any workable standards for
judicial enforcement. Lack of congressional specificity in banning farther
military aid to Indonesia, for example, allowed the Department of Defense
(DOD) to evade the spirit, if not the letter, of the restriction in the mid-1990s
by providing the aid through another DOD appropriations account.4 23
Statutory ambiguity also potentially allows either Congress or the President to
promote a wide range of policy goals through the rhetoric of fundamental
rights. Ambiguity in definitions can be substantially reduced, however, if the
statutes are interpreted consistently with internationally recognized human
rights standards.
421. Supra notes 402 & 403.
422. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
423. Tim Weiner, U.S. Training of Indonesian Troops Goes On Despite Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
17, 1998, atA3.
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(b) Executive Certifications
Discretion also is built into certification provisions that require the
Executive to find that certain conditions are present before sanctions are
imposed or withheld. Even when sanctions provisions are otherwise
mandatory, certification requirements allow the Executive to avoid operation
of the statute by declining to find-sometimes in the face of overwhelming
contrary evidence-that a country is a gross human rights violator. President
Reagan repeatedly certified that El Salvador was meeting congressional
requirements on reducing torture and complying with international human
rights in order to release foreign aid to the country in early 1980s, despite the
dubious accuracy of the finding.424 In January 1986, on the other hand,
President Reagan declined to find that Haiti's Duvalier regime was taking
steps to improve human rights, an act that suspended U.S. foreign assistance
aid to Haiti and substantially contributed to Jean-Claude Duvalier's flight
from Haiti in February of that year.425 Discretion similarly is built into the
GSP benefits review process through the Subcommittee's largely unbridled
authority to accept or reject country practice petitions for review.
426
Decisions to impose sanctions may be heavily disputed within the
executive branch, with competing pressures from the State Department,
national security personnel, and embassy officials in the target state.
Executive reluctance to certify countries as human rights violators is
exacerbated when the nation is a friend or important trading partner of the
United States, or an important security ally.427 As President Clinton observed
424. See CARTER, supra note 8, at 43-44 n.38; Amy S. Griffin, Comment, Constitutional
Impediments to Enforcing Human Rights Legislation: The Case of El Salvador, 33 Ahi. U. L. REv. 163,
190 (1983) ("As long as the administration provided a nominal factual basis for certifying that the
human rights conditions had improved, the findings of the executive branch were conclusive."); Scott
Horton & Randy Sellier, Commentary, The Utility of Presidential Certifications of Compliance with
United States Human Rights Policy: The Case of El Salvador, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 825 (arguing that the
statutory certification process was ineffective in ensuring that aid would be conditioned on human rights
compliance). Reagan administration votes in IFIs consistently opposed loans to pro-leftist states such as
South Yemen on grounds of human rights abuse but did not oppose similar loans to non-leftist human
rights abusers such as Chile, Paraguay (until 1985), and pre-Alfonsin Argentina. CARTER, supra note 8,
at 169 n.46.
425. CARTER, supra note 8, at 47 n.47; see also Section 705, 22 U.S.C. § 2347 (Supp. 1111985)
(requiring the President to certify that Haiti was improving its human rights situation before Haiti could
receive foreign aid).
426. OECD STUDY, supra note 7, at 185. Nearly half of the formal reviews for the forty
countries whose labor practices were challenged in GSP petitions between 1984 and 1995 were
postponed, while the remaining countries usually were found to be in compliance. Id.
427. Despite the central position that human rights played in the Carter Administration's
foreign policy, the Carter State Department never determined formally, even in a classified finding, that
any particular government was a gross human rights abuser. Stephen Cohen, who served as the Assistant
Secretary of State for Human Rights in the Carter Administration, has described the political pressures
giving rise to that administration's "fear of finding" as follows:
It was feared that each country named would then consider itself publicly insulted, with
consequent damage to our bilateral relationship. In addition, there was concern that once
such a finding was revealed, the freedom to alter it might be severely constrained by
public political pressures. Any attempt to name a country as a "gross violator" would
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in opposing Congress's plan to impose mandatory sanctions in the Religious
Freedom Act of 1998, mandatory sanctions place "enormous pressure" on the
Executive to "fudge" the finding.428 Executive findings, even when difficult to
support, substantially shift to Congress the burden of disproving a presidential
determination.
429
Executive discretion, however, is not absolute. A certification or waiver
decision that is difficult to support may cost the Executive valuable political
capital and is subject to attack both in Congress and by the general public.
Congress may hold hearings on the subject, and certain statutes require the
President to defend his findings if Congress contests them.43  The State
Department's 1991 decision certifying that Peru had not engaged in gross
human rights abuses and thus qualified for anti-narcotics trafficking
assistance, for example, prompted protest from the human rights community
and congressional hearings on the certification decision.431 The outcry resulted
in an agreement between Congress and the Bush administration to delay $10
million of Peru's military assistance.432 Congress theoretically may override
an executive decision, either by refusing to appropriate funds or restricting the
use of existing appropriations, or by passing other legislation. Control through
formal legislation, of course, is always potentially subject to presidential veto.
In 1983, for example, President Reagan vetoed legislation that would have
continued to condition military aid to El Salvador on findings of human rights
compliance. 433 In 1986, Congress overrode President Reagan's veto to enact
comprehensive sanctions against South Africa.
434
raise the ire of defense-minded conservatives who did not want military ties cut off. Any
attempt to change the finding because a country had improved conditions would be
subject to intense scrutiny by human rights partisans to determine whether the supposed
improvements were cosmetic or genuine. Thus, maximum flexibility required that no
country be formally found to be prohibited from receiving security assistance under
section 502B.
Stephen B. Cohen, Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human Rights Practices, 76 AM. J. INT'L
L. 246, 264-65 (1982).
428. Elaine Sciolino, Clinton Argues for 'Flexibility' Over Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28,
1998, at Al.
429. Mark A. Chinen, Presidential Certification in U.S. Foreign Policy Legislation, 31 N.Y.U.
INT'L L. & POL. 217, 239 (1999).
430. If the President makes a finding of extraordinary circumstances to waive restrictions on
security assistance under Section 502B, Congress may request information from the Secretary of State
regarding the nature of the alleged extraordinary circumstances. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(c)(1)(C) (1990).
Likewise, a waiver based on improved human rights conditions requires the President first to report to
Congress regarding the nature of assistance to be provided and the justification for the assistance,
including information regarding the significant human rights improvements that have occurred. 22
U.S.C. § 2304(g) (1990).
431. Determination under Section 4(a) of the International Narcotics Control Act of 1990, 56
Fed. Reg. 38,165 (Aug. 12, 1991); Dep't of State, International Narcotics Control Act of 1990:
Justification for Determination: Peru, reprinted in Review of the Presidential Determination on
Narcotics Control and Human Rights in Peru: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
102d Cong. 167 (1991).
432. Holly Burkhalter, The Peruvian Coup on Capitol Hill, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 23, 1991, at
26; Eugene Robinson, U.S. Drug-Fighting Program in Peru "Enormously Delayed", WASH. POST, Nov.
24, 1991, at A28. For further discussion, see Chinen, supra note 429, at 227-28.
433. CARTER, supra note 8, at 44 n.38.
434. Id. at 35.
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(c) Waiver Provisions
Waiver provisions also incorporate substantial executive discretion into
sanctions policies and, depending on their application, either allow reasonable
flexibility or provide the legal cover for politically-motivated selective
enforcement. Even where Congress itself finds that fundamental rights
violations warrant the imposition of sanctions, sanctions statutes invariably
authorize the Executive to waive the restrictions based on a discretionary
finding that waiver will accomplish certain goals or further U.S. interests.
Waiver and suspension provisions may be fairly specific, requiring a finding
that the country has pursued a specified course of conduct (as in Helms-
Burton), or they may generally allow waiver due to the presence of
"extraordinary circumstances" or conditions in the national interest.
435
Although Congress is understandably reluctant to tie the hands of the
President by imposing mandatory sanctions, broad waiver provisions invite
Executives with competing priorities to refuse to impose sanctions on
countries that would otherwise qualify. Once given discretion to impose or
waive sanctions, the President is left with an easily manipulated instrument.
Greater specificity of language may not always constrain executive
discretion. The waiver provision of Title III of Helms-Burton, for example,
requires the President to find both that the suspension is "necessary" to U.S.
national interests and that it "will expedite a transition to democracy in
Cuba., 436 Congress adopted these requirements over the President's preferred
formulation: that suspension was 'important to the national interests of the
United States, including expediting a transition to democracy 
in Cuba."' 437
Despite Congress's prediction that the President could not in good faith find
that suspension under current conditions would expedite Cuba's transition to
democracy,438 President Clinton has repeatedly exercised the waiver, and
international law scholars such as Alston would be likely to approve of his
decision.
(d) Executive Fact-Finding
State Department Country Reports, which provide the factual basis for
executive human and labor rights findings, also are subject to politicization.
During the Reagan administration, State Department reports were heavily
criticized by human rights NGOs and other watchdog entities for exaggerating
human rights abuses in communist and leftist-allied countries such as Cuba
and Nicaragua, while downplaying violations by friendly right-wing regimes
such as El Salvador, Haiti, and Chile. For two decades commencing in 1978,
435. Supra note 193.
436. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
114, § 306(b)(1), 110 Stat. 785 (1996).
437. Helms-Burton Conference Report, supra note 348, at 65 (emphasis added).
438. Id. at 65-66.
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the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and other human rights NGOs
jointly published an annual critique of the State Department reports.439 The
NGOs reported in 1984 with respect to Nicaragua, for example, that the State
Department Country Report was pervaded by "[m]ajor omissions, misleading
statements and highly slanted reporting .... Truth is distorted to serve the
administration's policies toward Nicaragua." 440 In the labor rights area, State
Department reports in the 1980s refused to acknowledge substantial labor
rights violations occurring in Malaysia, and the Reagan and Bush
administrations persistently refused to impose trade restrictions on Malaysia
for labor rights violations.441 Early Clinton administration reports on Haiti,
while the administration was judicially defending its policy of forcibly
returning Haitian refugees, were criticized for "severely distorting the reality
of human rights violations." 442 The quality of the reports improved
significantly after the administration's policy was upheld and progress was
made negotiating President Aristide's return. 
3
One persistent critique of the State Department Country Reports' and
GSP Review's methodology has been the agencies' excessive reliance on
information from U.S. embassies, which are primarily concerned about
maintaining cordial relations with the host country and official positions of
foreign states, and their refusal to accept outside submissions from religious,
human rights, and labor groups and international organizations.' With the
end of the Cold War and the Clinton administration's greater sympathy for
human rights concerns, both State Department Country Reports and the GSP
439. The 1984 Human Rights NGO critique, for example, noted that:
[T]here are important exceptions to the generally high standard of reporting. The most
striking are the reports dealing with four countries in Central America: El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. In the case of the first three, the reports seem to
make every effort to minimize abuses; in the case of Nicaragua, the report goes in the
opposite direction, grossly exaggerating abuses. The effect is to paint an unrealistically
rosy portrait of human rights condition in those countries in the region supported by the
United States and an unrealistically grim portrait of human rights conditions in the
country opposed by the United States.
After acknowledging the United States' active political and military involvement in the civil wars in
Central America, the report continued:
However compelling the Administration perceives its interests to be in those countries,
there can be no excuse for distorting a factual discussion of human rights conditions to
further Administration policy in other spheres. We question whether it is possible for the
State Department to carry out even-handed human rights monitoring in situations where
the United States is at war, either directly or by all-out support for one side.
Americas Watch Committee, The Helsinki Committee, & The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,
Critique: Review of the Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1984
(1985), quoted in Louis HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RiGHTS 843 (1999).
440. Id. at 845.
441. Int'l Lab. Rights Educ. and Research Fund v. Bush, 954 F.2d 745, 753 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(Mikva, C.J., dissenting) (discussing labor rights groups' allegations that the U.S. Trade Representative
had extended GSP benefits to Malaysia even after finding that Malaysia was violating worker rights).
See discussion infra note 450 and accompanying text.
442. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Critique: Review of the U.S. Department of
State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994 (1995), excerpted in HENKIN ET AL.,
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 439, at 852.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 853.
2001]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Reviews have become significantly less politicized and more professional.
The process of compiling the annual State Department reports now requires
embassy officials to gather information from a wide range of sources
throughout the year, including government officials, jurists, military sources,
journalists, academics, and human rights and labor activists."
5 The State
Department then reviews and compiles the submissions using additional
information from domestic and international human rights groups, foreign
governments, the United Nations and international organizations.
44 6 The
reports have improved in accuracy to the point that the human rights NGOs
discontinued publishing their annual critique in 1999.
447 The GSP
Subcommittee Review similarly includes consideration of information
contained in ILO documents, the State Department Country Reports, U.S.
Department of Labor reports, and information supplied by relevant U.S.
embassy personnel, the GSP review petitioners, and the beneficiary
government about its legislation and practices.44
8
(iii) The Courts
Judicial decisions granting great deference to the Executive in the
foreign affairs area protect the Executive's ability to politically manipulate the
sanctions process. Courts are notoriously reluctant to second-guess executive
findings or otherwise enforce sanctions statutes. Vague language makes
enforcement difficult. In Dames & Moore v. Regan,44
9 the Supreme Court
rejected a claim that President Reagan's resolution of sanctions against Iran
exceeded the Executive's authority under IEEPA, finding the executive
actions consistent with the spirit, if not the letter, of the sanctions statute. In
International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund v. Bush,
4 50 labor
and human rights groups claimed that the Bush administration had acted
arbitrarily and contrary to the GSP statute by continuing to extend trading
privileges to countries such as Malaysia, despite well-documented evidence of
labor abuses. The district court dismissed the suit as nonjusticiable. It found
that, by authorizing the Executive to make findings on countries' compliance
with internationally recognized worker rights, the statute committed labor
rights determinations to agency discretion and yielded "no law" for the court
445. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRAcTIcES, at xii (2000),
available at http://www.state.gov/wwv/global/hummmights/1999_hrpjreportlpreface.html (last visited
Mar. 3, 2000).
446. Id.
447. HENKIN, supra note 439, at 842.
448. OECD STUDY, supra note 7, at 184.
449. 453 U.S. 654, 675-88 (1981); see also Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984) (construing
statutory language broadly to uphold executive expansion of Cuban embargo under IEEPA).
450. 752 F. Supp. 495 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd, 954 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also Terry
Collingsworth, International Worker Rights Enforcement: Proposals Following a Test Case, in Compa
& Diamond, supra note 229, at 227,228.
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to apply.451 The decision was affirmed on appeal in a per curium opinion with
separate concurrences.
452
Again, greater specificity may not remedy the problem. In Japan
Whaling Ass 'n v. American Cetacean Soc., 45 3 Congress attempted to provide
unilateral remedies for violations of the international whaling convention by
requiring the President to sanction countries found to be in violation of the
treaty. Although Japan was a clear violator and Congress had intended to
make the imposition of sanctions mandatory, the Reagan administration
avoided imposing sanctions by declining to make the relevant finding, and the
Supreme Court deferred to the executive decision.454 On the other hand, in
Population Institute, Population Council v. McPherson,455 a district court held
that it was authorized to review USAID's decision to deny development
assistance to China pursuant to the statutory bar on funding programs
supporting coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization. The court found that
it was entitled to determine whether the Administrator had relied upon a
reasonable interpretation of the statute.45 6
In addition to substantive obstacles to review, procedural barriers such
as standing preclude judicial consideration of many sanctions decisions. In
Clark v. United States, 457 a federal district court rejected, on standing grounds,
taxpayers' claims that the Reagan administration had violated the human
rights provisions of Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act by giving
military assistance to El Salvador and the Nicaraguan Contras.458 In Talenti v.
Clinton,459 the D.C. Circuit held that an individual whose property allegedly
had been expropriated by the Italian government could not sue to enforce a
statute mandating sanctions against Italy for such conduct. 46  In Smith v.
451. Int'l Lab. Rights Educ. and Research Fund, 752 F. Supp. at 497.
452. Judge Henderson would have dismissed the action on the grounds that the Court of
International Trade had exclusive jurisdiction over the claims. Int'l Lab. Rights Educ. and Research
Fund, 954 F.2d 745, 747-48 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Henderson, J., concurring). Judge Sentelle believed that
the labor union and human rights organization plaintiffs lacked standing. Id. at 749-52 (Sentelle, J.,
concurring). Chief Judge Mikva dissented, finding that the labor unions had standing and that the statute
imposed a mandatory duty on the Executive that was subject to judicial review. Id. at 754-59 (Mikva,
C.J., dissenting).
453. 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
454. Id. at 231 (holding that the statute dedicated certification to executive discretion); see also
Associated Imports, Inc., v. Int'l Longshoremens' Ass'n, 609 F. Supp. 595, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(Section 307 commits determination whether products are produced with forced labor to discretion of
the executive branch); cf. China Diesel Imports, Inc. v. U.S., 870 F. Supp. 347 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1994)
(upholding Executive's exclusion of goods made with convict or forced labor under Section 307).
455. 797F.2d 1062, 1068-69 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
456. Id. at 1069.
457. 609 F. Supp. 1249 (D. Md. 1985).
458. The Court found that the provision had been "enacted to effect the relationship between
the Congress and the President over disbursing foreign aid funds in light of an official policy of concern
for human rights," and that only the Executive or members of Congress could enforce its provisions. Id.
at 1251.
459. 102 F.3d 573 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
460. In light of the President's authority to waive sanctions and the small likelihood that
sanctions would compel Italy to provide restitution, the court concluded that it was "mere speculation"
that ajudgment would remedy the plaintiff's injury. Id. at 577.
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Atwood,461 a federal district court held that a Chinese national lacked standing
to challenge a finding by USAID under the Foreign Assistance Act that a U.N.
agency was not promoting forced population control measures in China and
thus was eligible for U.S. assistance.462 In Aerotrade, Inc. v. Agency for
International Development, the court held that a statute authorizing
withholding of foreign assistance did not create a cause of action for private
enforcement, and "involve[d] political considerations more properly a subject
for Congress than for the Court." 463 Crockett v. Reagan
464 similarly rejected
an effort by members of Congress to challenge the reasonableness of
President Reagan's certifications in the early 1980s under Section 502B of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 that El Salvador had succeeded in curbing
torture and murder by the military and was making "a concerted and
significant effort to comply with internationally recognized human 
rights." 465
Finally, in some statutes, such as the Export Administration Act, Congress has
expressly barred judicial review, thus dedicating the decision whether to
comply with the statute substantially to the Executive's absolute 
discretion.466
Frustration with congressional abdication of responsibility and
executive implementation efforts has led some commentators to call for
"clearer directives, less discretion, and more assiduous congressional
oversight" of sanctions provisions.467 Mandatory sanctions may in some
circumstances provide political leverage for the President in his efforts to urge
compliance with fundamental rights by foreign states, by allowing him to
argue that his hands have been tied by Congress. Recent legislation such as
Helms-Burton has attempted to detail more specifically the sanctions to be
imposed and to reduce executive discretion, though the measures chosen in
this case merely exacerbated international objections.
461. 845 F. Supp. 911 (D.D.C. 1992).
462. While acknowledging that the plaintiffs fell within the statute's protection, the court found
the relationship between withholding of U.S. aid and any harm to the plaintiffs "entirely too remote to
provide them with the requisite standing." Id. at 914 n.3. The court suggested that congressmembers
could sue to ensure that the agency applied the correct statutory standard. Id. at 914-15. Accord
McKinney v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 799 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (rejecting, on standing grounds,
effort to require Secretary of Treasury to bar importation of goods made with forced or convict labor
under Section 307 of the TariffAct).
463. 397 F. Supp. 974, 976-77 (D.D.C. 1974).
464. 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
465. Id. at 902. Invoking the doctrine of equitable discretion, the Court found that the
President's findings had satisfied the formal requirements of the statute and that the appropriate
response, if members of Congress were displeased with the finding, was resort to the legislative process,
not the courts. Id. at 902-03.
466. 50 U.S.C. App. § 2412(a) (2000) (excluding EAA actions from review under the
Administrative Procedure Act); see also International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. § 6450
(2000) (barring judicial review of executive actions under the Act).
467. Cohen, supra note 172, at 277; see also Diane Orentlicher, The Power of an Idea: The
Impact of United States Human Rights Policy, 1 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43 (1991);
International Labor Rights Fund, History of Trade-Worker Rights Linkage in US. Trade Law, in
DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE MECHANISMS FOR IMPLEMENTING LABOR RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 2
(1998), at http://www.laborrights.org/projects/globalecon/ilrf/ilrf
2
b.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2000) (on
file with The Yale Journal of International Law).
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E. Toward a Normatively Legitimate Sanctions Policy
Some selective enforcement inevitably will result from the shared
political process by which sanctions are adopted, and so mere selectivity in
the actual imposition of sanctions does not necessarily render U.S.
enforcement efforts illegitimate. The appropriateness of sanctions may vary
widely in any given circumstance. Where the U.S. is on good diplomatic
terms with a state, for example, informal diplomatic pressure may be a more
effective instrument of first resort than broad restrictions on trade and aid.
Where the United States has few existing economic interests in a country, or
where sanctions are not likely to be respected by other trading partners,
economic sanctions may not be the most effective means of compelling future
international rights compliance. Determining what course of action is most
likely to encourage a change in state behavior thus should remain, within
reasonable and principled boundaries, a matter of political discretion.
Consistency in application, however, is important to the legitimacy of
unilateral human rights enforcement efforts. States are much more likely to
voluntarily comply with international norms that they perceive to be fair,468
and reliable interpretation and application of international norms by
transnational actors is critical to encouraging nations to recognize, internalize,
and obey international law. Politicization of sanctions efforts, and
unreasonable inconsistency in their application, accordingly, erodes the U.S.
capacity for moral leadership in promoting international human rights.
Whether or not U.S. sanctions practices will advance or undermine
international rights enforcement efforts in the future thus will turn heavily on
the consistency of the United States' interpretation of human rights norms
with international law. If U.S. unilateral action is to contribute constructively
to the development of the international rights regime, a number of steps must
be taken. First, sanctions should be imposed only to promote rights that are
mutually binding on the United States and the target state, either through
treaty ratifications or as customary jus cogens and erga omnes obligations.
This requirement is necessary to ensure that U.S. actions comport with
international rules regarding economic interference and jurisdiction. Second,
the United States must continue to look to international standards in applying
its domestic sanctions laws. This requires complying with the definitions set
forth in international instruments and acting consistently with the
interpretations and recommendations of intergovermnental bodies such as the
Human Rights Committee, the ILO, and NGOs. Third, the documentation of
violations by the State Department and condemnation by the United States
should be as even-handed as possible. The United States cannot be selective in
its condemnation of regimes that engage in fundamental rights violations
without severely weakening the credibility of its unilateral enforcement
efforts. Fourth, extraterritorial enforcement should be avoided except for the
468. See generally THOMAS M. FRANK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 7-
8(1995).
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possible purpose of enforcing core human rights norms against direct aiders
and abetters of gross human rights violations. Extraterritorial provisions, such
as Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, simply focus the attention of the
international community on the legality of the extraterritorial sanctions rather
than on the substantive violations of the target state. Finally, once a gross
violation is acknowledged, sanctions decisions should be made based on good
faith determinations by Congress and the Executive regarding the utility of
sanctions for strengthening the international system and improving
international rights compliance. This principle is perhaps the most difficult to
fulfill or monitor, since a decision to deny sanctions can always be justified,
however disingenuously, on the grounds that constructive engagement is more
likely to bring positive results. Yet compliance with this principle is ultimately
critical to the United States' capacity for moral leadership. A unilateral
sanctions policy that is based on a consideration of its international
implications could accomplish U.S. domestic goals while complementing and
strengthening the international rights regime.
VI. INTERNALIZATION OF GLOBAL NORMS
Economic sanctions are often criticized as ineffective in terms of
altering the behavior of the target state.469 Opponents of sanctions contend that
unilateral sanctions simply isolate and entrench human rights violators and
hurt U.S. industry by opening opportunities for foreign competitors, without
accomplishing desired changes in the target state. Given the hostility of the
business community to many economic sanctions and the uncertainty that
exists regarding the ability of sanctions to alter the behavior of foreign states,
one may wonder why the use of sanctions has persisted in the human rights
field. One reason may be that the traditional measures of sanctions'
"effectiveness" are underinclusive. Sanctions may have a number of less
tangible but nevertheless desireable effects on the behavior of both the target
and other foreign states. As Richard Parker puts it,
the failure of sanctions to topple Castro is often cited as support for the inefficacy of
economic sanctions employed for high foreign policy purposes. Yet the alert citizen and
policy-maker might well ask, did sanctions nonetheless weaken Castro's ability to
finance counter-revolutionary movements in Latin America; did they force the Soviet
Union to deplete its own resources subsidizing Castro; and/or did economic sanctions
force Castro to liberalize his state-ran economy more than he otherwise might have done?
Did the hardships imposed by sanctions on Cuba serve to deter other countries from
choosing the 'Communist' and expansionist path during those years when international• . •070
communism still had some charisma overseas?
469. E.g., HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 6, at 41 (defining sanctions' "success" in terms of
"changes in the policies, capabilities, or government of the target country").
470. Richard Parker, The Problem With Scorecards: How (and How Not) to Measure the Cost-
Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 235, 250 (2000). Parker argues that
"'effectiveness' cannot be accurately measured by counting the immediate results of individual face-offs
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Current evaluations of sanctions' effectiveness are incapable of taking such
considerations into account. They also fail to take into account the role of
sanctions that are threatened but not ultimately imposed, as well as the
expressive value of sanctions in distancing domestic regimes from the conduct
of foreign states.471 Indeed, current empirical methods are inadequate even to
measure the costs and effectiveness of sanctions even in the narrow sense.472
To be accurate, the "effectiveness" or success of sanctions should be
measured in terms of the international community's overall progress towards
accepting and implementing the normative values being advanced by the
sanctioning state.
Consistent with this approach, I would argue that the persistent resort to
unilateral sanctions reflects the important role of sanctions in the transnational
process of defining and clarifying international norms, and in internalizing
global norms into the domestic processes of states. Sanctions are a primary
means by which various members of the international community articulate
collective standards, monitor international behavior, and communicate outrage
at noncompliance by rogue states. Just as repeated bombardment of atoms in a
particle accelerator produces fission, repeated confrontations between states
and transnational actors facilitates the formulation and internalization of
global human rights norms.
While undoubtedly "haphazard" in their range and complexity, U.S.
unilateral sanctions programs share the common function of creating a forum
for various domestic and foreign governmental agencies and nongovernmental
entities to conduct an ongoing dialogue with foreign states regarding
international human rights compliance. The sanctions imposition, review, and
removal processes formally provoke numerous interactions between the
United States and foreign governments in which global norms are raised and
clarified, and norm internalization is promoted. While sanctions alone cannot
be a panacea for universal human rights compliance, the "bombardment" of
foreign states that results from U.S. and other unilateral efforts substantially
increases the transnational interactions that ultimately yield the development
and domestic and transnational internalization of global norms. U.S. trade and
aid sanctions thus promote both the internalization of human rights norms into
U.S. and foreign practices and the broader interplay of a concerted
transnational system of rights enforcement.
A. Domestic Norm Internalization
Trade and aid sanctions advance the goal of internalization in a number
of ways. Laws conditioning U.S. foreign assistance and trade benefits on
foreign countries' compliance with internationally recognized human and
between sender and target states. Sanctions may fail, for example, to achieve reversal of a politically
motivated expropriation by a target state but nonetheless deter further expropriations by that state or
others." Id. at 294.
471. DAVID BALDWIN, ECONOMIC STATECRAFr 130-38 (1985) (discussing the difficulty of
measuring the intangible effects of economic sanctions).
472. Parker, supra note 470, at 241.
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labor rights formally structure consideration of fundamental global norms into
U.S. legislative and executive processes. The annual State Department, GSP,
and congressional review processes formally inject consideration of human
and labor rights conditions into U.S. foreign policy and make it a continual
subject of public debate. In making decisions about export licensing and
foreign assistance, presidents are required to consider the human rights
conditions in a country, to publish findings in the Federal Register, and to
report to Congress. If an executive finding is challenged, the Executive must
provide factual support to defend its position. Congress, on the other hand,
must consider periodically whether to extend, withdraw, or modify existing
appropriations, and whether to continue or suspend trade benefits, based in
part on human and labor rights compliance. The sanctions provisions thus
create a constant dialogue between Congress and the Executive regarding
fundamental global norms.
The human rights dialogue, moreover, extends beyond Congress and the
President. Responsibility for compiling information for the annual State
Department reports has helped internalize respect for fundamental rights into
the State Department bureaucracy. Incorporation of human rights
considerations in trade and assistance laws also creates an organizing
mechanism for "transnational moral entrepreneurs ' 473 and "norm interpreters"
such as NGOs, consumer groups, and other private transnational actors to
participate in norm enunciation and clarification by lobbying Congress and the
Executive and publicizing rights abuses. Consideration of a major foreign
assistance package for Colombia in the spring of 2000, for example, presented
an opportunity for Human Rights Watch to release a report on human rights
conditions in Colombia and resulted in substantial news coverage and
congressional hearings on the subject. (Congress ultimately awarded an anti-
narcotics aid package to Colombia conditioned on human rights
considerations, which the President waived on national security grounds.)
These public-private dialogues in turn are picked up by the media and
disseminated to the national and international communities, thereby
heightening public knowledge of human rights standards and conditions and
contributing to domestic and global participation in transnational legal
developments. Sanctions thus play an important role in generating domestic
respect for fundamental rights and represent a significant example of
legislative and executive participation in transnational legal process.
473. Ethan Nadelmann has portrayed international NGOs as "transnational moral
entrepreneurs" who (1) "mobilize popular opinion and political support both within their host country
and abroad;" (2) "stimulate and assist in the creation of like-minded organizations in other countries;"
(3) "play a significant role in elevating their objective beyond its identification with the national
interests of their government;" and (4) direct their efforts "toward persuading foreign audiences,
especially foreign elites, that a particular prohibition regime reflects a widely shared or even universal
moral sense, rather than the peculiar moral code of one society." Ethan Nadelmann, Global Prohibition
Regimes: The Evolution of Nonns in International Society, 44 INT'L ORG. 479, 482 (1990).
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B. Transnational Norm Internalization
Conditioning U.S. trade and economic aid on human rights
considerations also has transnational impact by promoting norm development
and internalization by both the broader international community and the target
states. The periodic review of foreign state practices mandated by the aid and
trade statutes continually communicates to foreign states U.S. concern over
human rights compliance. One of the primary objections raised to permanent
normalization of trade relations with China, for example, was that the decision
would surrender the leverage of Congress's annual review of China's human
rights practices.474 As the Burma example suggests, U.S. sanctions debates
also have a cross-pollinating effect and encourage other members of the
international community to examine and support or reject sanctions against
the target state and ultimately to mobilize shame against egregious human
rights violators.
The GSP system and labor rights reviews similarly promote
transnational dialogue regarding labor rights compliance. GSP petitions
commonly are initiated by transnational non-governmental actors such as
domestic or international trade unions and NGOs. Once a GSP petition is
accepted for review, the United States, through various domestic agencies,
engages in a bilateral communication process with the country whose
beneficiary status is challenged, which may last a year or more. During the
review, an exhaustive examination is conducted of the country's labor
legislation and practices and the relevant international norms. Information is
gathered from numerous domestic and international sources, including the
petitioners. The review process includes ILO participation and generally
concludes with recommendations regarding a future desired course of action
for the country and use of ILO technical assistance. The OECD has concluded
that, perhaps even more than the actual imposition of sanctions, the process of
reviewing a country's labor rights practices has created an important impetus
for improved labor rights conditions:
The administration of the country practice reviews encourages improved workers'
rights practices principally by raising consciousness and applying international peer
pressure. A great deal of information about a country's labour regime is exposed during
the GSP's review process. Beneficiary governments do not want to be judged negatively
for fear of discouraging potential foreign investment.
47 5
The GSP review process also has been successful in internalizing global
norms into foreign domestic practices. Progress in improving core labor
practices has generally been made in countries subject to the GSP review
process, particularly when the review process is extended for several years.476
474. Eric Schmitt, White House Says Votes Are Lacking on Chinese Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
10, 2000, at AI0.
475. OECD STUDY, supra note 7, at 186.
476. Id. at 186.
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Preparation of the State Department's annual reports on country
conditions also plays an important role in norm identification, clarification,
and internalization by foreign states. The process of gathering information and
preparing the reports subjects foreign practices to constant scrutiny and
obligates U.S. embassy personnel abroad to be aware of human and labor
rights issues and to maintain contact throughout the year with local religious,
human rights, labor and other groups capable of bringing abuses to their
attention. Compiling information for the annual reports provokes constant
interactions around human rights norms between U.S. and foreign government
personnel and other foreign actors. The release of the annual State Department
reports themselves helps direct national and international attention to human
rights conditions and plays an important role in educating the broader public
about human rights conditions.
In short, efforts by the United States to use its economic power to
promote international human and labor rights compliance represent an
important example of how to promote the universalization of these
international norms and to incorporate them into states' domestic practice.
Economic sanctions are by no means the only option available to states to
advance these goals, as the Burma example makes clear. Nevertheless, in an
international society lacking global enforcement mechanisms, sanctions have
a role to play in the norm internalization process.
VII. CONCLUSION
Fifty years ago, the U.N. human rights system was conceived as a
system of uniform, organized processes for the articulation, oversight, and
dissemination of human rights norms. That early vision has been gradually
modified, transformed, and adapted by the Cold War and state and
institutional practice into a system in which multiple actors utilize a wide
range of mechanisms which loosely coalesce to promote recognition and
internalization of global norms. While the United Nations retains a critical
function in mobilizing international consensus around global norms, its efforts
are complemented by those of other transnational actors, many of whom may
concentrate their efforts on the promotion of a specific right or on improving
the practices of a single region or state.
U.S. unilateral economic sanctions play an important role in this
complementary process. A review of U.S. laws and practices imposing
unilateral sanctions for international labor and human rights violations
demonstrates that the United States has taken significant steps towards
cooperating as an international player in promoting respect for fundamental
rights in recent years. The United States has worked to incorporate
international standards and international monitoring efforts into U.S. sanctions
477. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR 1994, reprinted in
HENKIN, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 439, at 845-46.
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practices and to conform its sanctions decisions to both substantive global
norms and international rules governing the propriety of unilateral conduct.
States targeted today by U.S. sanctions for torture or forced labor cannot
reasonably contend that their practices do not violate international standards
or that U.S. unilateralism is contrary to international practice. The United
States' unilateral enforcement regime remains vulnerable to politicization and
abuse of the human rights agenda. But when employed consistently with
international standards, the incorporation of international norms into U.S.
economic practice contributes significantly to the development of the
transnational enforcement system for human and labor rights.
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APPENDIX: U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS SANCTIONS LAWS
MAJOR U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS SANCTIONS STATUTES
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
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Foreign Assistance Act, §116 Foreign Assistance Act, §502B
Title & Citation 22 U.S.C. § 2151n (1994) 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (2000)
Bars development assistance to governments Bars security assistance (including licenses under
engaging in "a consistent pattern of gross the Export Administration Act and Arms Export
violations of internationally recognized Control Act) to governments engaging in "a
Operative Provisions human rights" (§ 215 In(a)). consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights" (§ 2304
__(a)(2)).
Includes torture, cruel, inhumane or Includes torture, cruel, inhumane or degrading
degrading treatment, prolonged detention treatment, prolonged detention without charges,
without charges, disappearance, or other disappearance, or other flagrant denial ofthe
flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, right to life, liberty, and security of person (§
Rights Targeted and security ofpersons (§ 215In(a)); 2304(d)(1)); and
protection of children from exploitation, severe violations of religions freedom (§ 2304
abuse, or forced military conscription (§ (a)(4)).
2151n(b)); and severe violations of religionus
freedom (§ 215In(c)(3)).
Reporting on Genocide as defined under
Art. 2 of Genocide Convention & U.S.
Implementation Act (§ 215 In(d)(8));
trafficking in persons defined as "the use of Actions to be taken in accordance with
deception, coercion, debt bondage, the threat international obligations under the U.N. Charter.
Definitions of force, or the abuse of authority to recruit, (§ 2304(aX1)).
International Standards transport within or across borders, purchase,sell, transfer, receive, or harbor a person for Reporting on genocide as defined under Art. 2 of
the purposes of placing or holding such Genocide Convention & U.S. Implementation
person, whether for pay or not, in Act (§ 2304(b)).
involuntary servitude, slavery or slavery-like
conditions, or in forced, bonded, or coerced
j labor" (§ 2151n(f)(3)(A)).
Restriction may be overridden with Restriction may be overridden based on
executive finding that the prohibited presidential certification that "extraordinary
assistance "will directly benefit the needy circumstances exist warranting provision of such
people in such country" (§ 215 In(a)). assistance" (§ 2304(a)(2)), or of"a significant
Congress may request written support for improvement in its human rights record" (§
Waiver this finding (§ 2151n(b)). 2304(e)). Congress may request a report on the
extraordinary circumstances which necessitate
assistance (§ 2304(c)(I)(C)), and President must
first report to Congress on the significant human
rights improvements that have occurred (§ 2304
(g)).
Annual report from State Dept. to Congress
regarding the status of internationally
recognized human rights in all U.N. member
states. Reporting includes population
control, child labor policies, votes of the
U.N. Human Rights Comm'n, refugee
protection, religions freedom, commission
of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide, and trafficking in persons (§
2151n(d), (t).
Requires consideration of target country's
cooperation with international human rights
investigations by organizations such as the
International Red Cross, the U.N., or the
OAS (§ 2151n(c)(I)).
Annual Report from State Dept. to Congress
regarding respect for internationally recognized
human tights in each country considered for
security assistance. Reporting includes war
crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide,
population control, religious freedom, refugee
protection, and votes of Human Rights Comm'n.
(§ 2304(b)).
Requires consideration of the relevant fidingsof
international organizations, such as the
I International Red Cross, and the target
government's cooperation with human tights









Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009-133 (1996), as
amended by Amendment
No. 3406, S94621 (July 30,
1998)
Prohibits Secretary of State and
Defense Dept. from providing
assistance to foreign security
Operative force units if there is credible
Provisions evidence to believe that a
member of such a unit has










7 U.S.C. § 1733G) (2000)
Support for Economic and
Democratic Development of
the Independent States of the
Former Soviet Union 22
U.S.C. § 2295a (2000)
Bars agreements to provide or Bars development assistance to
finance agricultural governments that the President
commodities to the government determines are engaged in a
of any country engaging in a consistent pattern ofgross
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally
violations of internationally recognized human rights or I






disappearance, or other flagrant
denial of the right to life,
lierty, and security of person
(§ 1733G)(1)).
Includes the rights of
minorities, freedom of religion
and emigration (§ 2295(a)(3)).
Secretary of State may waive Restriction waived "if the Restriction waived ifthe
prohibition based on finding assistance is targeted to the President finds and reports to
and report to Congress that the most needy people in such Congress that furnishing
government is taking steps to country and is made available, assistance is "important to the
bring responsible members of . . through channels other than national interest of the United
the security forces unit to the government" (§ 1733G)(2)). States," "will foster respect for
justice, internationally recognized
human rights" or democratic
Secretary of Defense may development, or will alleviate
waive prohibition ifrequired by disaster (§ 2295(c)).
extraordinary circumstances
(1998 Amendment at (c)).
Secretary must report to
Congress thereafter describing
extraordinary circumstances
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MAJOR U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS STATUTES
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
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Export-Import Bank, 12 U.S.C. Export-Import Bank, 12 Multilateral Investment
Title & Cii § 635 (2000) U.S.C. § 635i-8 (2000) 
Fund,
22 U.S.C. §§ 283z-9(a),
290k-3 (2000)
I Allows bank to deny export-import Authorizing debt reduction Limiting MFI financial support
I credit applications only where the I only for countries whose to countries with
1 President determines that "such government "does not engage democratically elected
action would clearly and in a consistent pattern of gross governments that do not
importantly advance United States violations of internationally engage in a consistent pattern
J policy in... human rights recognized human rights" (§ of gross violations of
(including child labor)" (§ 635i-8(c)(4)). internationally recognized
635(b)(1)(B)). human rights (§ 283z-9(a)).
Bank shall not support sales of Instructing the U.S. Director to
defense articles or services unless oppose investment support in
the President determines and countries barred from GSP
reports to Congress that the status for failing to afford
Operative purchasing country "has not used internationally recognized
any such defense articles or worker rights (9 290k-3(l)).
Provisions services to engage in a consistent
pattern ofgross violations of
internationally recognized human
rights" and applies requirements of
22 U.S.C. § 2304 to such sales (§
635(b)(6)(D)(i), (1)).
Bars support for exports to Angola
until President certifies that free
and fair elections have been held




For Angola restriction: military
involvement in political violence
R g and human rights abuses; freedom












Instructs U.S. Director to
actively seek the concurrence
of other Directors in opposing
support to countries violating
worker rights (§ 290k-3(1)).
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International Financial Institutions Act
of 1977,
22 U.S.C. 4 262d(a), § 262p-4p (2000)
Directs the United States to use its "voice
and vote" in international financial
institutions to oppose assistance to countries
whose governments engage in a pattern of
gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights (§ 262d(a)(1), (f)),
and to adopt policies to encourage
borrowing countries to guarantee
internationally recognized worker rights and
to include the status of such rights as an
integral part of the institution's policy















Overseas Private Investment Corp., 22
U.S.C. §§ 2191a, 2199(i) (2000)
Bars OPIC insurance, guarantee, or finance
support for projects in countries which fail to
take steps to implement laws that extend the
GSP internationally recognized worker
rights, and requires labor rights protections
in OPIC contracts (§§ 2191(a)(1)).
Applies restrictions in 22 U.S.C. § 2151n to
bar OPIC support for projects in countries
engaging in gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights (§
2199(i)).
Includes freedom of association, right to
organize and bargain collectively, minimum
age for child labor, minimum standards for
wages, hours, health & safety, forced labor
(§ 2191(a)(1)).
Internationally recognized human rights in §
2151n
See § 2151n.
Human rights restriction may be overridden OPIC may support a project in a country
ifthe assistance will specifically "serve the failing to comply with the labor rights
basic needs of the citizens of such country" provisions ifthe President finds and reports
(§ 262d(f)). to Congress that such support "would be in
the national economic interests of the United
States" (§ 2191(a)(3)).
OPIC may support a project in a country
violating human rights that will directly
benefit the needy people in such country or





[Requires quarterly reports to Congress on
votes implicating human rights and the
human rights conditions in the country (§
262d(c)(2)), and consultation (§ 262d(g)).
Requires annual reports to Congress on the
extent to which each borrowing country
guarantees internationally recognized worker
rights to its labor force and on progress
toward achieving statute's goals (§ 2 62p-
4p(b)).
Human rights provision requires
consideration of the target country's
cooperation with investigations by
international human rights organizations
such as the International Red Cross,
Amnesty International, the International
Commission of Jurists, and U.N. and OAS
entities (§ 262d(e)). Labor rights provision
requires U.S. to encourage institution to
develop formal procedures for promoting
worker rights (§ 262p-4p(a)(3)).
Requires OPIC to report annually to
Congress regarding any project which OPIC
declined to support on human rights
grounds, or for which OPIC exercised its
human rights waiver authority. (22 U.S.C. §
2200a(2) (2000)).
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INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT (CONT.)
Includes torture, cruel, inhumane, or
degrading treatment or punishment,
prolonged detention without charges, or
other flagrant denial to life, liberty, and the
security of person (§ 262d(a)(1)), severe
violations of religions freedom (262d(g)),
and GSP worker rights (§ 262p-4p(a)(1)).
Waiver
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MAJOR U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS STATUTES
IMPORT PREFERENCES
Caribbean Basin Economic




Caribbean nations so long as
the country is "taking steps to
afford [its workers] ...
internationally recognized
worker rights" as defined in the





Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3205
Bars tariffpreferences to four
Andean nations if the country is
not "taking steps to afford [its
workers] ... internationally
recognized worker rights" as
defined in the GSP (§
3202(c)(7), (d)(8)).
Includes GSP worker rights






Restriction will not apply if the Restriction witl not apply if the Restriction will not apply if the
t President finds and reports to President finds and reports to President determines and
Congress that bestowal of Congress that bestowal of reports to Congress that
preferences is "in the national preferences is "in the national bestowal of preference
Waiver ,economic or security interest of economic or security interest of designation "will be in the
the United States" (§ 2702(b)). the United States" (§ 3702(c)). national economic interest of
the United States" (§ 2466a
__(a)(l)(B)).
Requires biennial reports to
Congress on country status (§
2702(f)(1)).
Requires report to Congress in
2001 on country status (§ 3702
(f)).
Requires r'resient to monitor,




requirements (§ 3705, § 2466a
(a)(2)).




I Title & Citation
Includes GSP worker rights,
including worst forms of child







Opportunity Act, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 3703, 2466a (2000)
Authorizes tariff preferences to
sub-Saharan African countries
that have established or are
making progress toward
establishing mle of law,
political pluralism, the right to
due process, a fair trial, and
equal protection; establishing
protection of the GSP
internationally recognized
worker rights; and are not
engaging in gross violations of
internationally recognized
human rights and cooperate in
international efforts to
eliminate human rights
violations (§ 3703(a), §
2466a(a)(1)).
Includes internationally
recognized human rights; GSP
worker rights (excluding worst
forms of child labor).
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Jackson-Vanik (MFN) Amendment to Generalized System of
e & Citation the Trade Act of 1974, Preferences(GSP),
19 U.S.C. § 2432 (2000) 19 U.S.C. §§ 2462, 2464,2467
Bars most-favored-nation treatment (now Requires the President to withhold GSP
"normal trade relations") and 1 tariffpreferences from any developing
credit/investment assistance to communist country that "is not taking steps to afford [its
erative Provisions countries if the President determines that the workers] internationally recognized worker
country denies its citizens the freedom to I rights" or "has not implemented its
emigrate (§ 2432(a)(1)). commitments to eliminate the worst forms of






Act focuses on emigration policies but also
considers country's record on "fundamental
human rights" (§ 2432(a)).
President may waive the Act's operation
annually if he determines and reports to
Congress that waiver will substantially
promote the purposes of the Act or if the
foreign government provides assurance that
its emigration practices will improve (§
2432(c), (d)).
Requires the President to report annually to
Congress that the nation is not violating
freedom of emigration (§ 2432(b)).
includes freedom ot association, the nghts to
organize and bargain collectively, forced
labor, child labor under a certain age,
minimum acceptable employment
conditions, and worst forms of child labor (9
2467(4), (b)).
1 Worst forms of child labor defined as
slavery or practices similar to slavery,
including sale or trafficking of children, debt
bondage, serfdom, forced or compulsory
labor, including compulsory recruitment for
armed conflict; use of a child for prostitution
or pomogrsphy; use of a child for illicit
activities (esp. drug trafficking); and work
which is likely to harm the child's health,
safety, or morals (§ 2467(6)).
Restriction will not apply if the President
i determines and reports to Congress that GSP
I designation "will be in the national
1 economic interest of the United States" (§
2462(b)(2)(H)).
Requires the President to submit an annual
report to Congress on the status of
intemationally recognized worker rights in
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TRADE RESTRICTIONS
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U.S. TariffAct, § 307 1 Trade Act of 1974, § 301 Government Procurement
Title & Citation 19U.S.C.§ 1307 (2000) 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2000) Exec. Order13,126,64
Fed. Reg. 32,383 (1999)
Bars importation of goods |Authorizestheimpositionof Prohibits federal agencies
made with forced, indentured, trade restrictions in response from purchasing goods made
convict labor, or forced or to unreasonable tade with forced or indentured
indentured child labor, practices by a foreign state, child labor. Does not apply to
Operative Provisions including engaging in a goods from countries party to
persistent pattern of conduct NAFTA or the WTO
that denies the GSP worker Agreement on Government
rights (§ 241 l(d)(3)(B)(IV) Procurement
_____________________________ (iii)). ________
Includes forced, indentured, Includes GSP worker rights Includes forced or indentured
and convict labor. (not including worst forms of child labor.
Rights Targeted child labor).
"Forced labor" is defined as Forced or indentured child
"all work or service which is labor is defined as "all work
exacted from any person or service (I) exacted from
under the menace of any any person under the age of
penalty for its 18 under the menace of any
nonperformance and for penalty for its
Definitions / which the worker does not 
nonperformance and for
International S offer himself voluntarily." which the worker does not
offer himself voluntarily; or
(2) perfonned by any person
under the age of 18 pursuant
to a contract the enforcement
of which can be
accomplished by process or
__,_.. .. _penalties."
Waiver
1 Requires report within two
I years of implementation to
Reporting Requirements Office of Management and
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International Emergency Export Administration Act of 1979,
Title & Citation Economic Powers Act (IIEPA), 50 U.S.C. App. §l2401-2420 (1994)
50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (2000)
Authorizes imposition of broad Authorizes the President to impose export
economic sanctions, including controls on goods or technology for
restricting currency, trade, and reasons of foreign policy, national
freezing foreign assets, if the security, or short supply, and to fulfill
Operative Provisions President finds that a national U.S. international obligations (§ 2401, §
I emergency exists that threatens U.S. 2404, § 2405(a)(1)).
national security, foreign policy, or
the U.S. economy (§ 1701, § 1702
(a)(1)).
None specified. Has been used for None specified. Has been used for human





President shall consult with and President must consult with and report to
report to Congress periodically Congress regarding actions taken (§ 2405
Reporting Requirements regarding the exercise of authorities (0).
under the Act (1703).
Directs State Dept. to consult with other
International Consultation / countries to obtain foreign support for
Multilateralism U.S. export control policies (§ 2404(k)).
I. The EAA lapsed in 1994, and the President currently sustains EAA restrictions through
his authority under IIEPA.
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Cuban Liberty &
Democracy Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996,
Pub. L. 104-114, 110 Stat.
785 (1996) (codified at 22
U.S.C. § 6021, et seq.
(2000) (Helms-Burton)
Bars private or public loans or
credit to any person to finance
a transaction involving
property confiscated from U.S.
nationals (§ 6033(a)); requires
U.S. to oppose Cuban
memberahip in IFIs and the
OAS and to withhold funding
from IFIs that approve
assistance to Cuba (§ 6034(a),
(b), § 6035).
i Authorizes suits by U.S.
nationals against persons who
traffic in confiscated property
(§ 6082).
Bars entry visas to aliens who








Expresses U.S. obligation to
promote human rights as
expressed in the U.N. Charter
and the Universal Declaration
(§ 6021(9)), invokes U.N.
Human Rights Commission
reports and General Assembly
resolutions condemning
Cuban human rights situation.
(§ 6021(20),(22)), right of
multilateral intervention under




Pub. L. No. 106-286, 114
Stat. 880 (2000)
Removes Cina fro MUN
review and establishes normal




with human rights (§ 302).
Establishes task force to
promote effective enforcement
of 19 U.S.C. § 1307
prohibiting importation of
products of forced or prison
labor from China (§§ 501-
505).
Includes rights to free
expression, assembly,




freedom of employment, and
protection from torture, cruel
or unusual punishment,
arbitrary arrest or detention (§
302(a)).
Emphasis on rights contained
in the ICCPR and Universal





V Federal Burma Act, Pub. L
No. 104-208, § 570, 110
Stat. 3009-166 (1996)
Bars foreign assistance (other
than humanitarian, anti-
narcotics, and human rights) to
Burma and entry visas to
Burmese government officials,
and instructs U.S. to oppose IFI
assistance to Burma until
President certifies to Congress
that Burma "has made
I measurable and substantial




, Authorizes President to bar new
investment to Burma if he finds
and certifies to Congress that
the government of Burma has
acted against Aung San Suu
Kyi or committed large-scale
repression against the





(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996,
Title & Citation Pub. L. 104-114, 110 Stat.
785 (1996) (codified at 22





determination to Congress that
a transition government is in
power, taking into
consideration a wide range of
human rights concerns,
including Cuba's compliance
with the Universal Declaration
and ILO conventions
Waiver regarding free association (§
6064(a), § 6065(a)(6)).
President may suspend private
right of action under § 6082
for 6-month periods upon
finding and reporting to
Congress "that the suspension
is necessary to the national
interests of the United States
and will expedite a transition
to democracy in Cuba" (§
6085(b)).
President must report annually
to Congress regarding foreign






Pub. L. No. 106-286, 114
Stat. 880 (2000)
Federal Burma Act, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 570, 110
Stat. 3009-166 (1996)
President may waive the
mandatory or conditional
sanctions if he finds and
certifies to Congress that the
sanction would be contrary to







hearings on the report (§
302(g), (i)).
Requires biannual reports to
Congress on human rights
conditions in Burma, including
living standards, labor
standards, and use of forced
labor (§ 570(d)).
Encourages President to obtain
foreign compliance with U.S.
embargo, (§ 6032(a)(1)), and
with transition to democracy
(§ 6062(e)).
Task force shall report
annually to Congress
regarding violations of§ 1307
(§ 505).
Requires President to seek to
develop a comprehensive,
multilateral strategy with
Burma's trading partners to
I improve democracy and human
_rights in Burma (§ 570(c)).
Norm Internalization and Economic Sanctions 101
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Title & Citation International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. § 6401, et seq. (2000)
Requires the President to identify countries violating or engaging in particularly severe
violations of religions freedom and to impose a range of sanctions or to enter into an agreement
with the country (§ 6441(b)(1), § 6442(a)(2)).
Authorizes imposition of a range of sanctions, including diplomatic reprimand, withholding of
diplomatic visits, withholding of non-humanitarian foreign assistance or investment guarantees,
Operative Provisions votes to deny assistance in international financial institutions, export restrictions, and other
actions (§ 6445(a)). The Act also bars entry visas to foreign officials who have engaged in
particularly severe violations ofreligions freedom (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(G)).
Restricts exports of crime control equipment under the Export Admin. Act if technology is
directly used to carry out particularly severe violations of religious freedom (§ 6461).
Religions freedom
Rights Targeted
"Violations of religions freedom" as set forth in the Universal Declaration (art. 18), ICCPR (art.
18(a)), Helsinki Accords, the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and
Discrimination Based on Religion, the U.N. Charter, and the European Convention for Human
Rights, including arbitrary prohibitions, restrictions, or punishment for religious assembly,
speech, changing one's beliefs and affiliation, possession and distribution of literature, and
raising of children, or detention, interrogation, fines, forced labor or mass resettlement,
Definitions /imprisonment, forced religious conversion, beating, torture, mutilation, rape, enslavement,
International Standards murder and execution (§ 6401(a)(2)-(3), § 6402(13)).
"[P]articularly severe violations of religions freedom" means systematic, ongoing, egregious
violations, including torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, prolonged detention
without charges, disappearance, or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the
security of persons (§ 6402(11)).
Waiver of sanctions is authorized if the President reports to Congress and waiver would further
Waiver the purposes of the Act or promote U.S. national security (§ 6447(a)).
International religions freedom practices to be included in the State Dept. Country Reports
under § 116 & 502B of the Foreign Assstance Act of 191 (641z(a)); also requt separate
Reporting Requirements annual report to Congress on religions freedom (6412(b)). President must report to Congress
regarding countries found responsible for particularly severe violations of religions freedom (§§
6442(b)(3), 6444)).
Requires President to consult with foreign governments prior to taking action (§ 6443(b)), and
to make every reasonable effort to enter binding bilateral agreements to protect religious
International freedom (6441(c)(1)(C)).
Consultation I
Multilateralism Requires U.S. embassies to maintain a consistent reporting standard, to thoroughly investigate
reports ofviolations of religious freedom, and to maintain contacts with religious and human
rights NGOs (§ 6412(c)(1)).
